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Abstract 
Existing studies of the career of Anthony Crosland have been biographical in emphasis or have 
concentrated on Crosland as a theoretician. This thesis will endeavour to examine his record as 
a minister and relate his conduct of ministerial office to his political principles and the wider 
political circumstance of the time. Crosland’s attempts to frame and successfully deliver 
departmental policy based on his socialist agenda will be evaluated at the conclusion of the 
study of each ministry. 
This thesis will be structured around Crosland’s progression through the five ministerial 
posts that he held in the Labour administrations of Harold Wilson (1964-70 and 1974-76) and 
of James Callaghan (1976-77). In so doing more attention will be paid to policy areas which 
have not attracted much scrutiny even in the two major biographical studies. In particular, I 
have made greater use of archive material at the National Archives to shed more light on the 
following areas under Crosland’s administration: the diversity of the Board of Trade activities; 
regional impact of policies at the Board and the Department of Environment; environmental 
concerns in the 1970s; and foreign policy decisions in central and southern Africa.  
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Introduction 
Theoretician as Minister  
In a tribute to the departing Prime Minister David Cameron in June 2016 the Conservative MP 
and former cabinet minister Peter Lilley spoke of Cameron as a politician ‘driven by legitimate 
ambitions and ideas’. For some politicians, theory and its application to their political life have 
taken a much more significant role as a motivation. Two examples can provide some 
illustration of the record of recognised theoreticians in office. Arthur James Balfour’s career 
totalled nearly thirty-five years and included one term as Prime Minister (1902-5). His 
philosophical ideas have proved a durable legacy. He published two volumes on philosophy: 
The Defence of Philosophical Doubt (London, Macmillan, 1879) and The Foundations of Belief 
(London, Longmans, 1895). In these he challenged the idea that human reason could determine 
truth, asserting that the propositions of science were no more susceptible to rational proof than 
were those of religion.1 Winston Churchill, a colleague, considered that this continual 
intellectual analysis of issues impeded progress in government. ‘If you wanted nothing done, 
AJB was undoubtedly the best man for the job. There was no one to equal him’.2 
 Crosland was one of the leading theoreticians of the Labour party in the 1960s and 
1970s and Keith Joseph contributed much to Conservative ideas in the period.  He was regarded 
by Margaret Thatcher as a colleague, friend and ‘mentor’ who helped her to bring her 
conservative instincts ‘into a coherent framework of ideas or into a set of practical policies of 
government’.3 Together they established a ‘think tank’, the Centre for Policy Studies in 1974. 
                                                          
1 For a study of Balfour’s career and ideas see RJQ Adams, Balfour: The Last Grandee (London, John Murray, 
2007). One writer on the Victorians described him as a ‘Philosopher among politicians and a politician among 
philosophers’. Piers Brendon, Eminent Edwardians (London, Secker and Warburg, 1979), p.77. 
2 Quoted in Brendon, Edwardians, p. 115. 
3  Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (New York, Harper /Collins, 1993), p. 14. 
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This was a free market British policy ‘think tank’ whose aim was to promote coherent and 
practical public policy, to roll back the state, reform public services and resist threats to 
Britain’s independence.4 Crosland was an active member of the Fabian Society but in addition 
to the advice of permanent civil servants, relied on his own economic advisers in government 
and was not dependent on the work of research institutes. A comparison with Crosland is 
appropriate in the context of theoreticians in ministerial office especially as they were 
contemporaries. Both were prolific writers who provided publications reflecting the 
development of their ideas often while in office.5 Finally, while both were disappointed in their 
ambition to become Chancellor, they were appointed to super-ministries, the product of the 
amalgamation of smaller discrete departments: the Department of Health and Social Security 
for Joseph in 1970 and the Department of the Environment for Crosland in 1974 To that extent 
both reflected the increasing reach of the state (in Joseph’s opinion, an over-reach). 
The record of Joseph’s work as Secretary of State at the Department of Education and 
Science reveals much of the competing and conflicting priorities when in office of those who 
were regarded as theoreticians. In one study of Joseph in 1989, it was claimed that Joseph saw 
too many sides of every problem to be a decisive minister.6 When faced with the continued 
level of subsidy required to sustain production at British Leyland, Joseph prevaricated, ignoring 
the importance of party considerations even though many Conservative MPs represented the 
                                                          
4 See Andrew Denham and Mark Garnett, Keith Joseph (Chesham (Bucks), Acumen, 2001), p. 240. Think tanks 
were organisations and institutes for research and advocacy of policy especially in social, political and economic 
fields. Most were non-profit organisations, although some received government funding.  
5 The following principal works of Keith Joseph were published by the Conservative Party Centre: Automation 
and the Consumer (1956); The Responsible Society (1959), Caring for People (1972) and Equality (1979). He 
also produced a series of pamphlets on economic issues published by Conservative Party Studies: The Economics 
of Freedom (1975), Monetarism is not enough (1976) and The Conditions for Fuller Employment (1978). 
6 See Maurice Halcrow, Keith Joseph: A Single Mind (London, Macmillan, 1989). 
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West Midlands. Michael Edwards, the Chairman of British Leyland at the time, summarised 
Joseph’s dilemma when faced with the issue of future government financial intervention: ‘He 
may change his mind, but I’m prepared to argue that he will only do so if he is persuaded by 
the intellectual case put to him’.7  A senior minister is recorded as stating that he was a 
‘marvellous man but a terrible politician’.8 Joseph stimulated a level of expectation which was 
difficult to control according to his officials at the DES. The attempted introduction of a 
voucher system into educational provision illustrated this weakness. Joseph was initially 
attracted to the idea; but eventually he became aware of the practical problems of introducing 
such a scheme: – complex legislation, the alienation of teacher unions and departmental unease 
and thus he abandoned the attempt.9 At the Department of Industry the conflict between 
principle and pragmatism was repeated. His officials at the Department were given a reading 
list of nearly thirty books; it was the normal practice they felt, to offer advice to the incoming 
minister as opposed to enduring academic seminars.10 Joseph found that he had no alternative 
but to act against his stated principles because economic conditions were far worse than he 
expected.11 He realised that West German economic success was often based on government 
subsidies and he felt compelled to advance another one billion pounds to rescue British 
Leyland; but then reversed his decision in cabinet.12  
                                                          
7 Ibid, p.148. 
8 Oliver Letwin, quoted in Denham and Garnett, Joseph, p. 372. 
9 Ibid, p.372. 
10 Ibid, p.334. 
11 Ibid, p.340. Peter Hennessy also noted the conflict between Joseph’s philosophy and the practicalities of 
administrating these policies while at the DTI. Hennessy observed that Joseph, a genuinely humane man, ‘could 
not let companies - state or private - which were wheeled into his casualty ward, simply be shunted towards the 
mortuary’. Peter Hennessy, Whitehall (London, Jonathan Cape, 1995), p. 432. 
12 Ibid, pp. 339-41. 
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Although Joseph serves as a comparator with Crosland as a theoretician who occupied 
cabinet office, he failed to enjoy such an extended ministerial career. In fact, those who have 
been recognised as contributing substantially to political theory have rarely also occupied any 
of the three great offices of state. Both Nye Bevan and Enoch Powell were seen as potential 
leaders but never achieved that position, although Bevan’s institutional legacy has been 
permanent. Those regarded as intellectuals but not ideologues have had more success in 
political life. Of Crosland’s contemporaries, Roy Jenkins and Denis Healey were admired for 
their intellectual ability and this quality enabled them to tackle the considerable financial 
problems they faced as chancellors. Michael Foot and Hugh Gaitskell were also intellectuals 
who became leaders of their parties. Gordon Brown was the only party leader and Prime 
Minister to hold a Doctorate, but he is not generally regarded as a theoretician. Jim Callaghan 
admitted to a lack of intellectual self-confidence. His boast that he was the first Prime Minister 
since the war not to have attended university may even have appealed to the electorate who 
were not generally attracted to theoreticians or ideologues as leaders. The most successful 
premiers since the war have been those who have been able to master the skill of party 
management and public presentation. Harold Wilson, a first-class mathematician, presented 
himself skilfully in the media as an approachable figure. Margaret Thatcher’s political demise 
stemmed from an inflexible determination to persevere with the imposition of the ‘poll tax’ in 
the face of overwhelming popular opposition to this fiscal measure. 
 Crosland was a rare example of a theoretician whose ideas are still discussed and had 
a significant ministerial career although he never achieved the leadership of the party. His 
failure to succeed in party elections was probably a result of an inability and reluctance to gain 
a sufficient following within the party, even though he was advised to lobby support to achieve 
his ambitions. With the aid of these comparative studies of theoreticians who have played a 
role in government, I intend to examine Crosland’s record in the five ministerial positions that 
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he held as head of the departments to which he was appointed, and his success or otherwise in 
applying his ideas to the business of government while managing the limitations imposed by 
office and the political and economic circumstances of the time. 
 
Historiography 
Crosland died in 1977 while Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 
Leading the tributes in the Commons, the Prime Minister Jim Callaghan said of his colleague 
and friend that he was ‘gifted beyond the reach of many of us’. It was his intellectual abilities 
and his contribution to the debate concerning the development of the Labour movement that 
have been the main focus for studies of his career. Consequently, the majority of the published 
material on Crosland since his death has concentrated on his role as political theoretician. In 
the late 1990s a more nuanced view on his role as theoretician and the relationship of his ideas 
to New Labour appeared. The Crosland Memorial Meeting took place in London on 13 
February 1997, the twentieth anniversary of his death. Many of his colleagues in government 
attended and delivered papers which were eventually published as a book in that year.13 One 
aspect of the conference was to examine how far the ideas of Tony Blair owed to Crosland. 
The most recent study of Crosland by Patrick Diamond concentrates on the relevance of his 
ideas on social democracy to the contemporary political world.14 Publications on his ministerial 
career are by comparison limited.  
In the wake of his death in 1977, those sympathetic to his ideas contributed to a review 
of them in a volume edited by his former adviser Dick Leonard.15 It was dedicated to his 
memory and sought to continue to promote these ideas, especially as the Labour party was in 
                                                          
13 Dick Leonard, (ed.) Crosland and New Labour (Basingstoke, MacMillan, 1999). 
14 Patrick Diamond, The Crosland Legacy: The Future of British Social Democracy (Bristol, Policy Press, 2016). 
15 Dick Leonard (ed.), The Socialist Agenda: Crosland’s Legacy (London, Jonathan Cape, 1981). 
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crisis and underwent a schism when four of his close colleagues, led by Roy Jenkins, left to 
form a new political party, the Social Democrats. The growing influence of those who favoured 
a traditional socialist programme convinced a minority of Labour MPs to leave and establish a 
party based on social democratic ideas.  Other writers were more critical of his legacy and 
viewed Crosland as part of a generation of politicians who failed to tackle the fundamental 
contemporary economic and social problems.16 With the election of New Labour under Tony 
Blair which some claimed to be a Croslandite party, Crosland’s ideas received renewed 
attention.17 Anthony Arblaster, ‘Anthony Crosland: Labour’s Last ‘Revisionist’’, Political 
Quarterly, Vol. 48, 1977, which examines the basic weaknesses in revisionism and the 
unpredicted development of British capitalism in the latter half of the twentieth century. Jeremy 
Nuttall examines a neglected aim of the Labour Party – the transformation of people into more 
caring, rational and sensitive citizens, and the extent Crosland’s writings reflect this: ‘The 
Labour Party and the Improvement of Minds: The Case of Tony Crosland’., The Historical 
Journal, Vol. 46, No. 1 (2003). Nuttall also attempts to place Crosland in the narrative of the 
decline of social democracy since the publication of The Future of Socialism in 1956: ‘Tony 
Crosland and the Many Falls and Rises of British Social Democracy’, Contemporary British 
History, Vol. 18, No. 4, Winter 2004. On this theme see also Stephen Meredith, ‘Mr Crosland’s 
Nightmare? New Labour and Equality in Historical Perspective’, British Journal of Politics 
and International Relations, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2006, 2006 and Kevin Hickson, ‘Reply to Stephen 
                                                          
16 See John Vaisey, In Breach of Promise: Five Men who Shaped a Generation (London, Weidenfeld and 
Nicholson,1983) and David Marquand, The Progressive Dilemma: From Lloyd George to Blair (London, Phoenix 
Giant, 1991). 
17 See: David Reisman, Anthony Crosland: The Mixed Economy (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1997); and D. Reisman, 
Crosland’s Future: Opportunity and Outcome (Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1997).    
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Meredith, ‘Mr Crosland’s Nightmare? New Labour in Perspective ‘, British Journal of Politics 
and International Relations, Vol. 9, No.1, 2007.  
Two biographies provide substantial studies of his work in the five ministerial positions 
he held between 1964 and 1977, those of his widow Susan Crosland (1982) and the historian 
Kevin Jefferys (1999).  Tony Crosland by Susan Crosland was published in 1982. It was an 
intimate account of their life together, but the emphasis was on his work as a theoretician and 
minister.18 It reflected relatively uncritically on her husband and his achievements throughout 
his political career. There are no references to sources and no bibliography. Susan Crosland 
was an accomplished journalist and states that her biography was ‘structured like a novel’ and 
that footnotes would have interrupted the flow.19  However, it provided a detailed survey of his 
work in all of the departments in which he served, and is especially strong on his periods as 
shadow Secretary of State for the Environment and on his twelve months at the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office. In spite of its obvious lack of impartiality, it is a valuable resource and 
it will be utilised throughout. Crosland, unlike his colleagues Tony Benn, Richard Crossman 
and Barbara Castle, did not keep a diary of political events and therefore Tony serves as a 
substitute for his personal and political observations. 
 In contrast, Kevin Jefferys’ biography of Crosland is an academic study in contrast to 
the memoir of Susan Crosland. To that extent it is more a political study and, therefore, he 
considered his work to be a ‘more detached’ account.20 Jefferys attempted to examine 
Crosland’s career in the context of the debates in Labour ranks over revisionism, attitudes to 
                                                          
18 Susan Crosland, Tony Crosland (London, Jonathan Cape, 1982). 
19 Ibid, Preface. 
20 Kevin Jefferys, Anthony Crosland (London, Richard Cohen Books, 1999), ix. Jefferys states that his work is 
neither ‘official’ nor an authorised biography although he records that Susan Crosland did not object to his project. 
Ibid, xvi. 
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Europe and the management of the economy. Jefferys’s biography is based primarily on the 
collection of Crosland Papers at the London School of Economics and on Crosland’s own 
writings. However, Jefferys does not use any other personal papers for example those of Jim 
Callaghan. (Those were particularly useful for insights into their working relationship when 
Crosland was appointed as Secretary of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in 
1976.) Jefferys’s study also draws heavily on material from the National Archives (formerly 
the Public Record Office). It was more critical of Crosland as Minister of State and Jefferys 
does provide a subjective assessment of his work in the Epilogue. As with the volume published 
by Susan Crosland, Jefferys’s biography provides the only substantive record of his work at 
the Board of Trade although it is somewhat brief and limited on foreign policy. 
The 1999 collection of essays (Crosland and New Labour) reflected on Crosland’s 
contribution both as theoretician and cabinet minister. This volume gave summative 
assessments of Crosland’s work at three departments which he led by those who worked closely 
with him as officials and advisers: Roy Hattersley, Chris Price, David Lipsey and Michael 
Palliser, amongst others. Although all admired Crosland, these are not uncritical accounts and 
they offer a useful interpretation of some of the key issues he tackled in education, environment 
and foreign affairs. In general, they recognised that there were inconsistencies in his thinking: 
he was determined to end segregation for secondary education but proposed a binary system 
for higher education and on transport policy his thinking was based predominantly on a 
simplistic interpretation of class usage.  The authors did agree that his most useful contribution 
was in reconciling equality and liberty, and in drawing a distinction between enduring values 
and transitory means. This volume of work was written a year into the first government of New 
Labour and therefore the authors were not in a position to comment on Tony Blair’s 
government and the possible incorporation of Crosland’s ideas. 
14 
 
 Appraisals of his work as a theoretician and cabinet minister have appeared in numerous 
volumes on significant figures in the Labour movement. In 1980, Gerald Kaufman provided a 
picture of Crosland as departmental head.21 Kenneth O. Morgan included a consideration of 
his impact on Labour thinking in his volume on Labour leaders in 1986.22 Raymond Plant 
contributed an essay on Crosland in a volume on important figures in the evolution of the 
Labour Party.23  This study concentrated on his intellectual contribution and his attempt to 
apply his ideas to his ministerial briefs. The Labour MP Giles Radice wrote a ‘comparative 
biography’ of Crosland, Denis Healey and Roy Jenkins in 2002.24 Radice, who became a 
Labour MP in 1973, admitted that these three were his political heroes and he considered that 
after the death of their mentor Hugh Gaitskell they became the leading revisionists and 
modernisers of the 1960s. They believed that Labour had to break with its nationalising 
tradition, adopt a less class- ridden approach and adjust its policies to accommodate changing 
conditions. In particular, Radice identified Crosland as the theoretician whose writings tried to 
show how a modified capitalism could be combined with a commitment to greater equality.25 
Radice believed that Crosland’s record at the Board of Trade was disappointing but that he was 
an innovative Education Secretary and a highly competent Environment Secretary.26  
 Assessments of Crosland’s work at the Department of Economic Affairs are to be found 
in the published material of those officials who were appointed to this department between 
                                                          
21 Gerald Kaufman, How to be a Minister (London, Sedgwick and Jackson, 1980). 
22 Kenneth O. Morgan, Labour People Leaders and Lieutenants: Hardie to Kinnock (Oxford, OUP, 1986), iii.       
23 Kevin Jefferys (ed.), Anthony Crosland, Labour Forces: From Ernest Bevin to Gordon Brown (London, I 
BTaurus, 2002). 
24 Radice, Giles, Friends and Rivals. Crosland, Jenkins and Healey (London, Abacus, 2003). 
25 Radice, Friends, p. 3. 
26 Radice, Friends, p. 268. 
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1964 and its dissolution five years later [Wilson considered that its functions could be best 
accommodated in other departments]. They were experienced in economic planning and 
produced, often contemporaneously, a series of articles and a memoir which explained the 
genesis of the department, its functions and its potential, in their opinion, for bringing direction 
to the national economy.27 The diary of Samuel Brittan gives a detailed insight into the daily 
business of the DEA and Crosland’s contribution to decisions made in 1964 and 1965.28 In his 
memoir, George Brown commented favourably on the working relationship that he had with 
Crosland as his deputy, although there is little on the details of Crosland’s work here.29 Later 
assessments by these officials recorded Crosland’s brief role in the department.30 Since 1997, 
more impartial academic assessments have been given which relate the existence of the DEA 
to the interest in indicative planning in the 1960s, and the legacy of this experiment in economic 
management.31 Andrew Blick placed the DEA in the broader context of the drive for planned 
                                                          
27 See Geoffrey Owen, ‘The Department of Economic Affairs An Experiment in Planning’, Political Quarterly , 
Vol. 36, Issue 4, 1965; Eric Roll, ‘The Machinery of Economic Planning: 1 The Department of Economic Affairs, 
Public Administration, Vol. 44, No. 1, 1966: Douglas Allen, The Department of Economic Affairs, Political 
Quarterly, Vol. 36, Issue 4, 1967. 
28 R Middleton (ed.), Inside the Department of Economic Affairs. Samuel Brittan: the Diary of an Irregular. 1964-
6. (Oxford, OUP, 2012). Samuel Brittan was an economic adviser appointed to the DEA. 
29 George Brown, In My Way, (London, Victor Gollancz, 1971). 
30 Eric Roll, Crowded Hours (London, Faber and Faber, 1985); Fred Catherwood, At the Cutting Edge (London, 
Faber and Faber,1995); and Donald MacDougall, ‘The Machinery of Economic Government: Some Personal 
Reflections’ in Albert Henry Halsey and David Butler (eds.), Policy and Politics: Essays in Honour of Norman 
Chester (London, Macmillan, 1978). 
31 See Chris Clifford, ‘The Rise and Fall of the Department of Economic Affairs 1964-1969: British Government 
and Indicative Planning’, Contemporary British History, Vol. 11, No.2, (Summer 1997) ; Chris Clifford and 
Alistair McMillan, ‘The Department of Economic Affairs’, Contemporary British History, Vol. 11, No. 2, (1997) 
; and James E Cronin, (2001), ‘Labour’s ‘.National Plan’.: Inheritances , Practices, Legacies. The European 
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economic growth which was central to the agenda of Wilson’s government following Labour’s 
triumph in 1964.32  
Crosland’s work at the Department of Education and Science has attracted most 
attention by historians and educationalists and has been a result of the continuing debate over 
educational standards. Crosland’s admission to his wife that ‘If it’s the last thing I do, I’m 
going to destroy every fucking grammar school in England and Wales and Northern Ireland’ 
is the phrase that has defined his work at the DES.33 Crosland was perceived as ideologically 
driven to end selection and determined to prevent the middle classes from engineering the 
eleven plus to their advantage.  Crosland reflected upon his work at the DES in a joint interview 
with Edward Boyle (former Conservative Educational Minister) and the educational writer 
Maurice Kogan in 197134 It is particularly useful for giving an insight into the relationship of 
Crosland as a Secretary of State with his officials and the local authorities following the issuing 
of the famous circular 10/65.  
  Callaghan was so concerned about the quality of learning and teaching in the state 
sector that he initiated a ‘Great Debate’ on Education at Ruskin College Oxford, in 1976.35 
                                                          
Legacy: Towards New Paradigms,Vol.6, No.2, pp. 215-232; Glen O’Hara ‘‘.Planned Growth of Incomes’’. or 
‘Emergency Gimmick’: The Labour Party, The Social Planners and Incomes Policy, 1964-70’, Economic History 
Review, Vol. 60, No.1, 2007 ; and O’Hara again, From Dreams to Disillusionment: Economic and Social Planning 
in 1960s Britain. (Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2006). 
32 Andrew Blick, ‘Harold Wilson, Labour and the Machinery of Government’, Contemporary British History, 
Vol. 20, No.3, September 2006. 
33 Susan Crosland, Tony, p.148. 
34 Maurice Kogan, The Politics of Education: Edward Boyle and Anthony Crosland in Conversation with Maurice 
Kogan (London, Penguin, 1971). 
35See James Callaghan, Time and Chance (Glasgow, Fontana /Collins, 1987), pp. 409-11 and Kenneth O Morgan, 
Callaghan A Life (Oxford, OUP, 1997), pp. 540-541. 
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However, educationalists and writers on the right were determined to preserve traditional 
standards and considered that these would be undermined by Crosland’s secondary school 
reorganisation. In 1969 two Black Papers were published which stated that the decline in 
educational standards was a product of progressive educational practices which flourished in 
the comprehensive school and blamed the Labour Government for this crisis. The authors of 
these papers were educationalists and writers such as Brian Cox, Rhodes Boyson and Kingsley 
Amis. The Labour Secretary of State for Education in 1969, Edward Short’, later condemned 
these papers as ‘scurrilous documents’ in a BBC programme (Comp, September 2005) for 
Radio Four, ‘The Blackest Day’. The Conservative governments of the 1970s were less 
committed to the phasing out of grammar schools and the debate continued into the 1980s and 
1990s and they often focused upon Crosland’s role in the accelerated move to comprehensive 
education. 
In the 1990s, with the apparent crisis in state education as reflected especially in the 
problems of the comprehensive school, several observers believed that Crosland’s reforms 
were in large measure, to blame. Ben Pimlott, in his biography of Harold Wilson, was critical 
of Crosland’s attempts at social engineering, which he believed restricted the advancement of 
the less privileged working class children.36 The views of journalist Peter Hitchens were 
representative of those who considered that Crosland and all those who followed him at the 
DES had subordinated ‘standards to ideology’.37 Two popular studies of the educational 
reforms of the 1960s, reviewed the controversy surrounding the comprehensive revolution and 
Crosland’s place in it. Andrew Marr gave an astute survey of Crosland’s contribution placing 
it in the broader context of educational developments – A History of Modern Britain (London, 
                                                          
36 Ben Pimlott, Harold Wilson (London, Harper/Collins, 1993) pp. 511-513. 
37 Peter Hitchens, The Abolition of Britain: the British Cultural Revolution from Lady Chatterley to Tony Blair 
(London, Quartet Books, 1999) p. 6. 
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Pan Books, 2008). Dominic Sandbrook was less forgiving of Crosland’s commitment to the 
abolition of the 11plus and selection in White Heat. A History of Britain in the Swinging Sixties 
(London, Abacus, 2007). By contrast, Shirley Williams, who was a minister in the DES under 
Crosland and an admirer of his ideas, defended his attempt to use education to achieve equality 
in society and wrote extensively on his reforms.38 
Several writers and educationalists such as Brian Simon and Clive Chitty who were 
committed to the ending of selection at eleven and championed the comprehensive, wrote about 
the growth of the comprehensive school and berated Conservatives for their attempts to retain 
the grammar school. Crosland’s failure to employ legislation in 1965 was heavily criticised by 
these authors. His role in secondary school reorganisation was recognised but his contribution 
to this significant educational reform was relegated compared to other ministers of state at the 
DES. Simon and Tony Benn made this case in 1970, believing that Crosland’s approach ‘by 
bark rather than bite’ favouring DES circular rather than legislation had resulted in a ‘failure 
to grasp the nettle impairing the momentum of the comprehensive movement.39 Clive Ponting, 
a former civil servant and historian of the Labour movement, argued that Crosland was building 
on the growing support for the comprehensive school both outside and inside parliament.  
Edward Boyle and Michael Stewart, who preceded Crosland at the DES, had already pressed 
                                                          
38 Shirley Williams, Climbing the Bookshelves: The Autobiography (London, Virago, 2009). 
39 Brian Simon and Tony Benn, Half Way There. Report on the British Comprehensive School Reform 
(Maidenhead, McGraw-Hill, 1970), pp,40-50. Also, see Brian Simon, Education and the Social Order 1940-1990 
(London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1991) and ‘The Politics of Comprehensive Reorganisation: A Retrospective 
Analysis’, History of Education, 1992, Vol 21, No 4, p.38; Clyde Chitty, The Education System Transformed, 
(Manchester, Baseline Books, 1992) and Clyde Chitty and John Dunford (eds.), State Schools: New Labour and 
the Conservative Legacy, (London, Woburn Press, 1999). 
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for the abolition of selection in secondary schooling before Crosland was appointed.40 Neither 
of the previous ministers were seen as theoreticians or who had made known in such publicised 
form their vehement opposition to selection and the grammar schools. Their approach was 
perceived as reformist rather than revolutionary and they therefore did not receive from 
supporters of comprehensives the criticism that was given to Crosland.  
The debate concerning progressive educational practices against more traditionally 
didactic ones, and the retention of the 11 plus and the grammar school as opposed to the 
comprehensive model, intensified during the 1990s. The Conservative governments under a 
succession of ministers at the DES – in particular, Keith Joseph (1981-86), Kenneth Baker 
(1986-89) and Kenneth Clarke (1990-92) - were determined to address the crisis in education 
that they believed was a result of the reforms of the Labour administrations of the 1960s. A 
series of articles appeared that attempted to remove the discussion away from sectarian lines 
and provide a more nuanced view of the political background to the issues. More recently, there 
have been attempts to achieve a ‘balanced’ view of the origins of the comprehensive school, 
especially with the ‘waning of interest’ in the comprehensive model and the growth in 
popularity of academies which are free of local authority control.  David Crook concluded that 
Crosland had been seeking to give the impression that the government was merely overseeing 
a grass-roots locally led democratic reform.41 
                                                          
40 See Clive Ponting, In Breach of Promise: Labour in Power 1964-70 (London, Penguin, 1989) and Michael 
Stewart, Life and Labour (London, Sidgwick and Jackson, 1982). 
41 David Crook, ‘Politics, Politicians, and the English Comprehensive Schools’, History of Education: Journal of 
the History of Education, Vol. 42, No. 3, 2013. See also Dennis Dean, ‘Circular 10/65 Revisited: The Labour 
Government and the ‘Comprehensive Revolution’ in 1964-1965’, Paedagogica Historica: International Journal 
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 Crosland’s reforms in higher education and the public schools have received very 
limited academic coverage. (By comparison, the history of the Open University has attracted 
far more interest.42 Crosland’s role was limited by his own admission and this thesis will not 
include a consideration of his role in this educational project.) Crosland decided to establish a 
‘binary system’ in higher education by establishing the Polytechnics and rejecting the Robbins 
Report of 1963 which had called for an expanded university sector to cater for all. This led to 
accusations that he was introducing segregation in this area of higher education while 
abolishing such a system at the secondary tier.43 Several writers supported the polytechnic 
innovation in the early 1970s basing their case often on mainly sociological grounds. They 
viewed the traditional universities as far too aloof and unable to cater for the demands of 
contemporary society. Polytechnics would help to liberate the educational system from their 
old class interest.44 A Young Fabian pamphlet praised his vision for the polytechnics as a means 
of establishing an institution which would concentrate on vocational courses and therefore 
leave the universities to continue to focus on academic research. They would be able to 
establish their own precedents and traditions.45 With the expansion of the universities and the 
absorption of the polytechnics after 1992, Crosland’s reform was seen in less favourable light.  
Peter Scott explained the new educational climate in which the pursuit of higher education was 
                                                          
42 See Patricia Hollis, Jenny Lee. A Life (Oxford, OUP, 1997) for the relationship between Crosland and Lee. See 
also Peter Dorey, ‘‘Well, Harold Insists on Having It!’ – The Political Struggle to Establish the Open University. 
1965-67’, Contemporary British History, Vol. 29, No 2. 
43 See C D Goodwin, ‘The Origin of the Binary System’, History of Education, Vol. 27. No.2, 1998. 
44 Malcolm Weir, ‘The Polytechnics: A Socialist Achievement’, Socialist Commentary, August 1970, p.13. See 
also Tyrrell Burgess, ‘A Policy for Higher Education’, New Statesman, 29 January 1971. 
45 Colin Crouch and Stephen Mennell, ‘The Universities: Pressures and Prospects’, Young Fabian Pamphlet, 
No.28, January 1972. 
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more market driven and where privatisation was an increasing factor.46 In regard to Crosland’s 
limited attempt to tackle the reform of the public schools, even Chris Price, Crosland’s private 
Secretary and an admirer, accepted that he did little more than appoint a Commission to 
examine ways to integrate boarding schools into the state system as promised in the Labour 
Manifesto in 1964.47 There is much scope to examine his attempt to tackle this area for no 
government since has shown any appetite to focus on this again. 
 Crosland’s two years as President of the Board of Trade (1967-69) have had little 
coverage although business leaders recognised his achievements when he left. The two 
standard biographies are the only substantial source for the details of his administration in this 
department. Crosland’s appointment to the Department of Local Government and Regional 
Planning and then Environment (as it was termed when he returned to office in 1974) has 
generated much consideration about his role as Secretary of State in this period of 
governmental change, but little on his record while there. The challenges of administering two 
departments was examined by William Plowden in 1970 during Crosland’s first year. William 
Plowden was an academic and civil servant who with Edward Heath founded the Central Policy 
Review Staff in 1971. This ‘think tank’ was designed to provide advice on strategy to the 
Cabinet.48  Labour’s return to power in 1997 renewed interest in its regional policy and this 
was explored by Janet Mather who examined the ambivalence of Labour’s interest in 
devolution of power while still retaining existing central government powers.49  Humphrey 
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48 ‘Riding Two Horses: The Crosland Ministry’, New Society, 1 January 1970.  
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Cole, an adviser to Crosland at the DOE and Bernard Donoghue who was a special adviser to 
Harold Wilson have both given not uncritical  assessments of his work at the Department of 
the Environment even though they praised Crosland’s efforts as Secretary of State.50 Ken 
Livingston a committed left-wing figure, admired Crosland’s determination to improve social 
conditions for the working classes in London and gave a useful account of Crosland’s support 
for his programmes for housing and campaign against the location of London Third Airport at 
Maplin.51 
In this thesis, perspectives on Crosland’s conduct in the two main issues that absorbed 
his attention in foreign affairs, namely Rhodesia and the Cod War rely on four main sources: 
the autobiographies of Callaghan and Henry Kissinger, the memoir of Susan Crosland and the 
biography of Crosland by Jefferys. Susan Crosland gave detailed accounts of her husband’s 
attempts to tackle the problem of Rhodesia and the crisis over Uganda. Jefferys’s study focuses 
on the achievements in these areas and is less concerned with narrative. Callaghan and 
Kissinger, in their memoirs, discuss Rhodesia and depict Crosland in a mainly supportive 
role.52 Kissinger’s memoir is particular detailed on his collaboration with Crosland in Southern 
Africa. Their biographers offer a more nuanced assessment.53 Icelandic historians have 
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provided recent assessments of Crosland’s intervention in the Cod War and his role in bringing 
it to a conclusion.54 John Prescott MP for Hull West and a former seaman and involved in 
previous negotiations, commented on Crosland’s role in his biography.55 
Crosland’s record as a shadow Minister of Environment 1970-74 is best covered in the 
two main biographies; but Patrick Bell devotes considerable space to Crosland’s contribution 
to the discussion surrounding potential policy objectives before the 1974 election.56 Bell also 
examined his role in opposing the Conservative Housing Finance Bill. Crosland’s opposition 
during the passage of this last bill and to Heath’s plans for an Airport at Maplin received a 
detailed treatment in the two standard studies of the life and career of Edward Heath by John 
Campbell and Philip Ziegler.57  
 
Sources. 
The objective of this thesis is to assess Crosland as minister. As such, most of the research is 
rooted in an examination of archival material. Any consideration and assessment of his work 
as minister will be reliant upon the two biographical studies published by Susan Crosland and 
Kevin Jefferys. Both provided a sound narrative of his departmental policies; but they are not 
detailed on certain areas, for example the Board of Trade and aspects of foreign policy.  
Archival material, especially that from The National Archives, has shed light on these areas. 
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The personal papers of Crosland (LSE, London) and Callaghan (Bodleian Library, 
Oxford) have been extensively used. Crosland had a long association with the Fabian Society 
which established the LSE. He was elected onto the executive committee in 1955 and provided 
lecture and pamphlets throughout out his career. Thus, the LSE became the location for the 
papers. Crosland’s papers are located in the archival section of the university and are a 
collection of his personal notes, typed records of aspects of departmental administration and 
material relevant to his career. These aide-memoirs made throughout Crosland’s political life 
compensate somewhat for the absence of published diaries which are available from his 
colleagues. As such Crosland’s handwriting presents certain problems of interrogation (a skill 
I have been able to master over time). The papers of George Brown were also to be found in 
the Bodleian Library. I decided that these would not be consulted for he gave extensive 
assessments of the contribution of Crosland to the work of the DEA in his memoir. During 
Crosland’s two years at the DES he received the Plowden Report in 1967. This was concerned 
with primary education. However, I considered that I would concentrate upon secondary and 
higher education and the issue of private schools in my thesis. Crosland showed little interest 
in the primary sector and therefore I would not consult the Plowden Papers although these are 
retained in the library of Newcastle University. 
 Crosland kept a series of ’Commonplace Books’ throughout his time in the army and 
political career. These are classed as ‘diaries, notes and note books’ in the LSE catalogue. In 
these he noted down his thoughts on colleagues and their behaviour and on matters brought to 
Cabinet on issues such as devaluation, government cuts in public expenditure and economic 
policy in general. Susan Crosland has utilised these in her biography. Specific departmental 
issues have little mention in these ‘books’. 
 The Crosland papers do contain several advisory notes by civil servants close to 
Crosland for example Wilma Harte at the DES, David Lipsey at the DOE and Michael Palliser 
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at the FCO. Particular helpful are the prolific notes made by Crosland on the transport review 
in 1976 and the personal briefing notes on the conduct of British foreign policy.  The entire 
archive of the Callaghan Papers was donated to the Bodleian by the Callaghan family to be 
available to scholars along those of Clement Attlee, Harold Wilson, and Harold Macmillan 
amongst other leading post-war leaders. The boxes on Callaghan’s personal involvement in 
African affairs have proved most valuable.  
Oral history was considered but presented major practical problems not least arranging 
a suitable date with figures who still pursue an active role in public life. Three contemporary 
figures of the 1960s and 1970s and ones still active in the political world are Shirley Williams, 
John Prescot and Roy Hattersley. They were all admirers of Crosland although not necessarily 
uncritical of his ministerial record. However, they have left detailed memoirs and 
commentaries with extensive comments on his career and therefore I felt that little additional 
material could be included in this thesis except for perhaps anecdotal evidence of a personal 
nature. Detailed appraisals of his ministerial record by officials in his departments - Christopher 
Price, Humphrey Cole, Michael Palliser - could be found in the volume on Crosland published 
in 1999 over three decades after his death.58 Therefore, it was considered that little more could 
be gained from these figures another twenty years on. 
The British Diplomatic Oral History Project conducted between 1998 and 2001 with 
senior officials in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office presents a personal view of 
Crosland’s co-operation with his civil servants. The project began in 1995 and is in its third 
decade. Interviews with retired officials are conducted often by former diplomats themselves 
and interviewees are encouraged to be as candid as possible often a result of the spontaneous 
nature of the one-to-one interview. Hence, they often reveal some of the unrecorded events of 
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diplomatic history of the twentieth century especially pertinent to Crosland’s time at the FCO. 
This project is designed to provide a unique source of raw material for historians. All material 
is retained at The Churchill Archives Centre in Cambridge although much is now available on 
line. 
Memoirs and diaries of the 1960 and 1970s are plentiful and provide a personal insight 
into Crosland’s relationship with his colleagues and his impact as a minister of state although, 
of course, these are less impartial than institutional and archive material. Tony Benn, Richard 
Crossman and Barbara Castle were colleagues and cabinet ministers who kept and later 
published diaries on the political events throughout the period of Crosland’s ministerial career. 
These diaries have the great virtue that the material was recorded within hours or at least days 
of the events covered. Richard Crossman dictated his material into a recording machine at the 
weekends. Crossman died in 1974 before publication of volume three and therefore his editor 
played a greater role than intended in the selection of material for this volume. They give a 
very personal account of cabinet meetings in particular and thus add more detail and 
interpretation than are available in the official Cabinet records. Comments on Crosland are 
often based on his performance in Cabinet rather than an assessment of his role as a minister. 
However, personal animosity between colleague and author must be taken into consideration 
as a limiting factor for the veracity of the events described. Barbara Castle was no admirer of 
Crosland although she did respect his knowledge of economics. Tony Benn however became 
a close friend of Crosland. Richard Crossman’s first diary was published in 1975 within one 
year of his death and followed a sustained legal battle to prevent publication by the then Labour 
government. The granting of this legal right enabled other ministers to publish their own diaries 
and memoirs with greater ease.  
Memoirs provide a more rounded view of the period rather than the detailed description 
of events as they occurred in the traditional diary format. However, the memoirs I have 
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consulted for this thesis were mostly compiled after the retirement of the author from 
mainstream political life as a minister and therefore lack the immediacy of diaries. There are 
exceptions. Wilson’s memoir appeared in 1970 and was an attempt to explain and justify 
governmental decisions of his first two administrations. Likewise, George Brown having 
finally resigned from the government on a permanent basis, published his memoir in 
1971.Those written by Crosland’s cabinet colleagues, in particular Benn, Callaghan, Jenkins, 
Healey, Stewart and Short appeared in the1980s and 1990s after their retirement from 
government. In these volumes, authors have the opportunity to explain the background to 
decisions. In their memoirs, they are often able to respond to criticisms in print made by 
colleagues or political commentators. 
Press coverage offers another significant source for contemporary opinion of a 
minister’s performance while in office. Editorials provide an assessment of a minister’s record; 
but these usually reflect the political persuasion of that paper and the party allegiance favoured 
by their reading public. Crosland found support in general from the Guardian and Observer – 
the Times and Telegraph were more ambivalent. Although Crosland was a leading theoretician 
of the left, the press appeared willing to assess his ministerial decisions impartially.  
The detailed interview with Edward Boyle conducted by Maurice Kogan in 1971 on 
educational reform and the functioning of the DES in the 1960s and 1970s has provided the 
relevant material and therefore, consulting the Boyle Papers housed in Leeds University was 
considered to be unnecessary. Civil servants and officials have left accounts and diverse 
appraisals of his work: Bernard Donoghue, Fred Catherwood, Donald MacDougall and Eric 
Roll.59 Much of the detailed factual material on Crosland’s attempt to modernise areas of 
industrial and commercial life while at the BOT and the DOE – the textile industry in 
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Lancashire, the domestic tourist trade and the aero industry – can be found in the press reports 
of the period.  
The majority of information on Crosland’s departmental work is to be found in the 
official government records in the National Archives in Kew. Because of the abundant nature 
of these papers, I have had to select departmental issues which I considered relevant, 
contentious and ones which would reflect his personal interest. In particular the following have 
received detailed treatment; educational selection at eleven, higher educational reform, reform 
of independent schools, regional development, environmental issues, textiles and tourism, 
transport and housing policy, central and southern Africa (Rhodesia) and the dispute with 
Iceland. Other diverse areas will be omitted. 
Other official sources have proved invaluable when examining Crosland’s comments 
both in Cabinet and Parliament. Although, according to Tony Benn, Crosland could be 
annoyingly reticent when asked to contribute to Cabinet discussion, his memoranda in the 
relevant minutes on specific issues could be highly illuminating. Crosland’s appraisal of a 
situation and the possible options available for a resolution offer a detailed view of his thinking. 
The official record of parliamentary business, Hansard, gives a picture of the public 
presentation of policy by Crosland, especially in conjunction with the Cabinet discussion 
beforehand. Reactions by MPs have been used to illustrate the impact of decisions and 
initiatives when announced in the Commons by Crosland. 
The reception of Crosland’s departmental policies and decisions within the party are 
sourced mainly from the records of party conferences both in government and opposition. 
Crosland’s contributions are infrequent for he was never elected to the national executive; but 
major statements on foreign policy were given in debate as well as his contributions on 
economic matters (devaluation, public expenditure) which are also to be found in the meetings 
of the Parliamentary Labour Party.   
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Ministerial Careers: A methodology for assessment. 
The assessment of the effectiveness of a minister’s record in office can be based upon a 
multitude of criteria. A useful assessment model of the various roles undertaken by a cabinet 
minister was offered in a study published in the year 2000: ‘Re-Assessing the Role of 
Department Cabinet Ministers’ by David Marsh, David Richards, and Martin J. Smith.60 
Following extensive research and interviews with ministers and civil servants, they identified 
and compiled the assessment format below selecting four generic roles. 
Policy                      Political             Executive or Managerial          Public Relations                               
*agenda setting       *advocacy of         *departmental management         *overseeing department’s  
*policy initiation    department’s      *executive decision taker            relations with 
*policy selection    position in                                                              *interests groups  
*policy                  * parliament/ party.                                                 *public 
 Legitimisation      *EU                                                                         *media. 
                              *Cabinet 
In this thesis I shall base my evaluation of Crosland’s record while in ministerial office upon 
this model as far as it is applicable. In terms of the ‘policy’ role, a distinction is drawn between 
ministers who aim to change the agenda of the department and those who accept the broad 
policy inherited and aim only to select or prioritise certain features of the departmental line. 
For some ministers the objective would be merely to legitimise policies presented by their civil 
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servants or, as the authors state, admit to be fundamentally ‘a mandarin minister’.61 Judgement 
of a ministers record of representing his department in Cabinet, party and parliament is also 
identified as a crucial feature of his or her performance. The increasing significance of Europe 
especially from the 1970s and the minister’s impact in this arena is also stressed as an addition 
to the traditional roles. Likewise, the increasing pressure of successfully responding to the 
demands of public scrutiny in the 1960s and 1970s is noted. Finally, the extent to which a 
minister is able to manage departmental personnel and act as a proactive executive of that 
ministry should be considered as a component of any assessment. 
Anthony Crosland was given ministerial responsibility at a time of significant change 
for government policy in education, the environment, economic direction and our relations with 
Europe and our remaining imperial obligations in southern Africa. In the conclusion, I shall 
examine his legacy in these key areas. He was to play a leading role in the newly created 
Department of Economic Affairs an attempt to plan economic change on a more rational basis 
especially tackling the perennial problem of the balance of payments. As Secretary of State at 
the Department of Education and Science he would be faced with the growing discontent with 
segregation in the secondary school sector a product of the eleven plus exam; and the pressing 
need for reform of both higher education and the independent schools. Industrial decline, 
especially in the north and Wales, and the possible solutions to the social and economic 
problems created would fall under his remit as President of the Board of Trade and as minister 
for Local Government and Regional Development (1969), a responsibility which he retained 
also as Secretary of State for the Environment (1974-1976). Growing concern for the impact 
of urban and economic development on the environment became central to the rationale 
underpinning the environmental brief especially as transport and housing were amalgamated 
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in this ministry. During his brief tenure as Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Crosland 
was to be faced with conflict with Iceland over fishing rights and the future of Rhodesia. His 
policy here would be one of many attempts by ministers at the FCO to bring a resolution to this 
decade long crisis in southern Africa. 
 
Following the election in 1964 of a Labour government after fourteen years, Crosland received 
his first ministerial appointment in the newly constructed Department of Economic Affairs. He 
was given the title of Economic Secretary and was deputy to George Brown. This did not carry 
with it a Cabinet seat but provided him with an opportunity to formulate and administer 
economic policy. The next chapter of this thesis will examine Crosland’s record for the four 
months he remained there. 
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Chapter One: Economic Secretary to the Department of Economic Affairs 
(October 1964 – January 1965) 
 
Keep up the momentum on prices and incomes…start a new momentum on restrictive 
practices and the wasteful use of labour…and naturally push on with all our DEA 
prodding and planning and bullying.1  
 
 The Department of Economic Affairs was an administrative innovation established by Harold 
Wilson in 1964 but one that did not last. Crosland was appointed its first Economic Secretary 
and Deputy to George Brown between October 1964 and January 1965. This chapter will 
examine several issues: the origins of the DEA; its relationship with the Treasury; Crosland’s 
role and the working relationship with George Brown; and his contribution to the issues of the 
balance of payments, export drive, enhanced productivity and prices and incomes, all of which 
were the responsibility of this new department.  
 
The Birth of the Department of Economic Affairs. October 1964 
Wilson believed that economic planning and control could bring stability to the economy by 
eliminating the ‘stop-go’ nature of growth under the Conservatives during the previous thirteen 
years. The Labour Manifesto for 1964 had warned of further Conservative economic 
uncertainty for ‘successive Conservative Chancellors have been unable to get the economy 
moving steadily forward. Every jerk of expansion has ground to a full stop as the Government 
jams on the brake in an attempt to combat inflation and rising prices’.2  Although the DEA was 
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rumoured to have been born in the back of a taxi in a discussion between Brown and Wilson 
before the 1964 election, there was a much longer gestation period. Wilson himself referred to 
this ‘rumour’ in his memoir in 1971, stating that the ‘legend’ was not true. ‘It was in that taxi, 
however, that I first suggested to him that the right job for him would be Secretary of State for 
Economic Affairs’.3  Brown supported this interpretation of the taxi ride in his memoirs: ‘That 
is the origin of the much-told story that the DEA was born in taxi – true, but by no means the 
whole truth. From then on the establishment of the DEA became a settled part of the official 
Labour policy’. 4 Brown became chairman of the Home Policy Committee of the Labour Party 
in 1963 and he stated in his memoirs that the creation of a separate department devoted to 
planning was central to discussions. ‘Out of this kind of thinking grew the idea that it would 
be better to have an economic department which (as I saw it) would be superior to the Treasury 
in determining the country’s economic priorities’.5 One authority on the period commenting 
on the story of the significance of the taxi journey stated that the account stemmed from a 
commonly-held belief that the British reshaped their constitutions on the back of envelopes.6 
A recent popular study of the Labour governments between 1964 and 1970 has again drawn 
attention to the ad hoc nature of the formation of the DEA. 7  
   The adoption of planning on a large scale was seen increasingly as a necessity during 
the First World War, and then an alternative solution to the crisis of the Depression. Planning 
                                                          
3 Harold Wilson, A Personal Record. The Labour Government 1964-1970 (London, Little, Brown and Company, 
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4 George Brown, In My Way. Memoirs (London, Victor Gollanz, 1971), p 97. 
5 Ibid.  
6 Peter Hennessy, Whitehall (London, Fontana Press, 1990), p.182. 
7 Andrew Marr, A History of Modern Britain (London, Pan Books, 2008), p. 243. 
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became an essential element in the strategy of total war between 1939 and 1945.8 Attlee 
introduced a measure of planning with the establishment of the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
(MEA) in 1947. Attlee offered this new post to Stafford Cripps a post which conveyed huge 
powers over trade, exports and production.9 The circumstances of Cripps’s appointment were 
not dissimilar to those of George Brown in 1964. Both were senior Labour figures and were 
given control of economic policy through separate departments created as a means of utilising 
their unique abilities and as recognition of their status in the party.10 Cripps was willing to 
collaborate with private industry rather than to coerce or threaten it. However, planning in 
Cripps’s view, related primarily to the domain of consumption rather than to production, and 
rather than relying on direct planning, his main instrument lay in management through the 
budget and the command of capital movements.11 In fact, according to Kenneth Morgan, 
Cripps’s planning resembled not so much state socialism but something resembling the co-
ordination of public and private activity that characterized Roosevelt’s New Deal in 1930s 
America.12 This ministerial innovation only lasted for six weeks for Cripps was appointed as 
Chancellor of the Exchequer in November 1947 following Hugh Dalton’s sudden resignation 
as Chancellor. The short duration of the life of the MEA had illustrated the inevitable confusion 
in roles between such a department and the Treasury. The ambiguity about Cripps’s role led to 
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conflict with the Treasury.13 This ‘conflict’ was repeated in the subsequent attempts to 
construct such a department and was a major factor explaining the short duration of the 
administrative experiment. Hugh Gaitskell occupied a similar role for eight months in 1950 
and Churchill created a ministry for economic development for Arthur Salter from 1951 to 
1952.  
The Conservatives under Macmillan also favoured an element of planning after the 
disappointing performance of the economy during the 1950s. Macmillan brought employers 
and unions into a partnership with government when he established the National Economic 
Development Council (popularly referred as NEDDY) in 1961. This council was a tripartite 
organisation of government, business and trade union representatives and had its own 
secretariat. From the start, it was concerned with the search for an agreed strategy for economic 
growth in order to arrest Britain’s relative economic decline. This corporatist organisation was 
modelled on the French Economic and Social Council and represented the centrist ideas 
formulated by Macmillan in his book The Middle Way published in 1938.  
Under the Labour governments of 1964 to 1970, the N.E.D.C’.s role in economic 
planning was largely subordinated to that of the DEA. However, it continued to provide a forum 
where employers and trade unionists could consult the relevant government ministers. The 
Labour Government enlarged the Economic Development Committees for individual 
industries – sometimes called the ‘Little Neddies’. 14 Wilson hoped that the establishment of 
the DEA and the increasing use of planning would enhance the level of exports following the 
                                                          
13 See Keith Robbins, ‘Chapter 4: Stafford Cripps,’ Labour Forces. From Ernest Bevin to Gordon Brown, ed. 
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36 
 
growth of productivity.15 His enthusiasm for such a department stemmed from his belief that 
the Treasury would restrict expansion and that the DEA was the solution to increased growth 
and productivity even though there was much scepticism about this innovation.16 
Wilson claimed to have gained shadow cabinet approval for the creation of such a 
ministry in February 1963.17 Callaghan fully supported the proposal for a new economic 
ministry and ‘the ideas of indicative planning which we had inherited from the experience of 
France’.18 From March 1963, there followed a series of meetings and committees within the 
Labour party which developed the idea of an economics ministry devoted to planning and 
production. A paper by the Finance and Economic Policy Sub-committee which concentrated 
on regional development discussed the possibility of creating a Ministry of Production (or 
Economic Planning) alongside a Ministry of Land Production.19 The proposal to establish the 
DEA was finally announced on 11 September 1964 when Labour published its’ manifesto. 
 Brown was to become the most enthusiastic supporter of the DEA. Having chaired the 
Home Policy Committee of the Labour Party, he was already pushing for ‘re-styling the 
Government’.20 Brown believed that the DEA should not be ‘subordinated to the orthodox 
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financial policy of the Treasury’21 Callaghan, who admitted to being no economist and relied 
on advisers was less enthusiastic about this innovation. Crosland was the recognised economist 
but Callaghan still maintained that the Treasury could deliver the desired growth. Wilson’s 
authorised biographer recounted an interview with Callaghan in which the former chancellor 
stated that the DEA was unnecessary in 1964 as the Treasury under William Armstrong was 
ready to countenance an ‘expansionist’ policy; also, that Callaghan’s private secretary had 
christened the new department – the ‘Department of Extraordinary Aggression’.22 
The new Chancellor interpreted this development as a deliberate attempt by Wilson to 
encourage rivalry between these departments which Wilson termed ‘creative tension’. This 
would lead to more efficient performances by those institutions although Callaghan personally 
did not consider this approach fruitful.23 Callaghan pointed to the potential development of 
‘turf wars’ between the two institutions.24 Crosland was to find himself compromised by this 
potential conflict of interests in the four months he was minister at the DEA. Peter Hennessy 
stated that Wilson developed a degree of animosity towards the Treasury and admitted as such 
in an interview with Hennessey in 1985: ‘Some of us had more success than others. I had been 
in the Civil Service in the war … anyone who had had that knew a little bit about fighting back 
and working around them … they still wheedled and played their little tricks’. 25 
An agreement over the division of responsibilities between the two departments was 
imperative. This agreement was termed the Concordat. The DEA was to be responsible for 
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long term aspects of economic policy for physical resources, incomes policy, economic growth 
and regional and industrial policy. The Treasury’s responsibilities would be short-term 
economic policy and finance.26  The pressing economic crisis led to a lack of time with which 
to craft a suitable understanding between the departments and there was, in Callaghan’s 
opinion, an unwillingness on the part of those involved to make it work. ‘The Treasury began 
to regard the DEA as unrealistic, and the DEA considered the Treasury obstructive’.27 Brown 
agreed: ‘We did manage to draft something that I called a ‘Concordat’, but it never got itself 
formally accepted between Jim Callaghan, the Prime Minister and myself’.28  Roy Jenkins, 
who became the new Minister of Aviation, termed this division of responsibilities between the 
departments as ‘dyarchy’ which he considered ‘was to be the order of the day on the economic 
front, with George Brown given precedence as head of the new Department of Economic 
Affairs, but Callaghan commanding the truncated although seasoned timbers of the Treasury’.29 
Opinions within government and the civil service varied concerning the wisdom of the creation 
of the DEA.  There was a concern among some Labour MPs that there would be some 
opposition and obstruction by the civil service to the new party of government after thirteen 
years of Conservative rule based on class or ideological grounds.  However, these suspicions 
were ‘largely unfounded’ according to one authority. 30 
 Douglas Jay, President of the Board of Trade, had no doubt that this arrangement would 
fail, as had the short-lived Department of Economic Affairs in 1947 in the Attlee Government. 
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For Jay, the establishment of the DEA would be a ‘repetition of the discredited muddle of 1945-
7’.31 A separation of Treasury functions had been attempted in the Attlee Government. In 1947 
this separation was abandoned and Cripps was made Chancellor of the Exchequer and Minister 
of Economic Affairs.32 
Sir William Armstrong, Joint Permanent Secretary at the Treasury between 1962 and 
1968, doubted the viability of dividing responsibilities between the two departments.33 
However, Eric Roll, who became Permanent Under Secretary of State at the DEA in 1964, 
wrote enthusiastically in 1966 about the importance of the need for a department which had a 
pivotal role to play in the development of the economy in both the public and private spheres; 
that ‘economic management’ by the government was therefore ‘inevitable’ and that the newly 
formed DEA was designed for that purpose.34 In 1985, Roll commented further on the nature 
of the Concordat stating that ‘…The Treasury presumably cast in the role of the Pope and the 
DEA in that of the secular power, although George Brown on occasion liked to refer to himself 
as the ‘Pope’!35 Douglas Allen, Permanent Secretary of State at the DEA between 1966 and 
1968, considered that the creation of the DEA reflected a widely held view that macro-
economic control of the economy, in which short-term considerations predominated, did not 
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deal sufficiently with the problems of the United Kingdom economy in the 1960s and that a 
closer system of consultation with industry was necessary.36   
There was some support for the DEA within the press. Geoffrey Owen, Industrial Editor 
of the Financial Times, believed that the Treasury was overly concerned with ‘short-term 
financial regulation’ and that ‘.it was instinctively inclined to curb expansion rather than to 
generate it’, whereas the DEA was committed to faster economic growth and had the power to 
carry it out.37  The Economist was more enthusiastic about the potential working relationship 
between the two departments in the first month of the life of the DEA, stating that ‘all soundings 
suggest that the two departments are so far co-operating much more sympathetically than cruel 
cynics had expected’.38 In particular, it pointed to the economic expertise of Crosland whose 
appointment at the DEA along with that of Robert Neild at the Treasury had considerable 
significance for the management of Britain’s economic affairs and could lead to cross 
fertilisation of idea between the two departments.39 
The death of Hugh Gaitskell in 1963 had placed Crosland in a weaker position in the 
party for he had been a political ally and friend of the leader. In the subsequent leadership 
election, he had actively supported Callaghan against Brown and Wilson the eventual winner. 
When Callaghan was appointed Chancellor, Crosland, who harboured ambitions for this post, 
feared for his future in the party.40 Crosland made little attempt to come to terms with the new 
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leader and even considered withdrawing from politics. Tony Benn approached Crosland and 
tried to convince him to reconsider his attitude to Wilson. 
 
I had a long talk to Tony about his attitude to Wilson, who he still thinks is a shit, but 
who has done very well and would like to help in any way he could. I must try to pass 
this on to Harold since Tony is too good to waste. But the simple fact is that with Hugh’s 
death his courtiers feel out in the cold – exactly as I felt with Hugh.41 
 
Crosland and Roy Jenkins who both perceived the Labour Party as a social democratic 
movement, were more supportive of Wilson after his speech at the party conference in 
Scarborough in October 1963. Wilson called for social reform twinned with economic growth 
based upon state-sponsored advanced scientific research – an alliance of ‘science and 
socialism’. Both stood in the PLP elections to the shadow cabinet and, although they did not 
gain a place in the top twelve, they had indicated their ambition for advancement. Brown had 
come to respect Crosland’s expertise in economics and in discussions concerning the 
establishment of a new department, Crosland had come to be accepted as the probable Deputy 
Minister.42 Following Labour’s election victory, Crosland’s appointment was confirmed by 
Brown at a celebration party on the evening of 17 October 1964, even though Crosland still 
entertained hopes that he might be appointed Callaghan’s deputy at the Treasury.43 
Callaghan believed that there was another factor which motivated Wilson to create the 
DEA. He needed to find a post for George Brown suited to his economic expertise and 
prestigious enough for a senior figure who had been his closest rival in the leadership election 
                                                          
41 Tony Benn, Out of the Wilderness: Diaries 1963-67 (London, Hutchinson, 1994) 10 May,1963, p. 16. 
42 Brown, In My Way, p.90. 
43 Jeffreys, Crosland, p.96. 
42 
 
of 1963. ‘The Prime Minister had a problem of Cabinet balance and needed to satisfy the 
tremendous talents and energy of George Brown’..44 Michael Stewart agreed that Brown’s 
position within the party as Deputy Leader necessitated his appointment to a ‘top job’ in any 
future government.45  William Armstrong also speculated on Wilson’s decision regarding 
Crosland’s appointment as Brown’s deputy at the DEA. This may have been indicative of 
Wilson’s determination to detach him from Callaghan. Armstrong considered that Wilson was 
concerned that if one of the foremost economists in the Labour Party and a close colleague of 
Callaghan had gone to the Treasury, this would have presented a formidable team both in 
Cabinet and one which could have obstructed Brown at the DEA.46  
 Crosland, however, did not attend a vital meeting on the evening of the first day of 
government. Wilson met with Callaghan and Brown and they agreed that there would be no 
devaluation of the pound. Wilson was determined that a Labour Government was not to be 
labelled as the party of devaluation - the party which squandered money and failed to have the 
confidence of the bankers. He was convinced that a Labour government should not take the 
‘easy way out’ and that ‘speculation would be aroused every time Britain ran into even minor 
economic difficulties’ under a Labour administration.47 The previous Labour government had 
been responsible for the devaluation of 1949 and had received much criticism. Crosland was 
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annoyed that he had not been involved in this decision for he was convinced that only by 
devaluation could exports be driven up, the adverse balance of payments addressed and growth 
assured.48 Although he remonstrated with Brown to reconsider, it was obvious that the topic 
was never to be referred to again in political discussion, the issue becoming what Crosland was 
to call ‘the unmentionable’.49 Crosland was to refer to the issue of devaluation many times  to 
the annoyance of many of his colleagues. Samuel Brittan, who was Economics editor for the 
Observer and had joined the DEA on 1 November 1964, records in his diary that Crosland 
refused to obey Brown’s injunction concerning the topic of devaluation. ‘Also, (Crosland) 
received very severe talking to from GB for privately advocating the unmentionable’.50 A 
reputed economist with several publications to his name, Crosland regarded the failure to 
devalue immediately in 1964 a grave mistake which would severely hamper the work of the 
DEA. Wilson, Brown and Callaghan considered the matter closed but Crosland used every 
opportunity to push for this measure. 
 
Crosland’s contribution to the work of the DEA. 
 The existing DEA records for the months during which Crosland was Economic Secretary 
reveal his involvement in two areas in particular: firstly, the attempt to boost exports and 
secondly, the assistance which he gave to Brown in the formulation of a Declaration of Intent 
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with unions and employers on prices and incomes. During his appointment, he was given a 
broad brief within the department although his time was taken up with two key areas: 
improving domestic productivity and assisting export growth.  The latter task was considered 
crucial to solving the undisclosed balance of payments deficit of £800m inherited from the 
previous government. This section will firstly examine the various methods that Crosland 
employed to increase productivity at home and export growth abroad. Crosland advocated a 
varied package of methods – modernisation of management techniques, a freeze on wages and 
prices, moderation of the tax regime on employers and measures to encourage union co-
operation – all within the context of advice proffered by his officials. 
One of Crosland’s first duties was to attend the council of the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) in Geneva on 1 November 1964 in order to defend the decision of the 
Labour government to impose a fifteen per cent surcharge on all foreign imports, except raw 
materials, tobacco and food.51 Wilson wanted an economist from the DEA to justify this 
measure.52 Crosland explained his defence of the surcharge in a speech in the House of 
Commons on the night of 4 November 1964 answering the charge by Conservatives that the 
imposition was unjustified and did not receive the sanction of other members of EFTA.53 
Crosland explained that faced with a deficit running at something between £700 million and 
£800 million this year, all other options available to the government would be rejected: 
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increased borrowing, deflation, ‘stop-go’, export subsidies, import quotas and tariffs. None of 
these measures would eliminate the deficit and all would entail associated problems for the 
consumer.  
However, Crosland did point to the inconsistency in the international trading 
regulations by which the United Kingdom was bound in regard to the choice between 
quantitative restrictions and a charge on imports for ‘the one that is most liberal the one that is 
least arbitrary, the one that is least rigid, and the one that allows the most consumer choice is 
the one ruled out by EFTA and GATT’.54 Crosland urged revision. To the charge by the 
Conservative opposition MPs that there had been limited consultation with Britain’s European 
trading partners, he replied that ‘elaborate consultation was not possible…if by consultation 
one means something genuine and real and not just an additional 12 hours advance warning’.55 
Crosland stressed that Britain’s trading connections were global – Commonwealth, the Six, the 
United States and the IMF – and, therefore, it was not feasible to consult them all as quickly as 
required to meet the pressing problem of the deficit. He concluded by condemning the 
Conservative government’s legacy as one which had ‘left the economy basically weak…an 
economy in which whenever we have full employment we have had a flood of manufactured 
imports coming in, and our exports increasing less than those of other countries’.56  
Throughout his four months at the DEA, Crosland investigated ways of restraining 
wage levels and controlling prices by other means and supporting Brown’s attempt to achieve 
a voluntary agreement by unions and employers to these ends. Although Crosland was a 
accomplished economist he was prepared to consult economists who were appointed to the 
department and those whom he respected. He did not refer to think tanks and would still 
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exercise his own judgement.  At the end of October, Crosland received advice from Nicholas 
Kaldor an economic adviser and from Donald MacDougall the Director of Economics at the 
DEA.57 Both gave their assessment of the remedies available to address the balance of 
payments deficit by improving the competitiveness of Britain’s trading position abroad. 
Kaldor’s prescription for this problem was a combination of internal taxation (a modified 
Universal Value-Added tax) which would then provide subsidies for exporters which would 
necessarily involve a reduction in wage levels. 58 Kaldor considered an incomes policy as far 
too lengthy a process. Crosland’s annotations on this paper emphatically rejected Kaldor’s 
advice.59  MacDougall advised against Kaldor’s scheme as unmanageable and unacceptable to 
the officials in the DEA.60  
 
                                                          
57 Nicholas Kaldor and Thomas Balogh were two prominent post-war economists both from Hungary who came 
to play a significant role in advising Labour Governments between 1964 and 1970. (Kaldor was eventually 
appointed as Professor of Economics at Cambridge University in 1966.) He championed the use of Value Added 
Tax and the short-lived Selective Employment Tax at the DEA. Thomas Balogh was appointed as Wilson’s 
economic adviser in 1964. He had made his name with the publication in 1959 of his celebrated essay ‘The 
Apotheosis of the Dilettante’ which was an attack on the Civil Service which he regarded as traditional staffed 
and therefore as unfit to meet the economic challenges of the Britain of the 1960s. He advocated the use of more 
specialist advisers. This theme was taken up by the Financial Times economic commentator Samuel Brittan who 
was also an adviser at the DEA.   
58 Nicholas Kaldor. ‘A Tax Instrument for Adjusting the Balance Of Payments’. A Note by Mr. Nicholas Kaldor’. 
25 October 1964. The National Archives, EW 16/2.  
59 Ibid. 
60 Donald MacDougall was Director of the National Economic Development Council in 1964 on leave from 
Nuffield College, Oxford. Wilson asked him to become Director at the DEA if Labour won. He was pro-
devaluation.             
47 
 
The immediate reactions of many people will doubtless be that it is politically 
impossible because it is too revolutionary, appears too crackpot, and is too reminiscent 
of Speenhamland … [it would be] an administrative nightmare both for the taxation 
authorities and for business … [also it was] too dangerous internationally and if it were 
thought too crackpot to last, there might be a capital flight.61  
 
Crosland continued to explore measures to strengthen Britain’s trading position in 
Europe and strengthen sterling although the successful application of such measures was 
limited, on occasions, by the ill-defined relationship between the DEA and the Treasury. 
Crosland was concerned about the export of private capital which he considered should be 
restrained. The continuing dichotomy in the roles played by the DEA and the Treasury was 
highlighted in a ministerial letter sent by Crosland to Brown’s office concerning this issue, 
which was also of concern to the Bank of England. 
  
The matter is vitally important, but we cannot take it much further in this Department 
since the Treasury and the Bank alone have the detailed expertise. But a strong shove 
is desirable. Dr. Balogh is conducting guerrilla operations from his office. Would you 
please make a frontal assault by sending the attached letter to the Chancellor? 62 
 
Brown complied with Crosland’s request for an uncompromising letter to be sent to the 
Treasury although no copy of this letter exists in the departmental files. 
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  Crosland also favoured the use of tax incentives for exporters and he referred to an 
article in the Times which advocated a five-year plan of tax reduction on overseas sales. 63 
Nevertheless, he recognised that this policy would not be popular with Britain’s European 
trading partners if the Government was seen to be assisting British exporters in gaining an 
advantage by the use of this instrument. ‘In case you have not seen it, I am enclosing a telegram 
about EFTA Working Party No. 2 which shows how carefully we must watch the international 
repercussions of anything we do’.64 Brown saw this minute and demonstrated his belief in the 
concept of indicative planning and protection, as adopted by the French government, by writing 
on the paper, ‘I’m rapidly becoming a Gaullist and EFTA can take a large share of the 
responsibility!’.65 
Crosland also pressed the department to consider French methods of planning as an 
economic model for enhancing exports, and he urged officials to obtain information on the 
French method of aiding exports through Government purchase.66 Crosland further insisted 
that the departmental officials give high priority to expenditure on roads leading to docks. As 
MP for Grimsby since 1959, Crosland would have understood the importance of this measure. 
Crosland had developed a genuine empathy with the importance of the fishing industry in his 
constituency and the part played by the extensive dock network in the economy of the town. 
The Guardian journalist Peter Jenkins had been most impressed with Crosland’s knowledge 
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and commitment to Grimsby’s future while on a visit to the area.67 Following on the idea of an 
export levy on certain industries, Crosland looked to a similar measure introduced in 1947 by 
the previous Labour Government. Again, the minutes of this meeting make it clear that 
Crosland had to be reminded that the authority of the DEA was limited by consideration of 
other departmental interests especially the Board of Trade.  
In the four months that Crosland was deputy to Brown, the issue that dominated the 
work of the DEA (other than that of increasing exports and helping to address the deficit) was 
the attempt to come to an early agreement with employers and unions on the matter of prices 
and incomes. An Incomes policy seemed to be a modern dynamic way of planning economic 
growth by democratic agreement, capable of bringing to an end a period of uncontrolled 
‘dashes for growth’ ending in inflation and then officially inspired deflation.68 Both Brown and 
Wilson saw an agreement on incomes as crucial to the future success of a National Plan for 
economic growth under the new government and there was much support for such a policy. A 
planned growth of incomes was seen as an instrument that would check inflation as the 
economy expanded and it could be achieved voluntarily through consultations with unions and 
employers.69They recognised that a more independent machinery to review incomes and prices 
would be required and that planned expansion of incomes meant that wages and salaries would 
have to be related to a measurable increase in productivity.70 
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Brown made the framing of this agreement his main priority from October and finally 
achieved his objective on 16 December when employers, unions and government signed the 
mutual Declaration of Intent on Productivity, Prices and Incomes. Brown was determined 
eventually to enshrine this declaration in statute and on 10 August 1966 a bill passed its third 
reading. In fact, Wilson was concerned that this aspect of the work of the DEA was becoming 
an obsession with Brown. The Prime Minister felt that the department had become ‘so 
overborne by prices and incomes questions that it was not driving ahead sufficiently fast with 
industrial planning and productivity questions’.71 Brown was to admit that Wilson was right 
and some warned him that ‘… in getting myself identified as the Prices and Incomes ‘King’ I 
was losing the chance of being identified as the general Economic Minister’. 72 
Crosland was given a significant role in the discussions with departmental officials 
leading up to the signing. It was in these discussions that Crosland was able to press for his 
preferred measures that should be part of any agreed strategy with unions and employers: the 
use of the instrument of wage ‘freeze’ and possibly a freeze on prices; modernisation of 
industrial practices; measures which would appeal to the separate demands of unions and 
employers. Finally, Crosland stressed that the DEA should press for a greater say in the Autumn 
Budget of 1964. Crosland’s ideas were received with varying degrees of approval within the 
department in the discussions that surrounded the framing of the Declaration of Intent and that 
if the issue of devaluation was not an option available, then the measures above were, in his 
opinion, appropriate alternative strategies. 
In the early discussions on the nature of an incomes policy which should be offered to 
the unions, Crosland continued to press the use of a freeze, but considered other features in an 
overall package put to employers: a capital gains tax, a ‘token’ increase in profits taxation, 
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action on business expenses and a tax on gifts in order to stop death duty evasion. Throughout 
discussions, the DEA officials reiterated the line that the use of a ‘freeze’ was undesirable. ‘A 
short-term freeze of wage increases was not practicable. It was also undesirable since it might 
increase the influence of the more militant union members … there was a need for a long-term 
policy’.73 Crosland was still keen to entertain the idea of a wage freeze three weeks before the 
declaration was signed much to the annoyance of the civil servants who advised against it. The 
concept of a ‘guiding light’ was recommended, whereby, there would be an agreed and 
published view from employers and unions on a permissible annual rate of increase of incomes. 
Reasons were advanced in this paper to explain why an immediate ‘wages freeze’ was 
considered ‘undesirable’: ‘It merely dams up wage claims and leads to unusually large 
increases after the period of the freeze is over … there are a large number of claims outstanding 
… any freeze is liable to give rise to anomalies which may break down [and] it would 
undermine the influence of the TUC’.74  
Crosland was concerned about the reaction of the unions and therefore proposed 
measures to gain their support. In response to wage claims higher than the so called ‘guiding 
light’ in the autumn of 1964, a new tactic was proposed – a higher increase in pay would only 
be granted if restrictive practices were abolished and productivity raised.75 Also, there should 
be a new body to deal with exceptional cases for wages and salary increases. The Labour 
Government was committed to the abolition of the National Incomes Commission and it was 
recommended that any new body set up should cover a wider field than wages and salaries and 
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could deal with global profits.76 A last measure was also urged. ‘To win the co-operation of the 
Unions, an Autumn Budget including a capital gains tax was highly desirable’.77   
 Crosland fully endorsed the measures discussed. A note to Brown encapsulated much 
of his political and social philosophy in urging the Chancellor to announce an Autumn Budget 
‘for every political and psychological reason’.78 He insisted that Callaghan as Chancellor 
should redistribute wealth in the interest of social justice in future budgets and he made no 
attempt in his introduction to the note to disguise what he considered should be the political 
aims of budgetary statements. ‘Herewith a brief political note on the tax changes required to 
create the right climate for an incomes policy - many of them are also desirable on other 
grounds’.79 The Economic Secretary proposed a series of measures to be included in the 
Autumn Budget which would achieve in his opinion, a more equitable society and measures 
which would satisfy the unions: capital gains tax, a ‘token’ increase in profits taxation and 
action on business expenses. Finally, he urged the Chancellor to state that if in future profits or 
dividends moved ahead of wages he would either raise profits tax or introduce a profit or 
dividend equalisation levy.80  
Crosland made further suggestions which he felt should be included in the April 
Budget: a full capital gains tax, a changeover from profits tax to a new corporation tax and a 
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tax on gifts in order to stop death duty evasion. This first document was to be seen by Brown 
solely for it was headed as ‘Top Secret’. The name of Sir Eric Roll was pencilled in but five 
other officials including Sir Douglas McDougall deleted.  However, it was then downgraded 
to ‘Confidential’ and a second document was issued seemingly the same day (28 October 1964) 
with greater access approved for officials. Roll alone, it would seem, had Crosland’s 
confidence in this matter – other officials were excluded perhaps to avoid further resistance to 
his ideas. 
The cooperation of the unions was seen as pivotal to the success of any agreement and 
Crosland was concerned that the inducements already offered were not enough to satisfy the 
union leaders. ‘It is questionable whether the above contains an adequate quid pro quo to attract 
the co-operation of the trade unions in an incomes policy’. 81 Policies to limit the profits of 
employers were reiterated – a new capital gains tax, corporation tax and more stringent control 
of business expenses. Additional other policies in Crosland’s opinion, might create the 
‘atmosphere favourable to a bargain’ – but not included in an eventual agreement – were better 
provision for redundancy, more vigorous action against regional unemployment and the 
awarding of higher pensions.82  
 Crosland was clearly concerned that the interests of employers should also be 
addressed. He opposed suggestions by economic advisers that the National Economic 
Development Council (NEDC) should handle issues concerning prices and incomes. ‘Members 
of the T.U.C. would have to pronounce on individual wage claims. And it would go contrary 
to the whole concept of N.E.D.C. which is that it should deal only with general policy. So I 
fear this is no good’.83 Presented with a draft statement on prices and incomes, he commented, 
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‘Do we really want to give this rigid guarantee on total profits? I would prefer the emphasis to 
be rather on prices and personal incomes, with the reference to profits somewhat blurred’.84 He 
advised against punitive taxation on company profits. He believed that this would discourage 
attempts to modernise industry by efficiency measures or by the increasing use of technology. 
He advised against monopolies and restrictive practices which he considered encouraged 
inefficiency, waste and high prices. Commenting on the attempt to set up a body which was to 
oversee the level of prices and incomes, Crosland pressed for a stronger statement than drafted 
to indicate that the new body should, where possible, urge wage restraint especially excessive 
wage increase.85 
In the draft document, the government committed itself to several targets including 
higher investment, enhanced industrial skills, modernisation of industry, balanced regional 
development and higher exports for the largest ‘sustained’ expansion of production and real 
incomes. Before ‘sustained’, Crosland suggested the word ‘possible’, indicative that, in his 
view, the government might be committed to an over-ambitious target in the future.86 Three 
days later in response to a letter from the Board of Trade concerning the wording of the draft 
Statement of Intent, Crosland commented: ‘I think this is a fair point. But it would be met 
merely by the deletion of the three words ‘a strong currency’.87 (Another possible reference by 
the Economic Secretary to the ‘unmentionable’ of devaluation which he was to continue to 
advocate in the early months of the Government.) Crosland was to continue to press for the 
modernisation of industry in speeches in December 1964 and January 1965. He called for 
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employers and workers to abandon ‘out-dated ideas and old practices’.88 In Nottingham, he 
accused managers of ‘inadequate’ technical knowledge which had prevented the widespread 
adoption of the latest equipment and machinery and he called for industry to invest in advanced 
research and development. These measures, he stressed, would be vital to the achievement of 
further growth.89 
Throughout negotiations on a policy on prices and incomes, the TUC representatives 
predictably countered with the importance of discussing ‘more fully alternatives’ to a definitive 
policy that favoured employers. The union leaders stressed the need for a firmer statement on 
restraint on the growth of profits and dividends.90 Crosland supported Brown’s assertion that 
agreement on a prices and incomes policy was imperative so that it would show ‘that we meant 
business both home and abroad’.91 However, he further reassured the trade union 
representatives that price competitiveness would not impact adversely on workers. ‘There is 
no question of undercutting our competitors through a fall in living standards. The objective is 
to keep the increase in money incomes in line with the rate of increase of productivity and thus 
secure general price stability’.92 The draft document of intent obliged the government to use 
their fiscal powers to correct any excessive growth in aggregate profits as compared with the 
growth of total wages and salaries. The TUC representatives were urging direct control of 
profits by ‘other appropriate means’. Crosland rejected this. 
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The Government considered that direct control of profits was undesirable in the 
interests of encouraging greater investment and efficiency and economic growth quite 
apart from the practical problems involved. They had however adopted a prices policy, 
which had not been accepted by the previous Government.93 
 
Crosland’s suggestion that a ‘freeze’ on prices met with no more support from DEA 
officials than the use of this device for wages. The chairman of the Working Party on Incomes 
and Prices, diplomatically, but firmly, rejected this suggestion as policy stating that a ‘freeze’ 
was not likely to be practical or desirable at least in the absence of a comparable ‘freeze’ for 
wages.94 The Chairman provided a comprehensive survey of the reasons why a price ‘freeze’, 
‘standstill’ or ‘pause’ were unpractical and concluded in the following manner. ‘As a long-term 
solution, however, this course runs up against the difficulty that there are some prices which 
are outside our control and others in which increases may need to be accepted in the best 
interests of the economy’.95  
In the early weeks of 1965, Crosland outlined what he considered to be an appropriate 
programme required to tackle a predicted balance of payments deficit of £230 million.96 This 
programme advocated the continual application of the ‘surcharge’ on European imports 
although he accepted that a system of quotas should be examined. However, his strategy now 
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included the realisation that government cuts, were necessary especially in overseas defence 
expenditure and the re-deployment’ of those resources elsewhere. The Government should also 
intervene to restrict private overseas investment. He stressed again that an export-led boom 
anchored on export tax incentives was ‘the basic solution to our difficulties’. With an 
agreement on prices and incomes, his strategy for the DEA had broadened to call for the 
acceleration of a regional development policy responding to the evident disparity throughout 
England in particular.  
Several conclusions could be drawn from his final written contribution to the work of 
the DEA. Crosland was always aware of the international context of Britain’s economic 
situation in particular the advantages that the USA, Germany and Sweden had achieved over 
Britain through their progressive economic and social programmes. If devaluation was not to 
be entertained or even mentioned then he felt that an export drive was essential to tackle the 
balance of payments issue and all measures that the government could adopt to assist this 
process were vital. Many of the records of the DEA reveal a certain frustration that Crosland 
felt with the attitude of the unions to negotiations over the declaration of intent.  He clearly 
believed that employers should be relieved of punitive tax burdens which would inhibit the 
competitiveness of their goods abroad even though the unions considered that their members 
may be asked to bear a greater share of the tax burden with implications for their standard of 
living. Crosland was convinced that outdated practices by both management and unions in 
industry were a key factor hindering increased productivity and he continually urged both to 
adopt modern methods although always insistent that the fiscal burdens borne by industry 
should be lightened. His memorandum to Brown included his prescription for the departmental 
focus for 1965.   
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Keep up the momentum on prices and incomes, and be very cautious of imposing any 
further cost increases on exports (e.g. by higher employers’ contributions). At a chosen 
moment, start a new momentum on restrictive work practices and the wasteful use of 
labour…And naturally push on with all our D.E.A. prodding and planning and 
bullying.97  
 
Evaluation 
 Tom Caulcott, the Principal Private Secretary from 1964, perceived Crosland’s contribution 
to the work of the DEA during his brief appointment as mainly organisational. ‘The great role 
that Tony played in the early days was to establish some order in which advice could be 
presented to George so that he would know the facts when taking a policy decision. Tony got 
some rational discussion going on the major issues of economic policy: devaluation – on which 
he refused to keep quiet – the import surcharge, economic councils, the autumn budget of that 
year’.98  Brown later acknowledged the benefits that Crosland brought to the department. 
Recognising him as ‘an economist of repute and an exceptional able administrator’, Brown 
stated that Crosland had successfully managed much of the work of the department and had 
thus allowed Brown ‘more time to be a politician as well as a Departmental Minister’.99  
Some officials in the DEA were not so impressed. Samuel Brittan noted the frustration 
felt by Crosland concerning the departmental arrangements between the DEA and the treasury. 
‘Crosland causing much trouble through ignorance of how Government machinery works’.100 
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Brittan was, of course, an ‘irregular’ and one with limited experience of Whitehall process. 
Crosland’s persistence over the use of a price and wage ‘freeze’ was firmly resisted by officials 
although Crosland’s role as an outstanding economist with no previous ministerial experience 
may have played a part here.  
Press opinion on Crosland’s first ministerial post was, in general, favourable. The 
Observer columnist Nora Beloff had already praised ‘the tireless support of this unusually 
tough and talented deputy’.101 The Guardian also commended his achievements in his first 
ministerial role and one that had been particularly demanding. He had proved to be one of 
Wilson’s ‘brightest’ junior ministers.102  ‘So far his chief tasks in office have been arduous-an 
obstinate defensive battle to rescue the pound and as George Brown’s economic Minister’.103  
The Observer pointed to his achievements in Europe for it considered that Crosland’s departure 
from the DEA would be a considerable loss. He was an ‘acknowledged European’ who ‘had 
conspicuously found the continental politicians easier to handle than his senior (cabinet) 
colleagues’.104 Nevertheless, support for Crosland’s performance in Europe was not 
unequivocal. The Financial Times criticised Crosland who it considered had ‘ducked’ the 
question of future possible negotiations on the surcharge. Although he may have won sympathy 
for the government’s existing economic dilemmas, he had not dispelled the feeling among 
EFTA representatives that the UK had ‘publicly scorned her free trade partners’. 105  The 
Economist praised the appointment as one of ‘considerable significance for the management of 
Britain’s economic affairs’ and was optimistic about the working relationship between 
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Crosland and Robert Neild the economic adviser to Callaghan for ‘.Both these men talk the 
same sort of language of economic policy than do their immediate political chiefs’..106 
Crosland failed to gain any traction within the DEA or government in regard to 
devaluation which he maintained consistently was the key measure required to tackle the 
deficit. Brown rejected devaluation and considered that an incomes and prices policy was the 
priority and much of the focus of the DEA, while Crosland was there, was on the achievement 
of this agreement leaving Crosland to suggest other policies which would assist economic 
growth. Roy Hattersley, a friend and supporter of Crosland, considered that Crosland was right 
to push for devaluation in 1964 rather than have the government forced into it and that if 
Crosland’s advice had been accepted then ‘the history of the 1960s might well have been 
changed’.107 
 Crosland therefore strove to press for other instruments to boost exports and limit 
imports but had little time to implement these at the DEA. Crosland’s strategy for economic 
prosperity reflected his socialist beliefs for he urged Callaghan to ensure that wealth was 
redistributed, and that the government should address regional economic differences. While 
striving to ensure that Britain’s commercial success abroad should be based on price 
competitiveness he stressed that this should not be achieved at the cost of living standards at 
home.  
Crosland attempted to achieve a balance between social justice for working people 
while encouraging entrepreneurship and therefore an increase in wages and incomes should 
reflect the rate of increase of productivity. He stressed throughout his contribution to the debate 
on the DEA’s policy in regard to relationship between management and unions that business 
potential should not be limited according to union demands. Industrial growth for Crosland 
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depended upon creating a suitable fiscal environment to enable business to flourish. He 
considered that calls for the limitation of corporate profits by the unions should be resisted. 
Callaghan and Brown were more sympathetic to the union position. Crosland was unwilling to 
develop a closer relationship to the unions, unlike Callaghan whose political success was rooted 
on their support. 
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Chapter Two. The Department of Education and Science. (Jan.1965- Aug.1967) 
 
A Minister has the duty - indeed he alone can fulfil this duty – of trying to create a sense 
of impetus, of things moving, of deep concern for education, a sense that we are all 
actively working towards the goal of better education, a sense of positive partnership 
between government, local authorities and teachers…I think that the prime 
achievement was a matter of morale and impetus.1 
If it’s the last thing I do, I’m going to destroy every fucking grammar school in England, 
And Wales. And Northern Ireland.2 
The passionate social revolutionary had been cooled and tempered by the reality of 
ministerial office. He quickly realised that private education was too tough a nut for 
Wilson’s reformist administration to tackle.3 
It is not too much to say that the binary policy was the most radical, most especially 
socialist policy the Labour government had in education.4 
 
Harold Wilson appointed Crosland Secretary of State for Education in January 1965 following 
the sudden promotion of Michael Stewart to the position of Foreign and Commonwealth 
Secretary. He was responsible for an established department and had now achieved full cabinet 
rank. The post had first been offered to Jenkins. However, he had declined it and opted to 
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remain as Minister of Aviation citing a lack of interest in education.5 Jenkins also admitted that 
he offered the excuse that all three of his children were at fee-paying schools and he felt that 
this would be an obstacle to serving as an Education Minister in a Labour government. He 
further admitted that his decision to decline Wilson’s offer was mixed with an element of 
jealousy when he heard that Crosland, his ‘great friend and formidable rival’ had been 
promoted above him.6 Wilson considered that the next best candidate and obvious alternative 
was Tony Crosland who, Wilson maintained, had always taken a keen interest in education 7 
Richard Crossman records the conversation with Wilson and George Wigg concerning 
Crosland’s suitability for the post stating that Wilson also added that Crosland would also be 
‘a positive addition to the Cabinet’.8 
 Crosland was reluctant to leave the DEA where he felt that his economic training had 
been put to good use.9 However, according to one of his biographers, here was an opportunity 
to direct policy at the highest of levels and in an area that was central to his version of the 
socialist case for equality.10 This chapter will focus on the record of Crosland’s attempts to 
administer reform in three areas which received prominence in the Labour Party Manifesto in 
1964: the reorganisation of secondary schooling along comprehensive lines; the attempt to 
address the issue of public and independent schools and their relation to the state sector; and, 
finally, the expansion and reform of higher and further education. 
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The Development of State Secondary Education. 1945-1965 
The period between the end of the Second World War and the 1960s witnessed significant 
pressures upon the provision of secondary education in the state sector both in terms of its 
purpose and structure of delivery.  Firstly, there was a growing acceptance that spending on 
education represented investment in the economy, especially as Britain was facing increasing 
competition from its trade rivals in the West. Also, a resilient economy would strengthen our 
position in the developing Cold War.11 Harold Wilson reinforced the linkage between 
education and economic prosperity in a speech before the 1964 election referring to a Britain 
‘forged in the white heat of the technological revolution’ and that the education system should 
be reformed to provide an appropriately qualified work force 12  Secondly, there was growing 
social demand for education as a means of meeting enhanced working and middle-class 
aspirations. This period saw the sustained growth of white-collar occupations and rising 
expectations among a wider section of the population, as most people experienced benefits 
from post-war recovery, especially a moderate degree of security sustained by a welfare state.13 
The pressure for places followed the rising levels of population growth, placed the education 
service under increasing strain from the late 1940s onwards. 14 Thirdly, there was a developing 
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conflict between the assumptions of pre-war educational psychology and post-war radical 
sociologists concerning the extent to which intelligence was an inherited factor compared to 
the influence of environmental factors and the extent that ability could be reliably predicted.15 
Fourthly, the ideological struggle between those who wanted selective and those who wanted 
nonselective ‘comprehensive’ education.16 The public debate on all these affected the changing 
role of central government and its relationship to local authorities. Crosland summarised the 
changes in 1970. 
From the late 1940s, the Department of Education began to take a more positive role in 
planning and developing the service as consumer demand increased. The Department began to 
take a lead in many areas perceived to be the responsibility of the local authorities: school 
buildings, teacher supply, pupil-teacher ratio and even more ‘untouchable’ areas such as further 
and higher education, school curriculum and even standards.17  Crosland summarised the 
changes in the post war period in regard to the relationship between central government and 
local educational authorities as follows. ‘Before the 1944 Education Act, the Board of 
Education was more concerned to hold the ring between the ‘real’ protagonists, the local 
authorities, churches and parents, than to exercise positive influence or control. Its functions 
were regulatory and quasi-judicial’.18 
Against this background, educational advance was promoted to accelerate the 
modernisation of society and the economy. Although the Conservative governments of the 
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1950s tried to address this situation with their own modernisation strategy, many in the Labour 
opposition felt that the pace was too slow, the ‘old order’ was still in control and that the 
tripartite system based on selection and segregation was not ‘fit for purpose’ to satisfy the 
demands of the economy and those of the aspirational working class. Confidence grew in 
Labour circles that they were in touch with what the electorate desired, particularly in 
educational matters. Despite talk of modernisation, no Tory Government was likely to destroy 
the hallmarks of their ascendancy.19 
Both Crosland and Edward Boyle (Conservative Secretary of State for Education 1962-
3) had become convinced that the 11 plus was iniquitous in the arbitrary way that it divided 
children into those who were suited for an academic future and eventually university and those 
who failed the test and were destined for basic manual tasks in society. Edward Boyle had 
become convinced that comprehensive schools offered an effective solution for LEAs seeking 
to reorganise their pattern of secondary education especially in rural areas. In 1958 a White 
Paper Secondary Education for All: A New Drive advocated the establishment of 
comprehensives in new housing estates and in rural areas. 20  The 11 plus exam divided the 
secondary school population into the twenty-five percent who passed and went to the well-
resourced grammar school and the seventy-five per cent remaining who were to receive their 
schooling at the secondary modern and technical schools which received considerably less 
funding. There was an increasing body of research which cast doubt on the system as 
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unscientific, unjust, wasteful and divisive and this added to the unpopularity of the tripartite 
system.21  
In spite of growing support for the comprehensive principle in some local authorities in 
the 1930s and early 1940s, many in the Labour Party were reluctant to abolish the grammar 
schools and endorsed the tripartite system established under the Butler Act 1944. The Butler 
Act 1944 endorsed the tripartite system of secondary education into grammar schools, technical 
secondary schools and secondary modern schools. All pupils would sit an exam at 11 and 
would be selected accordingly. The Act allowed for the establishment of comprehensive 
schools by local authorities – but few were to take advantage.22 The Labour conferences of the 
1950s finally confirmed comprehensive education as party policy23 and one year before the 
general election of 1964, a composite resolution on education at the 1963 conference, pledged 
the Labour Party ‘to set up a universal system of comprehensive education and to abolish the 
11plus … [by] converting permissive into compulsory legislation’.24 The Labour Party 
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Manifesto of 1964 reflected this commitment: ‘Labour will get rid of segregation of children 
into separate schools caused by selection at eleven years: secondary education will be 
reorganised on comprehensive line’.25 
 
The Evolution of Crosland’s views on Secondary School Reform. 
 
The school system in Britain remains the most divisive, unjust and wasteful of all of 
the aspects of social inequality.26  
 
With this uncompromising statement, Crosland condemned the secondary education system as 
it existed. Consequently, he determined to draw attention to the failure of this system to deliver 
equality of opportunity believing that the middle class took advantage of opportunities offered 
by this act to the disadvantage of the working class.  
 
The 1944 Education Act set out to make secondary education universal; and formally 
it has done so. Yet opportunities for advancement are still not equal...The class 
distribution of the grammar school population is still markedly askew.27  
 
Crosland drew attention to research which had shown that the children of the lower working-
class performed poorly in the grammar school; but he vehemently rejected the idea that innate 
genetic factors were a major reason that explained low performance compared to middle class 
children. He looked for the explanation in social factors citing ‘more crowded homes … smaller 
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opportunities for extra-curricular activities’ and the unsustainable financial burden.28 Crosland 
was to reiterate these views in a heated discussion with supporters of the grammar schools in 
1967 when he was invited to an education forum hosted by a popular magazine. ‘.There is no 
scientific evidence to show that 90% of IQ is hereditary. Almost everyone agrees that 
environment and hereditary factors are twin features’. and he drew a distinction between the 
life-chances of ‘.a child born in the slums with parents disinterested in education and all our 
children here (those of the middle class)’.. 29                                                                     
  Crosland raised serious objections to the system of selection as established by the 1944 
Act. Firstly, the tripartite system was no longer suitable for British society in the post war 
period. Classic forms of education may have been suitable for ancient Greece, ‘but it would be 
distinctly odd if educational systems adapted in the one case to an idealised oligarchy of 
philosopher-kings, and in the other to the needs of a far-flung British Empire, were equally 
well adapted to a democratic, egalitarian, mid-twentieth century society’.30 Again, it was 
exceedingly unpopular. The 11 plus examination came to be bitterly disliked and resented for 
it was thought that a child’s future should be decided on a single day’s test.  Finally, and in 
Crosland’s opinion the most damming objection, the system was serious flawed in 
implementation and was based on a view of society which could no longer be sustained in the 
post-war era. Crosland also criticised the premise of the tripartite division established by the 
1944 act that there were three identifiable types of children and that numbers in each could be 
accurately pre-determined by exam and assigned to separate schools. In his opinion, ‘.the whole 
business has a distinctly arbitrary air.31 
                                                          
28 Ibid.  
29 The Women’s Journal, January1967, p.7.                                                                       
30 Ibid, p.227. 
31 Ibid, p.225. 
70 
 
In The Future of Socialism, Crosland stated unequivocally the policy required for 
secondary school reorganisation. The Labour Government should ‘explicitly state a preference 
for the comprehensive principle and should actively encourage local authorities…to be more 
audacious in experimenting with comprehensive schools’.32 Where there was resistance to 
reorganisation on these lines ‘the object must be to weaken…the significance of the 11 plus 
examination and the rigidity of the prestige and the physical barriers inherent in the present 
tripartite stratification’. 33  
 
Only if…the Labour Party gives education a much higher priority than in the past and 
comes to see it as of far greater significance to socialism than the nationalisation of 
meat-procuring or even chemicals – only then will the reality take shape in the form of 
bricks and mortar, more and better teachers, a longer school life in ample, imaginative 
surroundings.34 
 
Crosland reiterated these views in The Conservative Enemy in 1962 where he called for the 
Labour party to design a policy which concentrated less ‘upon an elite and more on the average 
standard of attainment’35; and, again, in July 1965 when, as Secretary of State, he emphasised 
that the task of the Government was to ‘include the development of individuals to their full 
potential’ and not to maintain an elite from one generation to another.36 
                                                          
32 Ibid, p.232-233. 
33 Ibid, p.33. 
34 Ibid, p234. 
35 Anthony Crosland, The Conservative Enemy (London, Jonathan Cape, 1962), pp.177-178 
36 Anthony Crosland, Speech to the Association of Education Committees, 2 July 1965, Anthony Crosland Papers, 
ACP, CP 5/2. 
71 
 
In January 1966 Crosland delivered a detailed analysis of the evolution of his thinking 
in a speech which touched upon such themes as ‘Social Class’, ‘Social Waste’, ‘Equality of 
Opportunity’, ‘The Bright Boy’ and ‘Streaming’. His opening remarks condemned the tripartite 
division as established in 1944 and left his audience in no doubt concerning the objective of 
his educational reform in the secondary sector. 
 
For until recently our schools have been essentially middle-class institutions, and our 
educational system essentially geared to educating the middle class, plus a few from 
below who aspired to be middle class or looked like suitable recruits to the middle class. 
The remainder were given cheaper teachers and inferior buildings.37 
 
He condemned the 11 plus exam as unfair to the working-class boy for ‘what we are testing by 
examinations was perhaps as much home background as innate intelligence’.38 He was 
prepared to appease those who feared for the reductions of standards in the comprehensives 
compared to the grammar schools. ‘The essence of the operation is not to deprive the selected 
minority of children of a good education, but to give something better to all children’.39 
Following Labour’s election victory in October 1964, Wilson appointed Michael 
Stewart, formerly Shadow Minister for Housing, as Secretary of State for Education and 
Science. Tony Benn welcomed Wilson’s decision to appoint Stewart rather than Richard 
Crossman who had held the Shadow Education brief. ‘He [Stewart] is a passionate believer in 
comprehensive education and sees the danger of allowing the direct grant schools to obstruct 
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the development of fully comprehensive education’.40 Crosland later admitted that the outlines 
of policy for secondary school reorganisation were already worked out in Stewart’s period of 
office for ‘.the basic policy of going comprehensive was of course decided before I got there’..41 
The Labour Manifesto had made a commitment to expansion of comprehensive education but 
it contained few indications of the pace of reorganisation. Some LEAs had responded to the 
criticisms of the existing system which had separated children into grammar schools and 
markedly inferior secondary modern schools.42   
Stewart realised that he faced many issues other than secondary reorganisation that also 
would require Treasury funding and would restrict his strategy at a time of mounting economic 
crisis: expansion of higher education; an accelerated teacher training programme and retraining 
schemes for existing staff; and plans for the raising of the school leaving age. Stewart and his 
successors would also have to cope with the recommendations of two reports published in the 
early 1960s. The Newson Report called for greater attention to be paid to the educational needs 
of pupils with below average ability in secondary schools – the Robbins Report advocated the 
expansion of higher education to satisfy the demands of an economy in which science and 
technology would play a greater role. It was within this context that Stewart decided that the 
priority was to concentrate upon the ending of selection rather than tackling the question of the 
infrastructure (size and accommodation) for the new comprehensives. For Stewart, the most 
urgent task was to set the pace for the abolition of the 11 plus.43 That pace would be determined 
by the attitude of the LEAs and a balance would have to be struck between persuading 
recalcitrant authorities to cooperate or coercing them by legislation if needed. This was a 
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sensitive issue especially one for a government with a small majority. Harold Wilson urged 
caution in regard to the LEAs during a Cabinet discussion. ‘Any reference to legislation should 
avoid any terms which could be represented by the Opposition as a threat to the independence 
of the LEAs and the freedom of the choice of parents. It would be better not to legislate until a 
need to do so could be demonstrated by the response of the LEAs to the proposed circular and 
there would be no need for legislation immediately’.44  
Stewart records that there was general agreement in cabinet that legislation should be 
held in reserve and that ‘if I were questioned on the matter, I should say at the outset that the 
government would be prepared to legislate if that proved necessary for the carrying out of 
policy’. 45 Stewart was realistic in the progress that he felt he could make. ‘I did not think we 
should make a 100 percent transformation in the lifetime of one parliament; but in five years 
we should have got so far that comprehensive education would be the general rule and 
separation would be on the way out’.46 Stewart’s final task before leaving the DES was to begin 
work on the framing of a circular which called for authorities to submit plans for reorganisation. 
The wording would be crucial to the progress of secondary school reorganisation along 
comprehensive lines. This proved to be the most pressing task for the new Secretary of State.  
 
Secondary School Reform. 
In 1971, commenting on his impact at the DES, Crosland summarised his function while 
Secretary of State as the following: 
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My role was to influence the form, content and the style of the circular, subsequently 
to take the basic tactical decisions on the individual cases like Liverpool and Luton, and 
generally to set the mood and determine strategy of the operation.47  
 
 Christopher Price who was Crosland’s Parliamentary Private Secretary (1966-67) remarked 
that Crosland was equally determined to reform the entire education system. ‘Crosland 
inherited an English school and university system which had developed out of a complicated 
amalgam of religious foundations, class and imperialism. It was deeply hierarchical and 
Crosland was determined to transform it’.48 
Wilma Harte, the civil servant with responsibility for reorganising secondary schooling 
under Crosland, noted that Michael Stewart had been committed to ensuring that policy 
accorded to his objectives for in regard to the civil service ‘he was not going to acquiesce in 
schemes for going comprehensive that did not measure up to what he thought a comprehensive 
system should be’.49 She drew an interesting distinction between the two Secretaries of State. 
 
Crosland had a different personality, more open, he had been a university teacher, he 
liked sitting around the table chucking ideas about. Stewart was the classic 
‘Conservative minister’, they have discussions with a view to arriving at decisions: 
Labour ministers have discussions with a view to arriving at the truth.50 
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Stewart had prepared a circular to the local education authorities (LEAs) concerning 
the Labour Government’s determination to reorganise secondary education along 
comprehensive lines; but it was left to Crosland to finalise the form and wording of that 
document. Susan Crosland gave a personal and succinct summary of Crosland’s approach. 
‘Tony took the draft out, polished it, and began the negotiations with the multitude of local-
authority, teacher and other pressure groups that surround Education’.51  Harte comments that 
Crosland’s contribution was more detailed than had been suggested by his wife. 
 
He received the draft of circular 10/65 in February. He did a fair amount of work on it 
himself, which ministers don’t always do. He didn’t change it much, more a question 
of changing the order of things – very much what civil servants do with drafts. If you’d 
been involved in writing, a fresh mind with a political view, can make improvements.52 
 
The precise wording of the instructions to the LEAs in the circular proved to be one of the most 
pressing issues. Reg Prentice, the Education Minister’ wanted the more forceful ‘require’ to be 
inserted in the preamble to the LEAs.53 The Civil Service wanted the less assertive ‘request’ 
according to Harte ‘because we didn’t want to provoke the local authorities’.54 She commented 
further on Crosland’s resolution of this issue. ‘Reg Prentice found it hard to believe that ‘the 
Government’ couldn’t impose its will’.55 
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Crosland was to take much the same view as Stewart on ‘compulsion’. He considered 
that it was not necessary as ‘most local authorities were Labour controlled and sympathetic to 
what we were doing - as indeed were some Tory authorities. So plans were coming in at least 
as fast as we could cope with them. The limitation was one of human and physical resources 
and not one of statutory powers’.56 Harte agreed that there was general agreement among 
authorities on the move to comprehensives and that ‘it wasn’t just a dotty left-wing idea’.57 
 
If you had been saying that you need to impose comprehensives on local authorities, 
what you mean in effect is that most people don’t agree with it. And when you are 
dealing with a service that is locally administered, that is not a position you want to get 
into. So Crosland rejected compulsion.58 
 
Crosland’s assessment of his work on the circular accords with that of Wilma Harte. ‘.The 
circular existed in embryo when I got there. I thought it pretty unreadable and full of officialese, 
so I did what I have always done with documents – a great deal of redrafting of the language 
to try to create the kind of document that I wanted’..59 
 Crosland’s response to the steady flow of submissions from LEAs that followed in the 
wake of the circular impressed both Harte and Price in the DES. LEAs were given twelve 
months in which to submit but this was considered by DES officials as a ‘time scale, not as a 
deadline’.60 She was aware that ministers at the DES wanted to achieve more than they were 
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empowered to do in regard to directing the local authorities. ‘Ministers find it very hard to 
accept the narrow range in which they can operate. It is a local authority service. Crosland, not 
particularly in this field but generally, found it irksome’.61 However, a solid working 
relationship emerged as the submissions arrived. Crosland met with officials every week and 
although they were allowed to deal with each case based on a formula [called ‘books’] devised 
by the department, Crosland ‘took every final decision on the basis of our ‘books’ and at these 
meetings. But I don’t believe he was excessively involved in detail’.62 In Harte’s opinion, the 
Secretary of State played a valuable role. He was able to defend the decisions to enquiries and 
concerns because he had a grasp of the main details of the most contentious of these 
submissions. 
 
If you have a very good memory as Crosland had and if he’s soaked in the stuff, he can 
both answer immediately, or, if he can’t remember for once, he doesn’t feel so 
embarrassed to say so. Also, in that very political operation, you want to minimise the 
impression that it’s all being done by the civil servants. He needed to be able to sound 
as if he really had done it himself. 63 
 
Shirley Williams, Minister of Education (1967-9), recalled Crosland’s willingness to 
involve his department officials in decision making. ‘He conducted his department collegially, 
so that everyone, however junior, was encouraged to express their views. Reticence or 
sycophancy had no place in these exchanges’.64 Christopher Price remembered a similar 
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approach to meetings. ‘He would sit there at the head of the table, puffing his cigar and taking 
the various points, calling on each of us to come in on cue and then sum up, always the rational 
being and always getting his own way but never banging the table’.65  
Roy Hattersley, a friend and colleague, attests to Crosland’s ‘impatience’ with fine 
detail and he stressed that for Crosland the priority was the ‘ideological importance of 
comprehensive education.66 He recalled Crosland’s annoyance with Williams’ seeming 
obsession with examining every reservation and doubt whenever a Townswomen’s Guild 
wanted to ‘quibble about a catchment area’ leading to postponement for three months.67 
Hattersley commented further that impatience was a ‘major asset’ in a minister.68 
Crosland only intervened when a contentious issue arose from a submission. He was 
reluctant to impose a decision by direction even when pressured by his officials as the case of 
Ealing below illustrate. Discussions at Curzon Street were the default position. Harte admired 
the way Crosland tackled submissions considered unacceptable by the officials especially from 
Labour controlled authorities. Such authorities expected approval automatically. Liverpool was 
such a case. 
  
This was a great test: could a Labour government say no to a Labour authority who 
wanted to go comprehensive all in one go…Crosland showed enormous courage. After 
all the Labour Party suspected that Labour ministers would be gobbled up by the right 
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wing civil servants and lose touch with the grass roots. By rejecting the scheme, he 
earned an enormous amount of credit in the educational world.69 
 
 In the opinion of the officials in the DES, the plan for reorganisation of secondary 
schools in the Borough of Ealing illustrated the inadequacy of submissions by some LEAs. 
This ‘botched’ submission, if approved, could have set a precedent for other authorities in 
England for it would have run counter to the intentions of the Labour Government as outlined 
in their manifesto.70 The discussions over the Ealing Plan also reveal how far the process was 
driven by senior officials and the level at which Crosland intervened. 
 Harte and her team handled the initial correspondence concerning Ealing’s proposals. 
The strategy of the Joint Parents Committee of Grammar Schools of Ealing was to prolong the 
existence of their schools by claiming a procedural irregularity on the part of the Local 
Authority namely the lack of proper consultation by the authority as stated in circular 10/65. 
This was the basis of their appeal.71 When no reply was received, the Parent Committee 
addressed their grievance to the Secretary of State. Under the title ‘Is there a conspiracy of 
silence?’. The committee asked whether the DES would stand by the recommendations in the 
department’s own circular on the Reorganisation of Secondary Education, No. 10/65 regarding 
consultations with the supply of information to parents and teachers. ‘The Department does not 
reply to this specific point. Why not?’.72 The Parents Committee pressed their case further with 
a more forceful censure of the Secretary of State’s position on this matter. ‘On the face of the 
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facts, it is manifest that the Ealing Authority is to be allowed with impunity to avoid its 
obligations under Circular 10/65’.73 They also threatened to inform the parents in the 
Bournemouth and Surrey Education Authority areas that they would be offered the evidence in 
their possession of the repudiation by the Secretary of State of the obligations purported to be 
imposed by Circular 10/65 ‘as further justification of the decision of their representatives not 
to accede to the requirements of the Circular’.74 
 Harte and her team had overseen such correspondence with enquiries from concerned 
bodies within Ealing. It was only when their submission from the Ealing Authority arrived at 
the DES in late 1966 that Crosland became involved especially as the details of their 
reorganisation became evident. In a briefing paper circulated among her officials, Harte stated 
categorically that ‘the Ealing Plan must rank with that of Brent (in its original form) for sheer 
incompetence and slovenliness of thought and presentation’. The outer London LEA of Ealing 
was made up of the ‘old borough of Ealing, respectable middle class; Acton, very far to the 
left; and Southall, rather run down with a large immigrant population’.75 The Acton and 
Southall plans were considered acceptable to the DES.76 Furthermore, the Secretary of State’s 
decisions on the Ealing proposals were critical in her opinion because they would set a 
precedent on the question of what minimum size could be regarded as satisfactory for 11 to 16 
schools and their sixth forms. For Harte ‘the Ealing version is secondary modern education for 
all. And pretty poor secondary education at that’.77  Harte took an uncompromising position 
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that the principles adopted by the Labour administration in regard to educational reform would 
be enforced by the civil servants at the DES when faced with sloppy reorganisation plans. To 
accept these ‘would make nonsense of the many public statements by Ministers and other 
Labour spokesmen that grammar school education will not be destroyed by the Governments 
policy but will on the contrary be made available to all’.78  She made a strong plea to Crosland 
that he should be prepared to impose his decision by direction if the authority choose to defy 
him.79  
In a draft letter to the Ealing town clerk, Harte stressed that the proposals were ‘alien’ 
to the Governments purposes and that the Secretary of State had concluded that ‘it would not 
be educationally advisable, in the light of staffing available, both in country as a whole and 
Ealing in particular, to attempt to run comprehensive five-year schools as small as those 
proposed in Ealing’.80 However, further discussion within the department led to a redrawing of 
the letter and the adoption of a more emollient tone in the name of the Secretary as advised by 
a senior official. He made two observations in another note circulated within the department. 
These, he believed, would hamper the progress of Labours plans. Firstly, he pointed out that, 
in regard to Ealing a Labour controlled authority, ‘it would be an odd situation if the Secretary 
of State found himself exerting legal powers to prevent a Labour-controlled Authority going 
comprehensive, while unable to force a Conservative-controlled Authority even to produce a 
plan’.81 Secondly, Ealing had co-operated with the DES requests in part but they would still 
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receive a letter ‘fiercer in tone’ than other authorities that had submitted ‘non-plans’.82 He 
urged that in this case ‘.the Secretary of State should offer discussion at Ministerial level’.83  
 Revisions made by Crosland to the letter reflected a more flexible approach.  Crosland 
offered a conciliatory addition to the tone of the redraft removing the phrase ‘serious objection’ 
in relation to the Ealing proposals.84 ‘He [the Secretary of State] notes that the Ay (Authority) 
have already introduced a comprehensive system in the Acton area with effect from 
September1966’.85 However, Crosland was not prepared to tolerate more delay by the authority 
and requested them to reconsider their arrangements again. He deleted the relevant section in 
the letter and stressed that a meeting with the officials was the only remaining option. The letter 
concluded in an uncompromising fashion for he removed the phrase ‘if the Authority so 
desires’ and emphasised that he would conduct the discussion.86 In a minute to selected officials 
circulated by Harte, Crosland explained the rationale behind his amendments to the redraft and 
the tactics he considered appropriate in the case of Ealing: ‘I think that we must give at least 
an outline reason for rejecting, as we did with Liverpool … Meanwhile we must keep them 
talking probably at Ministerial level’.87 
Having sanctioned one part of the Ealing submission, the final letter sent to the Ealing 
town clerk on the 18 December 1966 concluded with two definitive statements which reflected 
a position upon which Crosland was not prepared to compromise. In this paragraph, Crosland 
laid down the DES policy on attempts by authorities to reorganise secondary schooling by the 
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exclusive use of existing buildings. This approach would obviously entail a minimum degree 
of disruption to the authority but would violate the spirit of the comprehensive principle as he 
envisaged.  
 
He [Secretary of State] has concluded that it would not be educational advisable, in the 
light of the staffing situation, both in the country as whole and in Ealing in particular, 
to attempt to run comprehensive five–year schools as small as those proposed … These 
proposals [arrangements for three sixth form colleges based on existing grammar 
schools] are therefore also unacceptable at the present time.88 
 
The decision of the DES to reject the ‘Ealing Plan’ led to an immediate adverse 
response from two local concerned bodies, one professional and one political. Both required 
Crosland’s personal attention. The Ealing Association of the National Union of Teachers 
(NUT) stated unequivocally that they supported a ‘truly comprehensive system of secondary 
education in the Borough of Ealing’.89  Crosland’s refusal to approve the scheme submitted 
would, they felt, ‘inevitably lead to a prolongation of the period of uncertainty which can do 
nothing but bring harm to the educational service in the borough’.90 The N.U.T. also 
complained that Crosland had been unable to meet an association delegation before he had 
made his decision. Crosland instructed a senior official to reply emphasising that the DES had 
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complied with procedure in 10/65 whereby interested bodies were to consult with the relevant 
local authority and not directly with the Department.91 
Criticism by the local Labour Constituency Party presented a more delicate problem. 
The local party, with the backing of the MP William Molloy, ‘deplored the manner’ by which 
the decision was made and considered that Crosland’s refusal to approve the Ealing submission 
compromised the party.92 
 
The terms of the rejection, which ignore firmly held local labour and majority teacher 
opinion and accept most of the criticisms made by local Tories and Grammar School 
parents, play into the hands of our political opponents.93 
 
They also called upon Crosland to exercise his influence outside his brief as Secretary of State 
and ‘consult privately’ with the Labour group within the Council concerning amendments for 
the ‘present decision is highly damaging to the Labour Party in view of the national interest 
which has focused on Comprehensive education in Ealing’.94 Crosland’s response came on 21 
January and comprised a short note to Molloy offering him an opportunity ‘to have a word with 
you about Ealing’.95  
 Crosland, when asked to intervene by his officials, was prepared to be conciliatory in 
tone but unyielding on the principle that even a Labour authority should comply with the 
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intentions of the Labour government and with the rationale of its secondary school 
reorganisation. Therefore, he was not prepared to compromise even if this placed the local 
party in an invidious position. His terse but polite note offered little to the local MP although 
there is no further correspondence in the relevant file. Crosland employed alternative tactics in 
regard the Ealing NUT. He was able to cite Circular 10/65 concerning the obligatory 
consultation that authorities would have to undertake over reorganisation plans. Thus, while 
welcoming their support for a truly comprehensive system, he was able to avoid direct contact 
with the union stressing that the NUT should address their concerns to the authority and that 
he would then respond to the authority’s communications.96 The NUT claimed that the DES 
and Ealing Authority were only really concerned with ‘the furtherance of sectional interests’.97  
 The Ealing submission proved to be particularly challenging for the department; but 
such submissions were rare. Most plans did not require Crosland’s intervention and the official 
team were entrusted with authority to manage submissions. The limits of power of the DES 
were highlighted by the Ealing Plan when Crosland was needed to intervene. The case of 
Hounslow Authority, a London borough adjacent to Ealing would appear to be routine and 
offers an appropriate contrast. The consultation process conducted by the authority as required 
by Circular 10/65 was wide ranging and included contributions from teacher unions, Liberal 
and Socialist groupings and even the Communist Party which presented a lengthy and detailed 
statement. A petition of concerned parents was considered by the DES but the officials were 
able to deal amicably with the points raised by the various committees and a delegation from 
Hounslow was received in Curzon Street in September 1966. In regard to the Hounslow 
submission, a senior official in the Schools Branch at the DES commented in an internal memo 
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upon the plans of the two authorities: ‘There has been public reaction to the Authority’s 
[Hounslow] proposals but has been nowhere near the scale experienced in Ealing’.98 There is 
no indication of Crosland’s involvement in the archive material available for the Department 
of Education and Science between 1965 and 1967. In fact, there would appear to be a general 
agreement amongst all sections of the community upon the plans finalised by the authority for 
Peter Blake Chairman of the Borough Education Committee referred to the ‘goodwill built up 
between the authority, parents, teachers and the general public’. 99 
Although Crosland intervened when his officials considered it appropriate, he allowed 
them to use their own discretion in most of the submissions received and apply their own 
judgements when administering prescribed government policy. Harte explained her rationale 
as leader of the team: ‘I thought that because we were evolving dogma and theories as we went 
along, as we learnt about it, it was enormous strength to have a small, closely knit team. Its 
astonishing how quickly individual civil servants can get out of line with received truth, simply 
because they are getting on with their own work’.100 
 Harte was convinced that Crosland’s time at the DES in regard to secondary school 
reorganisation had been significant in the permanent establishment of the comprehensive 
system. She admitted that in terms of the Labour Government’s determination to press ahead 
with comprehensive reform, they should aim to bequeath an educational environment whereby 
‘.most people felt that to be comprehensive was the normal and that to be selective required 
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defence [and] this they had achieved’..101 In her opinion, Crosland had overseen a reform that 
could not be reversed even though he left the DES in 1967. 
 
By that time precedents had been established, it had settled down almost to a routine 
the fireworks atmosphere had gone out anyway. The great push had taken place – but 
by the time he left the important work had been done – no, in this field it wouldn’t have 
been much different if he had stayed – the great push had already taken place.102 
 
 The Times Educational Supplement stated that on Crosland’s departure from the DES 
in August 1967 ‘a great shove towards comprehensive schools had been given’.103 Although 
his tactics won approval from his officials as stated above’ some of his colleagues in the DES 
and the party were critical. Prentice considered that more forceful methods would have 
accelerated the process if the circular had ‘required’ LEAs to produce plans for comprehensive 
reorganisation and legislation. Crosland’s successor Edward Short was preparing a bill for this 
purpose before Labour’s defeat in 1970.  
Price, Williams and Hattersley recognised Crosland’s passionate commitment to the 
elimination of segregation in education. Hattersley considered Crosland’s decision to insert the 
injunction ‘request’ rather than ‘require’ in the circular 10/65 the correct one for ‘being 
voluntary [it] would survive a change of government’. 104 With the steady application by 
conservative authorities as well, even the new Minister of Education, Margaret Thatcher, found 
herself unable to reverse the decisions between 1970 and 1974. This justified Crosland’s 
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preamble to the circular 10/65 which emphasised the voluntary nature of compliance. 
Hattersley further stressed that Crosland did eventually resort to an ‘element of coercion’ in 
1966 for permission for new secondary school building was granted only to authorities which 
were in the process of ‘going comprehensive’.105 Price also believed that his educational 
initiatives also reflected his determination to tackle social divisions in Britain. The 
establishment of Educational Priority Areas was an attempt to eradicate unacceptable 
disadvantages in urban areas: The Social Research Council would provide administrators with 
evidence for further reform. 
In terms of the education delivered in the comprehensives, opinion was divided. 
Although Crosland opposed ‘unnecessarily early and rigid streaming’. at the primary level, he 
accepted that there might be a place for it in the comprehensive.106 In this he was not supported 
by a Labour Party Conference decision in 1965 that ‘the educational system can only be 
become genuinely comprehensive if the practice of selection (streaming) is actively 
discouraged…’.107 Tony Benn doubted Crosland’s real conviction over the comprehensive 
especially on streaming for he ‘may by weak on comprehensives, behind hand on the real issue 
of streaming versus non-streaming’.108 He called for greater flexibility in curriculum matters 
in the comprehensive so that the Newsom child and the ‘bright boy’ could be catered for - more 
imaginative teaching for the former and increased opportunities for an academic education for 
the latter especially pupils from working-class homes.109 
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Departmental ministers at the DES, immersed in the endless negotiations and 
compromises over details with individual authorities over comprehensive reorganisation, could 
find the ultimate objective and rationale obscured by such a lengthy process. Crosland seems 
to have avoided this weakness as witnessed by his predecessor. ‘.The Minister is usually 
someone who, to reverse the common phrase, cannot see the trees for the wood. He has a good 
general picture in his mind of the nature of the problem and where he has to go’..110 Michael 
Stewart’s comment on policy objectives and departmental achievements might well apply to 
Crosland at the DES. The establishment of the comprehensive was his overriding target as an 
exercise in social engineering. Educational delivery within the new ‘common’ school was of 
less concern. However, the existence of the private sector was still an obstacle to equality of 
opportunity for those below the privileged classes. 
 
Independent Schools. 
Crosland had written in 1956 that even if state education was reformed on comprehensive lines, 
the existence of the independent sector would impede social equality for ‘we shall still not have 
equality of opportunity as long as we maintain a system of superior private schools, open to 
the wealthier classes but out of reach of poorer however talented and deserving’.111   Crosland’s 
original stance as outlined in his book The Future of Socialism, favoured the integration of the 
public schools with the maintained sector by opening them up on meritocratic grounds for the 
ultimate objective was ‘100% competitive entry’ and ‘the ablest pupils [to be] creamed off and 
given superior training’.112 As the campaign against selection developed, however, he now saw 
the priority as social integration and wrote in The Conservative Enemy in 1962 that private 
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school places should be allocated by ‘free choice’. 113 Crosland commented further that they 
offended against any ideal of social cohesion.114 
 
This privileged stratum of education, the exclusive preserve of the wealthier classes, 
socially and physically segregated from the state education system is the greatest single 
cause of stratification and class-consciousness in Britain…It is no accident that Britain, 
the only advanced country with a national private elite system of education, should also 
be the most class ridden.115 
 
The Labour Manifesto had given a firm commitment to the reorganisation of the secondary 
state sector along comprehensive lines. There was no such clearly stated objective in the 
manifesto in regard to the public schools beyond that of setting up ‘.an educational trust to 
advise on the best way of integrating the public schools into the state system of education’.. 116 
The demand for educational reform that had surfaced during the war especially that of universal 
free secondary education, saw the role of the public schools come under scrutiny as well. Brian 
Simon described in detail the growing volume of criticism of a leadership broadly recruited 
from the ranks of the public schools especially in the wake of the evacuation of the British 
army from Dunkirk in May 1940.117 Harold Dent editor of the Times Education Supplement in 
the summer of 1941 called for total reform ‘based on a new conception of the place, status and 
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function of education in a democratic state not a patching and padding of the present system’.118 
He was supported by other educationalists and writers who despaired of a system that 
perpetuated the idea of public school products who were regarded as manifesting ‘special 
fitness to rule’. 119 Cyril Norwood formerly headmaster of Bristol Grammar School and 
Harrow, chaired a committee on secondary education established by Butler the Minister for 
Education. In 1943 its report called for the establishment of a ‘tripartite’ system of schooling 
– grammar, technical and secondary modern. Writing in 1942, Norwood had stressed that the 
state drew its leaders from one class only and, therefore, was ‘not a democracy but a pluto-
democracy’ which resulted in a damaging division in the nation. The tripartite system was 
designed to cater for a range of abilities and aptitudes. 
In July 1942, R. A. Butler President of the Board of Education appointed a Committee 
to advise the government on the relationship of the public schools to the general education 
system. Lord Fleming, a Scottish politician and formerly Scotland’s Solicitor-General was 
appointed chairman. The report, which was published in 1944, failed to deal with the 
philosophical questions surrounding the provision of private education and focused instead on 
boarding a fundamental feature in many of the public schools. The Report recommended that 
twenty-five per cent of all residential places in such schools should be made available to pupils 
from the maintained sector who qualified on several criteria and that bursaries should be made 
available from public funds to finance this. Simon pointed out that Butler had avoided the 
democratisation of this sector thus nullifying the attack on their privileged position.  
The incoming Labour government broadly endorsed the terms of the Butler Act of 1944 
and accepted the terms of the Fleming report. The new Minister of Education Ellen Wilkinson 
was given the task of implementing the Fleming proposals but, according to one writer, the 
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national machinery established by Wilkinson was so weak that it soon faced real difficulties 
and there was no centralised scheme in which the Ministry rather than the LEAs played the 
main role.120 To many of her Labour critics, Wilkinson was seen as too conciliatory towards 
the private sector which they considered exclusive bastions of privilege. She claimed that 
reducing the number of approved independent schools that would receive public funding and 
raising the income level below which children qualified for admittance constituted an attack 
on that privilege stressing that ‘in many cases the direct-grant schools provided the only 
available grammar schools in the area’.121 Matt Perry, writing on Wilkinson’s Education Act 
of 1946, commented on the conservative nature of the features of the Act ‘which maintained 
the educational consensus with the Conservatives, entrenched the position of religious 
institutions in state–funded education and ignored calls for the abolition of independent 
schools’.122 
There were other problems in the wake of Wilkinson’s death in 1947: the assisted places 
scheme was a national scheme but it was for day pupils only; the bursaries were offered on an 
ad hoc rather than a structured basis; and, the participating schools retained control over whom 
to admit.123 The Conservative Government that was elected in 1951 did not expand the scheme 
despite promises to the contrary.124 This scheme, in the opinion of Hillman, ‘.lingered on in a 
desultory form’.. 125 Hillman’s conclusion was that it failed due to a lack of political will, 
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inconsistent support from the independent boarding schools and LEAs and the problems over 
the selection of pupils. Even the Public Schools Commission declared in 1966 that ‘.as an 
instrument of national policy, the Fleming Report rapidly became a dead letter’.. 126 In regards 
to the attitude of the Labour party to the position of the public schools in the British society, 
Hillman identifies three strands of thinking. One strand opposed the concept of private 
schooling altogether.  A second strand focussed on integrating the public schools with the rest 
of the educational system. A third strand of thinking accepted people’s right to pay for 
education and assumed that schools should be left relatively untouched.127  
In The Conservative Enemy, Crosland had suggested a strategy for reform of the public 
schools that consisted of three basic objectives: assimilation into the state sector; democratising 
their entry; and limiting the purchasing power of the rich to acquire a privileged education by 
‘creating a genuine equality of opportunity’.128 However, Legislation posed a problem for him. 
‘The object of legislation would be not to prohibit all private fee-paying, which would be an 
intolerable restriction of personal liberty, but, regulating the conditions under which education 
is brought and sold to secure a more equitable distribution of educational resources between 
the different classes of the nation’.129 According to Susan Crosland, he (Crosland) had 
elaborated further on this point stating that a democracy could ‘not forbid people to found 
schools and charge for them.130 He had also cited practical reasons against abolition for ‘parents 
and teachers would find way to get round the law’ and many highly qualified teachers would 
                                                          
126 Public Schools Commission, First report, 1966. 
127 Nicholas Hillman, ‘The Public School Commission: Impractical, Expensive and Harmful to Children?’ 
Contemporary British History, Vol 24, Issue 4, 2010. 
128 Crosland, Conservative Enemy, p.180. 
129 Ibid, p.182. 
130 Susan Crosland, Crosland, p.149. 
94 
 
emigrate.131 Crosland’s view was that a reformed state system was the key factor when 
confronting the determination of those from the middle classes who wish to seek an expensive 
education. 
 
Once the state system is strong enough to compete, if parents want to send their children 
to some inferior fee-paying school for purely snobbish reasons, that’s their affair. Why 
should they be denied the freedom to spend their money buttressing their egos if that’s 
is what they want.132 
 
In spite of Crosland’s strong feelings concerning the public schools, as minister he became 
aware of the many practical difficulties involved in radical reform and he informed Cabinet of 
these.133  The government was expecting to have to educate two million additional children 
over the following few years due to the rising birth rate and the planned increase in the school 
leaving age. The reorganisation of secondary education and higher education would involve 
funding for building construction and increasing staff demands. Wilson voiced these concerns 
as well. ‘.I am not sure we need to do anything in a public sense just now. There is a growing 
feeling in the country that we are stirring up too many things, not of equal priority’.134 While 
Crosland acknowledged these concerns accepting that ‘.the political grounds for postponement 
are over riding’,135 in July he challenged the idea that Labour’s commitment to reform should 
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be abandoned: ‘to sacrifice basic socialist principles for a few million pounds which cannot fall 
due for at least four years would suggest a certain lack of faith in our economic policies’.136 
Later he admitted that abolition was unfeasible. ‘It would cost a lot of money, and while you’ve 
got slum schools and so on it’s difficult to argue that this should be a top priority’.137 Wilma 
Harte acknowledged the dilemma facing a Labour Party committed to both liberty and equality: 
‘We always knew… that the Labour government had no real political will to deal with the 
…independent schools. This was partly because of the old problem of freedom of the 
individual, partly because of the religious problems but more importantly because they could 
never make up their mind whether these schools were so bloody they ought to be abolished or 
so marvellous they ought to be made available to everyone’.138  
Although Crosland was convinced of the unacceptable position of the public schools in 
the Britain of the 1960s and that a majority in the Constituency Labour Party were 
fundamentally opposed to their elitist nature, he, as a cabinet minister, was aware of the 
practical difficulties of outright abolition. In 1965 the Labour Party Conference carried a 
resolution stating that it was ‘essential to integrate the public school structure with the state 
education system’.139  The following year a motion calling for the integration of the public, 
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direct grant and other fee paying schools into the state system was remitted to the National 
Executive as well as welcoming the appointment of a Public Schools Commission.140  
 He was also constrained by the work load that that Department had undertaken as a 
result of the reorganisation of the secondary sector. He admitted that a compromise solution 
was required, one that avoided the two extremes of abolition and non-intervention and, in 
effect, ‘just let in a handful of state pupils and fiddle around a bit with tax concessions’.141 He 
was obliged to carry out the responsibility of the election manifesto: but the details of the terms 
of the Commission were to be his alone. ‘The Labour Party manifesto committed us to setting 
up a Commission. My role was to write the terms of reference, which was quite unusually long 
and detailed, and to choose the Chairman and the members’.142 
Crosland was not bound by any existing work of the department when he came to tackle 
the position of the public schools. Apart from the policy document ‘Signposts for the Sixties’ 
there was nothing substantial on the party’s position on the independent sector.143 Most of the 
initial thinking on the nature of the solutions available for the reform of the public schools was 
therefore his.  In a briefing paper on the Independent Schools prepared for his Minister of State 
Reg Prentice, Crosland explained the rationale for reform. He laid out three key arguments for 
action: on ‘merit’, for they were ‘a denial of equal opportunity…[and] they reflect and 
perpetuate class divisions of a kind we are pledged to abolish’; on ‘educational’ for ‘we cannot 
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introduce a comprehensive system in the state sector while leaving the private sector 
completely untouched’; and ‘political’ for ‘inaction would be especially ridiculous at a time 
when Headmasters and the Governing Bodies of the schools themselves are publicly asking to 
be reformed’.144 
 Crosland gave a detailed rejection of two extreme positions still favoured by many in 
the Labour party - abolitionists and squeezers - even though the Manifesto had pledged the 
Labour government ‘to go further’. He considered that the withdrawing of tax concessions and 
weakening of the link between Oxford and Cambridge as a means of ‘squeezing’ the public 
schools, unrealistic: ‘.Given the pattern of middle class spending and aspirations…the 
‘squeeze’ policy will not come near to attaining our objectives’.. 145 Therefore, his objectives 
as proposed for the Cabinet were more nuanced: to limit the possibility of buying educational 
privilege; to ensure that entry to private schools was socially mixed by terminating segregated 
schooling; to ensure that the private sector fitted in with the national policy of comprehensive 
education; and to ensure that ‘the considerable capital in the private sector contributes to the 
needs of the nation as a whole’..146 These would form the basis of the memoranda submitted to 
the cabinet. He was not prepared to compromise on selection ‘this is the thorniest aspect of the 
whole problem – the rock on which all previous reformist ideas have foundered’.147 For 
Crosland, the ‘comprehensive principle’ was non-negotiable even when dealing with small 
schools. These would be the Commission’s guiding principles to ensure that their detailed work 
and recommendations are ‘consistent with our fundamental objectives’.148  
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He suggested that the Commission must balance various criteria including avoiding 
academic selection, producing socially mixed entry, satisfying demand for boarding and 
justifying the cost for these particular children. However, having set the principles, Crosland 
referred back to the conclusion of two other bodies – The Alexander Working Party in 1960 
which concentrated on parents who were frequently absent and the Newson Report of 1963 
Half Our Future on the education of average and below average 13 to 16 year old pupils. These 
groups, Crosland felt, would benefit from boarding facilities. 
 As these proposals became known, Crosland faced particular criticism from his 
minister Reg Prentice and Cabinet colleague Richard Crossman. Crosland felt compelled to 
meet their strongly held views by compromising on the guiding principles of the Commission. 
Prentice hoped for greater pace of change and advocated legislation suspecting that Crosland’s 
proposals were insufficient to tackle radical reform of the public schools. Prentice pressed for 
teacher quotas for the public schools and stated that ‘legislation would be required, unless we 
content ourselves with an appeal for voluntary co-operation’.149 Likewise, he expressed a 
concern over the large number of public school entrants into Oxford and Cambridge 
universities and urged that ‘[we] ask them to consider a quota system’.150 Prentice insisted that 
direct grant schools be included in the Commission’s brief. 151 Crosland’s minister of state was 
sceptical that the Commission would deliver on reform and urged him to take responsibility 
immediately 
 
I think the major political question is this: how far should we do these things 
independently of the setting up of the Commission or should we allow the Commission 
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to advise on these aspects of the problem before making up our minds? On the other 
hand it would be good to do something definite to reduce the irrational privileges of the 
Public Schools, particularly as the Commission’s main operation is likely to be a slow 
one and we would like to show everyone that we mean business152 
 
Crosland resisted Prentice’s suggestions and was determined to pursue a more cautious 
and pragmatic line. Although Crosland had agreed to his Minister’s suggestions on building 
control and reduced tax relief for the private sector, he was still ‘inclined to favour the voluntary 
appeal on teacher quota’ and was convinced that they should ‘not take any overt action till the 
Franks Committee had reported back’.153 Crosland was not swayed on the inclusion of the 
direct grant schools for the following day in a meeting on the draft Cabinet paper the first 
comment on the summary of the discussions was an emphatic dismissal of Prentice’s advice. 
‘Direct grant schools are to be outside the Commission’s net’.154  
The issue of the direct grant schools aroused the attention of Crosland’s cabinet 
colleague Richard Crossman who presented his own critique when given a copy of the draft 
public schools paper by Crosland. Crossman’s comments ranged over several issues in this 
detailed analysis. In particular, he attacked the lack of precision in the definition of the 
fundamental objectives of the guiding principles. Crossman accused Crosland of obfuscation 
‘presumably because any kind of precise definition would spark a major disagreement between 
those who want to integrate the public schools as institutions into the state system and those 
who want to destroy their existing structures as a whole by taking over their buildings and land 
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as assets’.155 Crossman suggested that Crosland should select the membership of the 
Commission to achieve the desired result or make more precise terms. He likewise called the 
decision to exclude the direct grant schools from the Commission’s brief ‘indefensible’. 156 
As with criticisms of Prentice, Crosland accommodated his colleagues’ criticisms by 
compromising on certain issues. On the issue of direct grant schools he held firm maintaining 
that they should be excluded because they present a different problem and, above all, because 
to include them would strongly discourage them from coming into the local comprehensive 
schemes.157 His solution was to state that the direct grant schools would be considered but that 
the Commission would deal with the boarding schools first.158  Crosland also conceded the 
accusation by Crossman that the definition of the fundamental objectives had been left 
deliberately vague to satisfy in some part the two groups identified by his cabinet colleague. 
‘The final solution will then inevitably be a rather muddled compromise between the two’.159 
Crosland was determined that the Commission should not sound merely like a repeat of 
Fleming proposals for, in his opinion, it would be quite unacceptable to a large part of the 
Labour Party.160 The guiding principles would remain; but again he acknowledged the thrust 
of Crossman’s arguments: ‘I have amended the wording of my Paper in a number of respects 
to try and meet your presentation of this difficulty [the wording of the guiding principles]’.161   
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The issue of the direct grant schools led to greater pressure on Crosland by two bodies 
one political and one professional formed to advocate opposite views on the question of 
inclusion.  The Public Schools Committee (PSC) was formed by leading public figures in the 
academic and political world who were ‘sympathetic’ to the Labour Party and who wished to 
see the integration of the public schools on the basis of 100 per cent entry from the maintained 
system.162  This committee asserted that ‘If this is not the case, [they] were sure that integration 
will fail to achieve the change in the social character and educational role of these schools 
which the Labour party had called for again and again’.163  They made a public appeal to 
Crosland to ignore the case made by the chairman of the Headmasters Conference (HMC) that 
the direct grant schools should be included for they considered that such schools were already 
covered by the terms of the comprehensive circular.164 The PSC further stressed that inclusion 
would be completely unacceptable to the mass of the Labour Party and would represent a 
‘pernicious answer’ to this issue.165  
There is no record of his response to this appeal; but one does exist to a letter from the 
HMC and the Governing Bodies Association (GBA) the latter representing the independent 
sector for girls. The warden of New College Oxford, who chaired the GBA, justified the case 
for inclusion by emphasising the character of this group which had very strong boarding 
element.166 Crosland, however, countered this point by stating that ‘in the main … the direct 
grant schools are local day schools and it is right that their future should be linked with that of 
the maintained system’. He completed his defence of his decision to exclude these schools in 
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a more robust manner. ‘I am convinced that had I brought these schools within the scope of the 
Commission it could only have led to confusion’.167 Crosland eventually rejected an attempt 
by these bodies to force the Commission to consider a research project conducted under their 
supervision fearing that it would it would influence the Commission’s decision to the detriment 
of the objectives set by the government.168 Initially, Crosland stated that he would recommend 
their findings to the Commission. Then, presumably realising the potential consequences, he 
deleted ‘would support’ in his draft reply.169 
Crosland had no experience of formulating and presenting a White paper or of 
establishing a Commission He relied heavily upon his civil servants to assist him in this 
exercise. They provided the advice that was required in three areas; wording of the commission, 
the details of pilot schemes for selected schools and precedents for previous Commissions. A 
senior official advised that the White Paper would have to be revised for the quite different 
purpose it was to serve. A ministerial paper argued the case for reaching a certain decision, 
whereas, the purpose of White Paper was to announce a decision that has been reached and 
should do so in a way most likely ‘to make friends and influence people’.170  
The discussions within the team of officials also focused on the pilot schemes that 
would be vital to the delivery of a programme of full-scale integration.  They offered a strategy 
to ensure that these independent schools did not open their doors exclusively to the most 
academically gifted arguing that their merits were not simply academic, but also social and 
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character building.171 The Commission could monitor the impact of these pupils who lacked 
the social background which was common to the majority of public schools. Therefore, the 
officials suggested that the top public schools might not be the most suitable ones and that 
‘fairly run of the mill schools with good reputations for social qualities might be the better 
choice’.172 They further advised that these ‘experiments’ should involve ‘substantial’ 
numbers.173 Crosland finally received advice that his proposed terms of reference for the 
Commission were too lengthy compared past examples and would be open to extensive critical 
comments.174 Crosland, however, was not convinced and ‘decided not to be deterred by 
precedent’.175 
Crosland brought his proposals to Cabinet where they were discussed between July and 
November 1965. Cabinet’s conclusion represented a similar determination on their part that the 
Commission should do more than previous attempts. 
 
It would be important to make clear…that the Government would not consider 
acceptable recommendations which amounted to no more than an extension of the 
scheme for the entry to public schools of the proportion of pupils from the State schools 
recommended by the Committee on Public schools (the Fleming Committee)176 
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The Cabinet also added certain provisos for Crosland to consider which had received attention 
during Crosland’s ministerial discussions177 The question of tax privileges raised issues of 
policy which the Cabinet decided should be considered in a wider context. Finally, there was 
cabinet insistence that the composition of the Commission should draw on personnel ‘from 
outside the educational system with practical experience of administration’.178 These 
comments may reflect a determination by a majority of cabinet colleagues that the Commission 
should not present another diluted version of previous attempts at reform of the public schools.   
 Crosland announced the details of the Commission to the Commons on 22 December 
1965 stressing that ‘integration’ was the main objective and that the headmasters of the 
independent schools stated that some reform of them was ‘vitally necessary’.179 Conservative 
MPs suspected that ‘fundamental, changes in the status and character of the independent 
schools was Crosland’s ultimate aim despite Crosland’s assurances’.180 The first meeting of 
the Commission was in March 1966 and it did not report till July 1968 by which time Crosland 
had served ten months as President of the Board of Trade. Crosland had no contact with the 
Commission or John Newson and failed to attend the lunch at the first meeting citing a prior 
engagement.181 
  
Higher Education: Polytechnics 
The demand for increased higher education provision in the post war era stemmed from the 
increased birth rate and an acceptance by both parties that it was an economic necessity. The 
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Labour party in particular also viewed this development as social desirable. A committee set 
up under the chairmanship of Lord Robbins recommended in its report in 1963 that the growth 
should come from within the university sector, the unitary approach, even though this meant 
that many areas maintained by the state, for example the Colleges of Education, would be 
absorbed by the universities. The Conservative government was quick to accept most of the 
recommendations of the report especially the ‘unitary’ dimension. Edward Boyle, Minister of 
State for Education until October 1964, explained that the haste with which the Conservative 
government accepted the report was a result of ‘bad conscience’ concerning their quarrel with 
the universities over the size of grants and university pay in 1962. However, he was also 
committed to the concept of equality of opportunity for such expansion would enable more 
places for working class students.182 
  However, the universities were under increasing pressure with the post-war bulge in the 
birth rate. The creation of seven new universities in the period 1963-1967 and the upgrading to 
university status of a number of CATs (Colleges of Advanced Technology) did not satisfy the 
burgeoning demand for higher education. One contemporary writer on education commented 
that, ‘Further expansion was unavoidable. What was all-important however, was the shape 
which that expansion would take’.183  
 Labour’s thinking on this was encapsulated in the report of the Taylor committee, of 
which Crosland was a member, entitled The Years of Crisis: Report of the Labour Party’s Study 
Group on Higher Education published in September 1963. The report urged the expansion of 
higher education and insisted that Britain’s prosperity and standard of living could no longer 
depend on abundant supply of raw materials or a pool of unskilled labour for:  
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‘ 
…the primary asset is the brain-power and skill of its scientists, engineers, research 
workers and technicians, administrators and professional men and women…Economic 
expansion is only possible if university and technological education expands rapidly 
and continuously to provide the necessary brainpower and skill.184 
 
 The committee proposed a short-term ‘crash’ programme to create 150,000 places and a long-
term plan establishing some seventy universities over twenty years providing another 700,000. 
A succinct policy Labour and the Scientific Revolution based on the Taylor Report was put to 
the Labour Conference at Scarborough in September 1963 and unanimously approved. Harold 
Wilson fully endorsed this policy referring to ‘the Britain that is going to be forged in the white 
heat of this [scientific] revolution’.185  Educational reform was to be the main instrument in 
this revolution and a sustained attempt was made by Labour to take the ‘high ground’ as the 
main ‘modernising’ party in terms of science and technology and its application through 
education.186  
 Following the Labour victory in October 1964, Michael Stewart became the new 
Secretary of State in the Department of Education. The Labour government broadly accepted 
the expansionist view of Robbins in the 1966 election manifesto. Stewart, however, had already 
modified the Robbins plan. Upon the urging of Weaver, who was concerned about the future 
of non-university education and fearing that there would be a ‘rat race’ for institutional 
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promotion to university status, Stewart announced in the Commons that colleges of education 
would not be drawn into the orbit of the universities as schools of education.187  
 Crosland publicly aired his intentions in regard to higher education reform and the 
Robbins recommendations in a speech at the Woolwich Polytechnic on 28 April. He rejected 
the Robbins vision of a university dominated higher education sector and supported the ‘binary’ 
system favoured by Weaver and his officials. Crosland stated that the DES would continue the 
‘twin’ traditions which had created the existing higher education institutions - autonomous 
universities and the public sector represented by the leading technical colleges and the colleges 
of education.188 
 
The Government accepts this dual system as being fundamentally the right one, with 
each sector making its own distinctive contribution to the whole. We definitely prefer 
it to the alternative concept of a unitary system, hierarchically arranged on the ladder 
principle, with the Universities on the top and the other institutions down below.189  
 
Crosland believed that the ‘dual’ system was preferable for four reasons. There was an 
increasing demand for vocational, professional and industrial courses in higher education that 
could not be met by the universities. Secondly, a system based on the ladder concept would 
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inevitably ‘depress and degrade’ both the morale and standards in the non-University sector.190 
Thirdly, it was desirable for a substantial part of the higher education system to be responsive 
to social and economic needs and therefore should be under public control. Fourthly, in a 
fiercely competitive world ‘the accent is more and more on professional and technical 
expertise’.191 He rejected the unitary system for this could not cater for a rapidly changing 
world socially, economically and politically. Such a system, Crosland argued: 
  
Would be characterised by a continuous rat race to reach the first or university division 
and a certain inevitable failure to achieve the diversity in higher education which 
contemporary society needs.192 
 
 Simon described this speech as delivering a ‘sledgehammer’ blow to the Robbins 
concept of a unitary system of higher education.193 It resulted in a criticism not only from 
universities but also from ‘many who saw the Robbins concept of a unitary system as the basis 
for a broad based democratic advance’.194 The universities complained about the lack of 
consultation while many within the Labour Party considered that this speech presaged the 
imposition of a divisive policy on higher education, a division which Crosland had 
endeavoured to eliminate from the secondary sector. This contradiction was compounded for 
Crosland had been a member of the Taylor Committee himself and while accepting 
responsibility, claimed that he had been pushed into making this speech prematurely by his 
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officials. In 1971 he admitted that the speech was an appalling blunder from which he learnt a 
lesson that he should never make a policy statement until he had settled into office for at least 
six months.195 While he was ‘utterly convinced that the [binary] policy was right’., the speech 
‘.put people’s backs up unnecessarily’.196 Crosland later claimed that officials wanted to get 
the policy on record as soon as possible.197 Crosland admitted further that when he finally 
mastered the subject, he became a ‘passionate’ believer in the binary policy and polytechnics 
and did as much as anyone else to push the policy through.198 
Crosland elaborate further on the relationship between Toby Weaver and Crosland and 
the development of the idea of the polytechnic. 
 
Toby Weaver was now the senior official concerned with higher education. He 
proposed the binary policy to Tony. Tony seized it, amended it, made it his own…the 
next thing was to determine where to move from there. With the help of Weaver and 
others, he invented the polytechnics as a makeweight to the universities 
 
Brian Simon characterised the relationship as one whereby ‘the eminence grise 
[Weaver]…successfully pressurised Crosland’ to make the Woolwich speech.199 Weaver was 
determined that the DES would be strengthened in its control of higher education in relation to 
the universities and this would please the LEAs. The creation of the polytechnics offered a less 
expensive solution to the expansion of higher education a crucial factor in a period when 
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resources were under great pressure.200 The debate concerning the official influences on 
Crosland’s reforms in the higher education sector has continued. A more recent study considers 
that Crosland, who ‘was not especially interested in education and more ambitious for an 
economic ministry, simply fell in line’.201 The figures who helped to form Crosland’s ideas 
included Eric Robinson, chairman of The Association of Teachers in Technical institutions, 
Alexander Clegg, Director of Education in the West Riding of Yorkshire, and William 
Alexander, chairman of The Association of Local Authorities. These individuals swayed 
Crosland towards maintaining local authority control over much of higher education in the 
form of the binary system. 
Crosland finally presented the details of the establishment of the polytechnics in a 
White Paper in May 1966. To meet the needs of the 700,000 students that the government 
wanted to attract in both full-time and sandwich courses, the paper stated that ‘a considerable 
measure of concentration is therefore essential’.202 This was the justification for the creation of 
the polytechnics whereby a ‘limited number of major centres would be designated…in which 
a wider range of both full-time and part-time courses can be delivered’.203 A White paper on 
Technical Education in 1956 had led to the introduction of a four-tier system of Colleges of 
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Advance Technology (CATs), Regional Centres, Area Colleges and Local Colleges. Apart 
from the CATs, which would now be transferred to the university sector as recommended by 
Robbins, the remaining institutions would form the core of the new polytechnics of which there 
were to be thirty in number. Again, the paper stressed that ‘As comprehensive academic 
communities they will be expected to cater for students at all levels of higher education’. 204 
The White Paper also stressed that the existing system had two major weaknesses which would 
now be addressed: an institutional distribution which could not sustain high academic standards 
or a satisfactory corporate life; and an uneconomical use of resources.205 
Initially, there was much support for Crosland’s reform of higher education especially 
from contemporary writers on education.   Colin Crouch and Stephen Mennell published a 
Young Fabian Pamphlet defending the binary system in the wake of the establishment of 
polytechnics stressing that Crosland was left with no alternative. 
 
One is therefore forced to the conclusion that the binary system, or something like it, is 
unavoidable if we are both to respond to contemporary pressures and preserve those 
distinctive characteristics of the universities which are considered of value.206 
 
In answer to the charge that the policy of ‘separate but equal’, in regard to institutional reform, 
‘has a most unfortunate political history’, the authors predicted that the ‘polys’ would 
eventually achieved ‘parity of esteem’.207  
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What Crosland did in bidding the new polytechnics to become major institutions in 
their own right was to begin the process of creating a new institutional form of higher 
education. These powerful establishments are to seek academic weight and prestige, 
not by eventually being promoted to university status, but by making a place for 
themselves in their own right, establishing their own precedents and traditions.208 
 
Although they criticised Crosland for making a ‘crude distinction between academic and 
vocational education’, they praised the binary system for it was ‘as a system of diversity, 
secured by institutional differences, that the policy has its true relevance’.209 However, 
Crosland was accused of imposing a division on higher education while attempting to eliminate 
such a division in secondary education (Grammar/Secondary Modern). He rebutted this 
argument as a ‘false analogy’. ‘They said that if you were against the 11-plus, you should be 
against an 18-plus. But at 11-plus an entire age group is moving up to a different level of 
education and the question is whether it does so in a selective or non-selective fashion. At 18-
plus nothing of the sort is happening’.210 
 Writing in the Socialist Commentary in 1970, Malcolm Keir, a lecturer in Government 
in the new polytechnic system predictably praised Crosland’s answer to the expansion of higher 
education as a ‘great social and educational advance’.211 
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Above all higher education has cease to be the preserve of an elite. No longer need full-
time education stop at eighteen for those who do not go to a university or a college of 
education. A major advance has thus been made not only in economic terms but in 
opening up freedom of choice and giving reality to the notion of equality of 
opportunity.212 
 
Nevertheless, he was concerned that the polytechnics needed to develop a ‘personality of their 
own’ and one which would challenge society for these new institutions should still be 
characterised by ‘a pursuit of dedicated, disinterested scholarship’.213 Crosland feared that the 
vocational origin would stifle ‘a radical spirit of enquiry’.214 
Tyrrell Burgess, a writer on educational matters whose views Crosland greatly 
respected,215 enthused about the nature of the expansion introduced by the Labour Government 
under the new Secretary of State at the DES. ‘It is not too much to say that the binary policy 
was the most radical, most specifically socialist policy the Labour government had in 
education’.216 Burgess considered the universities had failed to meet the needs of those 
especially from the working class who required work-related courses. ‘The British universities 
are and always have been middle-class institutions… their tradition is aloof, exclusive, 
conservative and scholastic’.217 Burgess criticised academics especially those on the left-wing 
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who ‘sneered’ at ‘mere vocational education’. which would be delivered at ‘low status 
institutions’. According to Burgess:218 
 
The only Labour Secretary of State who ever understood this [the need and demand for 
vocational education] was Anthony Crosland…What Tony Crosland sought to preserve 
and extend was the open, ‘comprehensive’, educational tradition of the technical 
college.219 
 
 Observing the development of the polytechnics over the following decade, however, 
Burgess became disillusioned with their progress and considered that Crosland should share 
responsibility. While crediting him with ‘the challenge to the intellectual climate of the early 
1960s whereby universities were perceived as the dominant form of higher education as 
reflected in the Robbins Report, he drew attention to the weakness in the White Paper.220 For 
Burgess, Crosland’s policy had fallen short and their existed a discrepancy between his 
speeches and the White Paper.221 Burgess had identified what he termed ‘academic drift’ as 
‘the process by which institutions in the service tradition seek to move towards the autonomous 
[university sector]’.222 He now felt that Crosland’s higher education reform had failed to arrest 
this process. 
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If Robbins could be said to have institutionalised academic drift, the White Paper 
encouraged the process while seeking to stop it short institutionally with the designation 
of the polytechnics.223  
 
Criticism of Crosland’s plans as enshrined in the White Paper came foremost and most 
vociferously from Lord Robbins in a speech in the House of Lords. While praising the 
impressive figure cited for higher education expansion, he found fault with most of the other 
features of Crosland’s plans.224 There was to be no minister of higher education as he 
recommended nor were the colleges of education to be freed from LEA control. Robbins 
reserved his main criticism for the polytechnics or ‘binary abracadabra’ as he termed it. By 
cutting the State controlled sector adrift the government were creating ‘an educational caste 
system more rigid and hierarchical than ever before’.225 He was convinced that binary systems 
would not succeed and he called on Crosland to think ‘long and earnestly before continuing on 
a course which can bring no pleasure to anybody except a few snobs at the centre and a few 
bullies at the periphery’.226 
Edward Boyle also came to question the ‘binary system’. At first he supported 
Crosland’s innovation for it had the merit of efficient use of resources. Further, he conditionally 
endorsed the list of thirty polytechnic announced by Crosland in April 1967. 
 
As the Secretary of State knows, we on this side have always recognised that it is right 
to concentrate costly resources in fewer centres and to designate a limited number of 
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polytechnics as the main centres for the future development of full-time higher 
education outside the universities.227 
 
Nevertheless, he had a number of reservations concerning Crosland’s proposals. He stressed 
that students other than those attending full-time university courses should be given parity of 
esteem: the Secretary of State should ‘attach great importance to the part-time student as well 
as to the full-time student’.228 He also urged Crosland ‘to feel his way cautiously over the 
rundown of the higher education colleges other than polytechnics’.229  By 1971 Boyle had come 
to doubt the artificial distinction between university and polytechnics and the impracticality of 
this reform of higher education. 
 
I agree that the binary system as we have it today, is inherently unstable…Any attempt 
at precise articulation of the difference between what a university is for and what a 
polytechnic is for doesn’t stand up. There is considerable overlap.230 
 
Boyle also considered that the two institutions would inevitably co-operate in terms of research 
needs and that there would be ‘close relationship’ between departments. Financial reasons 
would dictate this. 
In the same interviews with Maurice Kogan in 1971, Crosland made an equally strong 
case for the polytechnics stating categorically that there continued to exist a ‘need for 
institutions which cater not only for the traditional full-time degree course but for the part-time 
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student, the sub-degree course and the kind of education which has its roots in the technical 
tradition’.231 A year later Crosland reaffirmed his belief in the ‘Polytechnic ideal’ speaking at 
a conference on the future of the polytechnics in 1972.232 He was aware of the mistakes that 
had been made while he was Secretary of State citing the disparity in salaries between 
university and polytechnic staff that had led to the loss of high qualified staff to the autonomous 
sector: similarly, the polys had favoured full-time degree courses in order to retain such staff. 
These developments had resulted in a reduction of diversity. He warned that the polytechnics 
should ‘resist the insidious Establishment pressures which try to force the polytechnics into the 
university mould’.233 He believed that these mistakes were not irredeemable and urged the 
Conservatives to adopt ‘positive government discrimination in favour of the Polytechnics’.234 
Crosland concluded with a robust endorsement of their position in higher education provision. 
‘I believe in them on grounds of equality, of choice, of opportunity of relevance to the modern 
world. I am more convinced than ever of their enormous potential’.235 
Crosland’s contribution to the development of higher education has been much debated 
since his tenure of office at the DES. Christopher Price, who was Crosland’s Private 
Parliamentary Secretary between 1965 and 1967, complimented his decision to produce a 
White Paper which ‘became the vehicle of expanding the participation rate in higher education 
from 10 per cent to 30 per cent’. 236  He elaborated further on Crosland’s achievement in 1997. 
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The binary polytechnic policy provided an alternative model of what ‘peoples 
universities’ could be like; little by little they were copied by more orthodox universities 
and enabled expansion to take place. The polytechnics did quite as much to open up 
education to the disadvantaged as the abolition of the 11 +. 237 
 
With the transformation of polytechnics into universities in 1992, Crosland’s reform 
and the lasting impact of the binary system on the history of higher education in Britain has 
been reassessed. One writer on education suggested three possible interpretations: Robbins’s 
proposal of a system dominated by universities was rejected and replaced by Crosland’s binary 
system; Crosland’s system was an ‘aberration’ and was ‘.progressively eroded over the years’.; 
and finally, differences between the two systems have been ‘overstated’ and were more 
concerned with ‘second-order’ matters for example governance and management.238 His 
conclusion was that the third interpretation was the best fit. ‘Robbins envisaged that future 
higher education would be dominated by large comprehensive multi-faculty institutions. In 
fact, that is what happened, not belatedly in the 1990s but from the start in the 1970s’.239 
Crosland’s achievement consisted in the creation of institutions which were more diverse and 
this ethos was to be adopted by the more traditional universities. 
 
If the former polytechnics had not been allowed to shelter behind the binary cordon 
sanitaire for a quarter of a century, they would have been unlikely to achieve the self-
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confidence and dynamism they now display as post-1992 universities…UK universities 
are still described as either ‘pre-1992’ or ‘post-1992’ and they are still divided into so 
called ‘mission groups’ [the Russell group amongst others] Maybe we still live in a 
binary world – Crosland’s world. 
 
The development of the idea of the Open University was one initiative within the DES 
into which Crosland had virtually no input. This was the work of Jennie Lee who was Minister 
of the Arts a ministry under the auspices of Crosland as Secretary of State. Wilson was 
enthusiastic for this ‘university of the air’ and supported Lee throughout.240 Crosland 
considered this of limited importance – it would consume funds which were needed for other 
far more vital schemes in particular the schools building programme and the raising of the 
school leaving age.241 Roy Hattersley, a close friend and colleague of Crosland, wrote that 
Crosland ‘had no enthusiasm [for the OU] and would have gladly sacrificed it if the money it 
cost could have been switched to pre-school education’.242 Crosland’s biographer characterised 
the relationship with Lee as ‘distant’ and stated that Crosland would complain in private about 
that ‘bloody women’; but that he had left her free to develop the OU concept well aware of her 
popularity within the wider Labour movement as Bevan’s widow.243  He complained that Lee 
gave him very little support over the comprehensive programme for she considered that 
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comprehensives schools were impractical.244 ‘He [Crosland] encouraged the belief that we 
could have a classless education in a class society’.245  In regard to the OU Lee considered that 
he was disdainful of the whole project as well as irritated by the way she had hugged it to 
herself. 246 In fact, he eventually gave her invaluable help. He argued alongside her when 
confronting the Treasury over funding and his suggestions on the wording of the White Paper 
on the OU made the programme more attractive.247 In fact when Crosland left for the board of 
Trade in 1967 he complimented her efforts in regard to the OU stating that ‘don’t let anything 
stop you. It was one of the last pleasures to have got money in the Public Expenditure exercise 
which gives the green light’.248 
 
Evaluation 
Critical assessments of Crosland’s work at the DES have tended to focus on his reform of 
secondary education especially the abolition of the 11plus exam and the accelerated 
establishment of the comprehensive structure.  Shirley Williams was in no doubt that his drive 
to end selection was the product of his social philosophy. ‘The Crosland vision … was one of 
an inclusive cohesive society of which schools were the building blocks … He cared 
passionately about equality and was driven by a controlled danger against the privileges, 
patronage and preferment that so clutter up British Society’.249 She further stressed that he had 
changed society for the better by the achievement of his socialist aims. 
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In that short time he had changed the character of the department into one suffused with 
the comprehensive idea: he had given the Labour Party a goal to work for; and he had 
put into practice the tenets of social democracy, equality of opportunity and social 
justice … He had begun a process that had a lasting effect on British society.250 
 
Although, Crosland never deviated from his ideal of comprehensive education, he accepted 
political reality and compromised on the instruction to the LEAs by requesting their compliance 
rather than requiring them in spite of the objection of his minister Reg Prentice. When faced 
with recalcitrant authorities which attempted to sabotage the comprehensive model he and the 
DES envisaged, he adopted an uncompromising stance.  
 Williams also pointed to the fact that he was never in a position to further these 
objectives again and his contribution at the DES was vital to the success of the reform. 
However, much of the groundwork on comprehensive education had been laid down by others. 
Both Boyle and Stewart at the DES had provided momentum to the campaign to end selection. 
Williams stated that he had transformed a department with his determination for the 
comprehensive model; but Harte and her team were fully committed to the achievement of this 
‘goal’.  
Price agreed that Crosland’s approach to the wording of the circular was correct in 
terms of the longevity of abolition of selection ‘Founded on the rock of a Crosland value 
judgement, the abolition of selection at the age of 11 became politically irreversible’. 251 He 
also credits Crosland with introducing an element of ‘spin’ into the promotion of the DES 
policy of comprehensive schools and abolition of selection. Price explained how Crosland 
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favoured press releases that were succinct and gave the impression of a ‘snowballing tide of 
educational change’ and that this development was unstoppable.252 Price does admit that 
Crosland was ‘lucky’ for the ground had been prepared with the increasing unpopularity of the 
11 plus with the post-war burgeoning middle class whose demand for increased grammar 
school places could not be met. 
Nevertheless, Price considered that Crosland’s ministerial contribution to educational 
reform was to be admired. ‘Crosland’s legacy is that without legislation and without any new 
resources … he encouraged local education authorities to consolidate comprehensive schooling 
as a principle’.253 Price writing in 1999, admitted the ‘bloom’ had faded on the comprehensive 
revolution in the three decades following the mid-sixties but that this was in no part Crosland’s 
fault. For Price, the cause was a failure of succeeding governments to match curriculum and 
teacher training to the demands of the diverse intake into comprehensives and Crosland’s 
attempt to tackle curriculum and training programmes had met with hostility from the teaching 
establishment.  
Tony Benn, who had regretted Stewart’s departure from the DES, was more critical of 
Crosland especially his indifference to the teaching regimes within comprehensives ones, 
which Benn felt, should not imitate Grammar schools. Although Crosland opposed 
‘unnecessarily early and rigid streaming’ at the primary level, he accepted that there might be 
a place for it in the comprehensive.254  
Crosland’s appointment as Secretary of State at the department of Education and 
Science provided an opportunity to advance the cause of equality in society. He regarded 
education as the most important instrument for this and continually wrote on this theme. 
                                                          
252 Ibid, p.76. 
253 Ibid, p.77. 
254 Anthony Crosland, North of England Education Conference, 1966, ACP, 5/2. 
123 
 
However, utilising education as a means of social engineering became the dominant motivation 
and strongly influenced his decisions often leading to contradictions in the delivery of his 
policies. The ending of educational selection and consequent segregation of pupils after the age 
of eleven was the fundamental feature of his programme of reform; but he was to find this more 
difficult to achieve recognising that practical compromises had to be made. Crosland’s 
obsession with countering middle class influence in education illustrates the limitations of a 
theoretical approach to reform. Crosland knew little of the internal dynamics of secondary 
school teaching and made no attempt to intervene in curriculum matters although he did take 
an interest in the innovative methods advocated by the Schools Council. 
Secondary school reform was the focus of Crosland’s work at the DES and his 
determination to ‘destroy every fucking grammar school’. Nevertheless, he opted for the less 
forceful ‘request’ rather than the ‘require’. Reg Prentice considered this was an opportunity 
lost for achieving this objective and that it would allow authorities to delay. In fact, the process 
of establishing comprehensives was well advanced before Crosland arrived and he did 
intervene where necessary to add weight to the department’s administration of the process of 
managing submissions. The benefits of comprehensive reorganisation were accepted by 
Conservative controlled authorities as well and Margaret Thatcher was unable to deny further 
requests when she became Minister for Education in 1970. Some educationalists considered 
that his rhetoric was not matched by his accomplishments and that Michael Stewart had 
contributed more to reorganisation of schools on comprehensive lines. Crosland’s colleague 
Tony Benn criticised Crosland’s indifference to the practice of streaming in schools for Benn 
considered that this was as important as selection in the achievement of equality in education. 
Crosland’s reform of higher education was driven by a combination of theory and 
practicality. He considered that the universities were institutions that only provided a traditional 
academic education for those from the public schools and did not cater for those students who 
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desired a more vocational preparation. Departmental influence pressed Crosland towards the 
idea of polytechnics before he had become convinced of this solution; but he eventually 
embraced this approach to higher education reform. However, he was criticised for creating 
segregation at this level when he had condemned it for secondary schools. He hoped rather 
unrealistically that the polys would not become subject to ‘academic drift’ whereby these new 
institutions would aim for university status. The division that Crosland created was meant to 
be accepted in the academic world as one of parity. Eventually the polytechnic he was to 
establish was abandoned in the 1990s as part of government policy although the vocational 
element became a permanent feature of university programmes of study. Crosland’s biographer 
stated that his efforts in the field of higher education reform met with ‘mixed fortunes’ although 
he accepted that the pressure on polytechnics to become universities ‘had more to do with a 
drift in policy after Crosland left the department’. He applauded Crosland for ‘championing’ 
greater access to higher education for working-class students, part-timers and women. He 
summarised his contribution as follows: ‘Crosland deserved credit for at least moving beyond 
the old conception that universities alone were synonymous with higher education’. 255 
Crosland’s reforming zeal was not extended to the public schools. The Labour 
manifesto of 1964 stipulated that a trust would be established to consider the best way to 
integrate these into the state system. Crosland’s sole contribution to this process was to lay 
down the terms of a public school commission (PSC) and to stress that the commission must 
reject the two extreme solutions of ‘abolition’ and ‘squeezing’. Although the Commission 
reported after he had left the DES, his legacy was very limited for one who placed such an 
emphasis on the achievement of equality as fundamental to a socialist society. Criticism was 
made of Crosland’s decision to set up a Commission for the Public Schools by Prentice and 
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others who anticipated a more robust approach. They expected Crosland to adhere to a policy 
based on principle and not one on pragmatism for it was felt in Cabinet that financial 
imperatives ruled out yet more reform.
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Chapter Three: President of the Board of Trade. (August 1967-October 1969) 
 
‘The drive of the long-distance runner who is now in charge’.1 
 
Crosland’s appointment to the Board of Trade (BOT) presented a different challenge to 
that at Department of Education and Science. As Secretary of State for Education he believed 
that he could further the goal of equality of opportunity in society by educational reform. This 
could be achieved by the following measures: the elimination of selection at eleven; the growth 
of the Comprehensive; broadening working-class intake via the polytechnics; and integration 
of public schools within the maintained system. The BOT offered few opportunities for the 
furtherance of his agenda programme. Susan Crosland recognised that this did not appeal to 
her husband. ‘In most departments morality and objectives are married. Redistribution of 
wealth, central to Croslandism, scarcely arose at Trade where morality is only indirect – 
affecting other people’s jobs which could be lost’.2 He rapidly immersed himself in a 
department which offered a chance to tackle some of the pressing issues of the economy. 
This study will then concentrate upon those areas that attracted his attention in 
particular and assess his effectiveness as a minister: external trade and negotiations with EFTA, 
inward investment especially from America, Monopolies and Mergers policy, and support for 
the business community. Crosland’s brief also included transport and he was faced immediately 
with three contentious decisions:  the purchase of the BAC 2-11 for BEA; the status of Stansted 
Airport and the threat to the launching of the liner Queen Elizabeth II. Crosland’s involvement 
in industrial growth, focused on the fate of three industries while at the BOT: the manufacture 
of cotton textiles in Lancashire; the establishment of an aluminium industry and the growth 
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and management of domestic tourism. The Board of Trade had traditionally overseen British 
imperial dominance of world commerce in the mid and late nineteenth century a product of an 
industrial revolution which led the world. Many notable Presidents were also committed 
supporters of free trade policies which helped entrench this supremacy.3 By the 1960s the 
British economy was suffering from foreign competition and many well established industries 
were in serious decline. Crosland’s appointment entailed designing regeneration projects for 
these and promoting diversity by the introduction of innovative industrial programmes.  
 
Appointment and the Board of Trade 
By October 1967, Crosland had viewed his two and a half years at the DES as more than 
satisfying and hoped to continue his work there. His wife stated that he felt that ‘he was in sight 
of accomplishing many, if not all, of the things he had set his heart on’.4 Crosland included in 
this list of achievements the acceleration of the comprehensives to the point that it was 
irreversible, the establishment of the polytechnics and a report on the public schools to be 
published within the year.  Harold Wilson had other plans for him and contacted him on holiday 
in Cyprus in August 1967. Wilson explained that he wanted Crosland to be involved in tackling 
the balance of payments. The DEA was to be wound up and Crosland’s expertise was required 
at the Board of Trade for this would be the ideal department for Crosland to assist economic 
development: ‘I was anxious to bring Tony Crosland into the economic team’.5 Crosland 
confided to Richard Crossman that it had always been ‘his nightmare that he might be pushed 
into this ghastly ministry which was nobody’s business’ and where any restructuring to make 
                                                          
3 William Huskisson, John Bright, William Gladstone and Joseph Chamberlain all in the nineteenth century. 
4 Crosland, Crosland p.182. 
5 Harold Wilson, A Personal Record. The Labour Government 1964-1970 (Boston, Little Brown and Co., 1971) 
p. 427. 
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it more effective would be an ‘appallingly dreary task’.6 However, Crosland eventually 
admitted to his wife that ‘on balance’ this was the right move to make.7 
 
He wanted to be in a stronger position to influence central economic policy. He’d 
always dreaded being landed with the Board of Trade. Yet he knew he’d be better 
placed there … to press the devaluation issue and influence the economic strategy on 
which Education and every other domestic spending departments ultimately depended.8 
 
 The Trade portfolio was traditionally regarded as useful preparation for the Chancellorship 
which had always been Crosland’s ambition.9 Jim Callaghan assured him that this would enable 
him to achieve this objective. Writing to Crosland he congratulated him for this appointment 
was a ‘step nearer the centre’.10 Nevertheless, any optimism concerning promotion to the 
chancellorship was crushed within three months when Roy Jenkins entered Number 11 
replacing Callaghan as Chancellor who became the new Home Secretary. Following 
devaluation in November, Callaghan decided that he would have to resign although he was 
persuaded to accept another of the key Cabinet posts. A straight swop avoided any need for 
Wilson to undertake a major reshuffle and Jenkins was a recognised economist. 
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8 Ibid. 
9 See Kevin Jeffreys, Anthony Crosland (London, Richard Cohen Books, 1999) p. 122. 
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Crosland was reluctant to take on a department which had such a disparate portfolio. 
Crosland considered it to be ‘a ragbag of things that didn’t relate to one another’.11 The BOT 
was also responsible for other areas of the British economy especially international trade; 
regional policy; Monopolies and Mergers; the Office of Fair Trading; policy towards 
technology and civil research and even the insurance industry.12 Crosland eventually 
concentrated upon the first three of these for he believed that it was here that he could boost 
the performance of British industry and increase export trade especially following the 
opportunities provided by devaluation finally announced in November 1967. Crosland had 
argued for devaluation since 1964 a measure which would have enabled the DEA to deliver 
the export drive that Crosland had worked for. However, as a trade minister, he joined the 
steering committee on economic affairs and was able to press for devaluation.13 The decision 
by the government had resulted in humiliation for Wilson and even a possibility that Callaghan 
might resign leaving the way open for Crosland to become chancellor. Callaghan did leave the 
Treasury for the Home Office but it was Jenkins who was promoted to the Chancellorship and 
Crosland, disappointed again, remained at the Board. 14 
 
                                                          
11Crosland, Crosland, p. 190. 
12 Peter Hennessy points out that the poor performance of British Industry since the war had led to a temptation 
by Governments to make adjustments to the Whitehall machinery designated to cope with it. The Board of Trade 
had been responsible for virtually all policy making but significant areas of the new industrial policy had been 
apportioned to departments such as the Ministries of Fuel and Power and Transport. Wilson had continued this 
process with the establishment of the DEA and the Ministry of Technology. Peter Hennessy, Whitehall, London, 
Fontana Press, 1990) p. 433. 
13 Jeffreys, Crosland, pp.125-6. 
14 Ibid. The decision to appoint Jenkins rather than Crosland may have been personal for, according to Pimlott, 
Wilson seemed more at ease with Jenkins than Crosland. See Pimlott, Wilson, p.488. 
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Transport: Planes, Boats and Airports. 
A decision that required his immediate attention concerned the aircraft industry and involved 
a triangular struggle with the Minister of Technology (Tony Benn) and the First Secretary of 
State (George Brown). Disagreements with Brown had characterised their partnership at the 
DEA in the brief time Crosland was there. Such instant decisions on future policy were rarely 
a feature of his responsibility at the DES. In December 1967, Crosland found himself isolated 
and eventually instructed to make an announcement in the Commons with which he profoundly 
disagreed. On this occasion, there appeared to be no ‘leaks’ from Cabinet. 
In July 1966 the Government had refused BEA permission to purchase the Boeing 727 
aircraft. BEA had subsequently asked for permission to buy the BAC 2-11 an aircraft developed 
in Britain. The decision that Crosland eventually faced along with the Cabinet was whether the 
Labour Government should accept this request or whether they should instruct BEA to instead 
purchase the Trident 3B from Hawker-Siddeley an independent British company. This was the 
effective alternative and one which had the virtue of being substantially less expensive. The 
BAC 2-11 was a two-hundred passenger seater plane which would cost £120 million to develop 
by the British Aircraft Corporation. The Trident 3B, seating only one hundred and forty-six 
passengers, looked a more attractive proposition at a cost of £15 million to the Government. A 
ministerial committee had met in the week before a full Cabinet meeting and Crosland had 
dissented from the majority recommendation to refuse BEA’s request for the BAC 2-11. 
Crosland made a plea to the Cabinet to reconsider. Brown had first pressed the case against the 
BAC 2-11 citing that the scale of the cost to the Exchequer which would be even more difficult 
to justify after devaluation and that the Government was now pursuing the ‘development of 
major aircraft only on the basis of an assured European market’. 15  
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Crosland reiterated that there were ‘powerful arguments’ in favour of the BAC 2-11 
which was the choice of BEA. If this request was refused a second time, this would severely 
‘impair morale’ in BEA. The company had selected the BAC 2-11 for very sound reasons: it 
was intermediate size between existing types of aircraft and the Airbus; it was the first 
generation of quieter aircraft; lower operating costs were guaranteed; and with devaluation, 
there were ‘greatly improved export prospects’.16 He concluded by pointing out the 
considerable attraction of this deal to the Government. Rolls Royce favoured the development 
of the engine designed for the BAC 2-11(the RB 211) for this could be sold in America. Again, 
developing the BAC 2-11 was a form of ‘insurance policy’. If the European Airbus project was 
abandoned then we would be left with no option but to buy American aircraft for there would 
be no outlet for Rolls Royce’s ‘new technology’. 17  
Crosland’s final statement in Cabinet encapsulated his strategy for export growth and 
sound public finances and one, which he stressed, could not rely on devaluation alone as a 
means of addressing the balance of payments issue or one which called for public expenditure 
cuts. 
 
There were two general considerations which argued in favour of developing the BAC 
2-11. First, we could not regard devaluation as being sufficient in itself to solve our 
balance of payments problems and we should still be prepared to incur Government 
expenditure where this would yield worthwhile results in terms of foreign exchange. 
Second, it was wrong to think that in our present conditions it was necessary to reduce 
public expenditure indiscriminately; we should consider all forms of expenditure from 
                                                          
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
132 
 
the point of view of their effect on the balance of payments, and from this point of view 
expenditure on the BAC 2-11 was fully justified.18 
 
Crosland’s summary drew on his belief in the opportunities that would accrue from 
devaluation and his championing of the beneficial effects of maintaining the existing level of 
public expenditure as a means of promoting economic growth. He had argued this economic 
strategy continually in Government and now applied this approach to the areas overseen by the 
Board of Trade. Crosland found himself virtually alone and faced Tony Benn who as the 
Minister of Technology supported the arguments of George Brown. Benn was not impressed 
by Crosland’s support for the judgment of BEA ‘since a large Government subsidy was 
involved and past experience showed that government would be unlikely to recover the major 
part of it’.19 Countering, what he seemed to regard as Crosland’s risk strategy, he dogmatically 
insisted that ‘It was wrong to develop any major aircraft unless there was an assured market 
for it with at least three major airlines’.20 Wilson summarised the discussion without 
recognising the merit in any of the arguments put forward by Crosland. His final statement 
precluded any compromise with BEA’s wishes. ‘It was unlikely that an aircraft designed to 
meet domestic requirements alone would be successful in world markets’.21 
 In the House of Commons, Crosland duly announced the Government’s decision to 
deny authorisation of the purchase of 30 BAC 2-11 aircraft and to agree to meet a share of the 
launching costs of Trident 3B from Hawker Siddeley. He cited two reasons for this decision- 
‘no certainty of sufficient foreign sales to justify public investment’ and ‘the urgent need to 
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limit new public expenditure at this present time’. 22 Reaction to Crosland’s announcement was 
anything but favourable and he found himself forced to defend a brief for which he had no 
appetite. MPs, in particular Conservative ones, speculated pessimistically on the future of the 
domestic aircraft industry raising such doubts as the following:  the damage to the morale of 
BEA staff and management; the effect on the long-term sales of prospects of British aircraft 
and engines; the impact on the British aero-industry; and the future, if any, of the European 
Airbus.23 Nicholas Ridley, for the Conservatives, focused on the BEA and the impact of this 
decision on their future freedom of action in aircraft selection. ‘What is the point of continuing 
to have BEA as an independent airline if the right hon. Gentleman is going to take all the major 
decisions for it, and what is more, probably take them wrong?’.24  
As a minister Crosland, was obliged to voice the consensus within the Cabinet even 
though he had advocated an alternative policy. In the Commons, he relied on the arguments in 
which he had relegated as subordinate to the potential benefits of BAC 2-11 the day before. He 
now stressed that Trident 3B was attractive in terms of running costs and that the Government 
was not necessarily under an obligation to choose aircraft the Corporation had preferred.25 He 
rejected the claim that this decision was the ‘death knell’ of the industry and concluded by 
emphasising that the Conservative opposition had gained what they had called for. 
 
But all these factors-the more attractive noise element, the more attractive operating 
costs, and so on-at the end were easily outweighed by a difference in launching costs 
between £120 million in the one case and £15 million in the other. Hon. Members 
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24 Guardian, 16 December 1967, p.14 
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opposite who are constantly urging us to economise on public expenditure cannot in all 
conscience say that we should have taken on the extra million burden.26 
 
Even if Crosland was unable to convince the Cabinet, he found support in the aircraft 
industry for there was general agreement that Crosland’s announcement did not augur well for 
the British aircraft industry and that an opportunity for export sales had been lost. Sir Anthony 
Millward (Chairman of BEA) said that he had learnt with ‘great regret’ of the Government’s 
decision which he believed was a ‘major blow’ to BEA as well as to the airframe and engine 
business of Britain.27 Freddie Laker, chairman and managing director of Laker Airways, who 
had announced that he was willing to buy three BAC 2-11s, was more blunt.28 ‘The 
Government decision is totally and shamefully wrong. This short-sighted policy will force me 
to buy the Boeing 727’.29  Autair International, which would have bought three BAC 2-11s, 
stated that they would look to American companies for further equipment. Crosland’s 
announcement was given moral support by a ministerial colleague. John Stonehouse, Minister 
of State in the Department of Technology, defended Crosland’s position stating that ‘.if the 
British aircraft industry is not to bankrupt itself…we must have the courage to discard 
techniques that do not pay off’..30 In view of the possible negative impact of the decision on 
the British Aircraft Corporation, Crosland assured MPs that the Government accepted full 
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responsibility for finding alternative work for employees who would be affected. Crosland was 
to engage with another issue in his first few months which would again test his resolve but one 
in which his judgement was finally vindicated and supported 
Crosland made another early decision, this time on his own initiative, when in the first 
few months he ordered that case for Stansted as the third London airport should be re-opened. 
Stansted, a base for bomber command in the war, was taken over by the Civil Aviation authority 
in 1949 and by 1966 was a major departure point for charter flights offering lower costs than 
either Heathrow or Gatwick. With the popularity and growth of air travel, the government 
looked to Stansted as a possible third London airport to relieve excess congestion from the 
other two.  A lengthy inter departmental review had been conducted by officials which had 
taken five months and this had come to the same conclusion as a similar study under the 
Conservative Government in 1964. The case for Stansted, it concluded, was indisputable and 
officials within the department thought that the matter was closed. Douglas Jay, the former 
President of the Board of Trade, supported this stating in a meeting of the Labour Party: ‘In all 
cases, Stansted, although not ideal, presented fewer or less acute difficulties than the alternative 
sites suggested’.31  
However, many backbenchers in that meeting had their doubts concerning the case as 
presented for Stansted.  
 
It was considered that the government’s decision had been unduly influenced by outside 
pressures. That many of the facts put forward in support of the Stansted site were open 
to dispute and time should be given for a careful examination of these details. Too much 
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attention had been given to the advice of civil aviation and air traffic concerns and too 
little consideration given to the views of Planning Authorities.32 
  
Their criticism continued questioning the arguments put forward, many of which they felt had 
been inexplicably ‘changed or distorted’.33 Therefore, Crosland’s decision was not taken in 
isolation from significant feeling within the party. He pressed his case further in Cabinet 
stressing that ‘a number of developments … made it desirable for them [cabinet] to reconsider 
the matter’.34 Central to his reasoning were several factors: the need for realignment of the 
runways at Stansted still posed new problems; the possibility of strong opposition in the Lords 
especially as this might obstruct the Government’s negotiations with that body for reform; and, 
above all, the revelation to the cabinet that vital statistical information had been suppressed.  
 
It now transpired that no cost/benefit analysis had in fact been made until after the 
Government’s decision had been announced…It was not possible to be sure in these 
circumstances that even now all the relevant facts were available to Ministers.35 
 
Crosland, who received qualified support from the Minister for Housing and Local 
Government, Anthony Greenwood, called for a small independent committee to be established. 
Crosland was directed by Wilson and the Cabinet to investigate two of the issues he had raised 
– realignment of the runways and the release of a ‘refined’ version of the cost/benefit analysis 
to interested parties. Within three months and following the results of the examination of these 
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issues, Crosland was able to announce to the Commons that there would now be a new full 
inquiry into the siting of the Third London Airport. He cited as justification that any 
adjustments arising from these assessments amounted ‘to such a radical departure from the 
early proposals as to constitute virtually a new project’.36 Crosland explained that a full public 
enquiry would therefore take place and claimed the credit for this decision ‘.for no public and 
objective inquiry such as the one I am proposing was ever conducted’..37 His statement stressed 
that there was genuine public concern and desire for this reappraisal and that the Government 
still regarded a Third London airport as a necessity by the middle of the 1970s as commercial 
and social demand increased which justified Crosland’s support for the BAC 2-11 and its 
greater capacity. 
 
The government have taken this decision in response, not merely to the very legitimate 
pressure of the House, but to the clear signs, both locally and nationally, which have 
emerged over the last few months that public anxiety and debate still continues.38 
 
Crosland’s claims were substantiated by the comments from across the floor of the 
House. In fact, many Conservatives welcomed his announcement but claimed the credit for this 
volte face and denied that it was down to his initiative. The only real disapproval of Crosland’s 
decision came from his departmental officials who had worked solidly on the Stansted proposal 
for many months. Susan Crosland recorded that her husband’s determination to reopen the case 
and effectively reject their decision, greatly strained relations with the Board’s officials at the 
beginning. He admitted to her the following. 
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I shall never forget the row of black faces! The officials thought that they had 
finally got Stansted sown up and were enraged to have the whole wretched 
matter reopened. They thought that I was mad and wrong. My relations with 
that group of people were pretty bad for some time.39 
 
Faced with another pressing decision in his first days at the Board, Crosland made an 
instant decision unrelated to the wider context or the opinion of Wilson.  Cunard was in 
financial trouble and threatened to scrap the launching of the Queen Elizabeth II by the Queen 
nine days before the ceremony. Crosland, as President, considered that there was no case for 
tax-payers’ money to be used to keep Cunard in business. Richard Crossman commented on 
Crosland’s casual reference to the financial crisis for Cunard and the possible benefit to the 
government stating: ‘Let them go bankrupt and afterwards the Government could buy up the 
remains cheaply. However, others felt that this would be unfortunate for the Queen’.40 Harold 
Lever, Financial Secretary of the Treasury, came up with a plan to save the liner without costing 
the government. Crosland listened to Lever’s scheme and, in spite of the expressed disapproval 
of officials, took the scheme to Cabinet where it was sanctioned. The credit for averting this 
potential publicity disaster for the Labour Government, Crosland assigned to Lever. 
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The Prime Minister said that they were all very grateful to the President of the Board 
of Trade of this swift and competent action ‘Very little to do with me,’ replied the 
President of the Board of Trade, one hand waving it away, ‘whole credit belongs to the 
Financial Secretary’. 41 
 
Ironically, the Times’ editorial praised the Board of Trade for securing a deal ‘without putting 
a heavier burden on the taxpayer’.42 Crosland received special merit and his promotion to the 
Board vindicated. This was seen as a ‘coup’ for the new President. 
 
Any doubts about his business acumen must now be resolved. He is believed to have 
taken a leading part in the refinancing – and by any standards he has done it well. The 
deal will raise his stature in the business community.43 
 
Crosland’s insistence that Cunard should not be treated as a separate case continued. In the 
Cabinet meeting called for 26 October, he proposed that legislative provision for the further 
assistance to the shipping company should not be included in the Industrial Expansion Bill but 
should form the subject of separate legislation.44 The shipping industry was entering a difficult 
period. Wilson was informed by Sir Basil Smallpiece, the new chairmen of Cunard, that there 
was a likelihood of the lay-up of many famous ships. Wilson considered that Government 
participation in Cunard was essential.45 Crosland disagreed arguing that: 
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It would give an unfortunate impression of the aims of the Industrial Expansion Bill if 
one of the first projects to be promoted under it was directed not to industrial expansion 
but to helping a firm in financial difficulties.46 
 
Crosland suggested that financial support could be found in the Civil Contingencies Fund and 
that any other legislation designed to help Cunard would only result in ‘further congestion of 
the Parliamentary timetable’.47 Wilson accepted Crosland’s argument and George Brown was 
requested to form an inter-departmental committee to consider whether the Bill [Industrial 
Expansion] should cover Government assistance to the Cunard Shipping Line. 48 
 
Business Policy, Trade and Investment. 
 The increasing incidence of takeover bids in the 1960s raised issues of the economic impact 
of mergers and monopolies. Crosland took a positive view of such developments as beneficial 
to economic growth but found he had to make concessions to those who doubted their benefits. 
The Guardian financial editor William Davies noted that ‘the year is less than six weeks old, 
but the market value of take-over bids already exceeds the total for the whole of 1967’ and he 
warned that ‘1968 looks certain to go down as the biggest year for bids and mergers’.49 Aware 
of the benefits of mergers, he asked the question ‘Are there  too many mergers?’.50 Davies was 
not confident that Crosland as the President of Trade would ‘probably show little interest in 
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mergers even if he was at home’.51 Crosland faced with several high profile takeovers (Unilever 
– Allied Breweries and Rank-De La Rue), summarised the increase of takeover applications as 
‘on balance a beneficial trend which had led to badly-needed restructuring of many 
industries’.52 Later still he stated that the merger ‘race’ was unacceptable53 and in a speech in 
Manchester used more emotive language fearing that mergers could become a ‘fashion’.54 
 
There have been signs recently of ‘merger fever,’ which may lead to ill-considered 
unions and a disproportionate expense of time and energy by top management in 
plotting and resisting takeover bids.55 
 
Crosland, while continuing to stress that he still regarded most mergers as ‘neutral or 
beneficial’,  took several steps to assure those who were equally concerned that the powers of 
the 1965 Act would be invoked when needed to provide a sufficient restraining influence.56  
Crosland stated that he would publish guidelines which would help the businessman to 
understand the Board of Trade’s criteria in judging mergers57 Crosland reiterated this intention 
to provide the necessary assistance to those considering a merger by stating to a meeting of the 
Industrial Reorganisation Committee that he intended to ‘publish a handbook on mergers latter 
in the year in order to make clearer to companies the kind of information which they would be 
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expected to provide before a decision was reached on whether to refer their propose merger to 
the Monopolies Commission’.58 Crosland made it clear that he and the Government were 
concerned about the establishment of ‘conglomerates’ which would have an unfair impact on 
the market and could lead to a monopoly. To further reassure the business community of the 
Board’s determination to monitor the situation, he promised that the government would appoint 
several new members to the Monopolies Commission.  
Crosland attempted to maintain a balance on this issue - responding to companies 
concern over the growth of ‘conglomerates’ while recognising the necessity to the economy of 
the development of such business models – and his attempts were acknowledged in the business 
press. Anthony Harris in the Guardian stated that the President’s actions were necessary ‘to 
refute the charge of inconsistency and to give industry some guidance, short of hard-and-fast 
criteria about which mergers are likely to be judged’.59 Harris also detected another possible 
motive in Crosland’s posture for, Harris suggested, the President of the Board of Trade was 
making a last minute bid for more departmental influence in merger policy in the future.60 It 
was obvious to Harris that the role of all departments involved in the development of the 
economy (Treasury, DEA, BOT) were soon to be clarified and he considered that Crosland had 
foreseen an opportunity to extend the responsibility of his domain.  
The issue of inward investment in the British economy especially by American 
corporations presented a difficult challenge for Crosland. Trans-Atlantic interest in the home 
economy raised the prospect of American control of British firms and involved once again the 
question of mergers and monopolies. The impact of American investment was seen as a threat 
on a wider stage in the opinion of the Economist.  
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General de Gaulle’s view of Britain as the American Trojan Horse has been fostered by 
many things. One of the most important has been its high propensity to attract American 
capital. Although the proportion of British industry in American hands is increasing, 
this argument has less force than previously, since the growth of le defi Americain has 
been more dramatic on the continent.61 
 
The Economist believed that government support and the IRC had a part to play in the 
modernisation of British industry, but that if these industries were to compete successfully in 
the international market, ‘they must be encouraged to compete on a world scale rather than to 
seek special assistance in the U.K’.62  A strong advocate of the benefits of inward investment, 
Fred Catherwood, who was Director-General of the National Economic Development Council, 
had worked with Crosland at the DEA and now attempted to convince the President of the 
many benefits of such investment. Catherwood was the main speaker at an Anglo-American 
conference in Oxford and said ‘.that Britain should continue to welcome American 
investment’..63 He offered Crosland a briefing paper on North American trade and one on 
Mergers following the conference. Crosland’s policy lacked consistency encouraging inward 
investment which could benefit the economy and yet attempting to protect British commercial 
interests.  
By April 1969 Crosland had sanctioned a draft minute for Wilson in which he tackled 
the contentious issue of the government’s position on the nature of its powers to prevent foreign 
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takeovers.64 Crosland provided Wilson with a choice of control mechanisms either the 
Monopolies and Mergers Act or Exchange Control. The former he characterised as an 
‘uncertain instrument’ which gave ‘no powers permanently to prevent the takeover’ if not 
censured by the Monopolies Commission.65 However, the latter mechanism, Crosland 
concluded, was a more direct method of control, the only requirement being Treasury 
permission before a British company passed into the hands of non-residents.66 Crosland 
favoured light-touch management rather than legislation of the Exchange control mechanism. 
In reference to inherent weaknesses in this latter instrument Crosland stated that 
 
any attempt to eradicate them [operational flaws] would involve legislation that would 
be highly controversial and would be taken as an indication that the Government intend 
to pursue a more restrictive policy towards inward investment; and I would prefer to 
leave any consideration of the possibility of legislation until we [Board of Trade] have 
had a chance to consider the results of the inward investment study which my 
department has been doing.67    
 
This minute almost certainly reflects Crosland’s instructions for he had expressed his concerns 
in a meeting on inward investment with departmental officials on 29 April 1969. Although 
conceding that there were ‘minor gaps in our powers’ of the Exchange Control Act, any further 
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legislation ‘would put foreign firms on notice and cause publicity’ thereby deterring possible 
investment.68  
Crosland favoured increased American investment but his approach met with some 
hostility from unions. A resolution by the Clerical and Administrative Workers Union objected 
to increased American takeovers. Crosland was given emphatic support by officials in the BOT. 
James Jack, an official, warned of the possible adverse consequences if the government 
supported this line and rejected the idea that ‘foreign investment in the UK should always take 
the form of minority holdings’. 69 He further warned of possible retaliatory measures against 
British ‘outward investment’. One area which did prompt Crosland to question the influence 
of American investment was in the field of UK publishing. An announcement by McGraw Hill 
Publishing USA that they intended to increase their holding of ten per cent in Penguin did not 
meet with his approval. Before Crosland left the Board of Trade, he expressed concern of a 
previous investment by a US publishing company and the threat posed to the independence of 
UK publishers.70  
One of Crosland’s reasons for apprehension in regard to his appointment was the diversity of 
responsibilities inherent in the position of President of the Board of Trade. He found himself 
indirectly involved in the survival of the cotton textile industry which was under the threat of 
growing competition from cheap cloth imports especially shipped from developing countries. 
Management and unions expected support from the Labour Government. They looked to 
Crosland’s appointment for some measure of protection - one that they felt they had not 
received from Douglas Jay and hoped that Crosland’s appointment might promise a new start. 
‘Whether we get a better deal from Mr Crosland than from Mr Jay remains to be seen, but we 
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could hardly have a worse one’.71 Jay’s departure and Crosland’s appointment was literally 
greeted with the flying of flags at cotton mills in Rochdale, Oldham and Royton. The Chairman 
of the Shiloh Spinners Group, Edmund Garside stated: ‘We are glad that Mr Jay has gone, and 
we are hoping for a new policy from Mr Crosland’. 72 
Crosland was presented with a new challenge and one which would require his 
negotiating skill in pacifying the strength of feeling within the Lancashire textile community 
in particular. As with the aircraft industry, Crosland as minister, was faced with the demands 
of meeting the expectations of these two vital industries within the context of Labour Policy. 
Crosland’s initial response was to meet the pleas of the textile community by indicating to 
union leaders that he would ‘go a long way to meeting many of their demands’.73 They made 
a robust demand at the 1967 Labour Conference in Scarborough for ‘anti-dumping’ measures, 
import controls and for special help to protect their industry – help which they felt had been 
given to the ‘tough miners’ lobby’ which had achieved a ‘stay’ of pit closures. 74  
Crosland’s first response was to embark on a ‘fact-finding’ visit to the mill towns of 
Lancashire and Cumberland. He was met by increased criticism by textile managers who 
complained of the failure by the government to take action to protect the industry and also 
unions who described their ‘shabby treatment’ compared to the protection offered to the 
miners. The textile community felt that the government retained little interest in their plight.75 
Crosland and the Labour government were faced with pressure from India and other 
Commonwealth countries. These nations pressed for freer access to rich markets for their 
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products.76 Following his visit, Crosland held out little hope for immediate action to meet the 
demands of the cotton textile community. Nor did he offer the consolation of conferring 
development-area status on the declining textile towns.  
In fact, his attitude hardened after studying the report of the textile council on 
productivity and efficiency. Crosland appreciated the endemic problems of the cotton textile 
industry in the north-west but insisted that assistance would only come if the industry 
undertook measures to increase productivity. 
 
If the industry will play its part on the side of productive efficiency, the Government 
will fulfil their responsibility for an adequate policy on imports. I am absolutely 
confident that if all those involved in this problem play their part, we can create an 
industry which will continue to play a major role in the national economic life.77 
 
  These comments evoked a hostile reaction from the textile council. The Council stated 
that the Labour government had failed ‘to appreciate the full significance of the problems 
which have faced the industry for the last 10 years’ especially the ‘huge burden of imports, 
mainly duty free from developing countries in volume five or six times greater than those 
admitted by the EEC countries’.78 Disillusionment with Crosland grew within the textile 
industry. In response to Crosland’s call for greater efficiency, one union leader stated that ‘Mr 
Crosland is wrong - he is miles off the target’.79 The Guardian had some sympathy with 
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Crosland especially when faced by a bid from the giant textile company Courtaulds for a 
dominant position in the market.  
 
Mr Crosland seems to have been pushed into an odd and potentially dangerous 
constitutional position. He is being asked, in effect to decide the future structure of the 
industry, although he has no legal authority to do anything of the kind…There is no 
doubt that Mr Crosland will deliver the best judgement he can, and he is as competent 
as any Minister to do the job. 80 
 
It also recognised that the Government could hold to account those companies seeking 
profitable mergers by threatening them with referral to the Monopolies Commission which 
could become ‘a bogeyman in case of bad behaviour’.81 In the wake of the Monopolies 
Commission report on the trade in cellulosic fibre, Crosland was able to broker a deal whereby 
Courtaulds agreed to end their cartel arrangement with EFTA producers an arrangement which 
had restricted competition in this raw material.  
Crosland’s fluctuating relationship with the textile industry culminated in a decision by 
the Board of Trade to find a degree of accommodation with the council by offering limited 
protection. The report by the textile Council was completed by the start of 1969. Accepting 
much of the Council’s recommendations, he announced the imposition of a 15 per cent tariff 
on imports of cotton textiles from the Commonwealth countries from 1972. This would replace 
the existing system of quotas. He stated that the tariff would offer the industry a margin of 
protection that would help to stabilise the market enabling the industry to plan ahead with 
confidence. This measure combined, with the temporary continuation of quotas, would offer 
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the industry the opportunity to invest further in order to compete successfully. Crosland’s 
policy was to give the large firms the stability they needed so that they could proceed with their 
internal reorganisation and integration. At the same time, he encouraged a necessary 
amalgamation amongst the smaller firms82 He also promised a sympathetic consideration to 
the textile Council’s recommendation for higher depreciation allowances for older plant 
worked on a multi-shift basis – although he rejected the plea for a 40 per cent investment grant 
for firms in the traditional textile areas. Crosland made an exaggerated claim for the policy of 
the BOT in reinvigorating a traditional industry. 
 
Successive Governments have failed to come to grips with the industry’s basic 
problems … I hope that the decisions that I have announced provided that they are 
accompanied by a clear determination on the part of both sides of the industry to carry 
out the changes recommended by the Textile Council, will enable the Lancashire textile 
industry once again to take its place in the forefront of British industry. 83 
 
There was general agreement within the Commons on the pressing need to afford the 
textile industry a measure of protection but opinions varied on the most suitable method. MPs 
suggested there were alternative instruments available to Crosland and government for 
supporting the textile industry. The abandonment of the quota system was questioned by some 
MPs while they were concerned that EFTA members would benefit if tariffs were imposed.84 
Two prominent conservative MPs questioned the impact on established commonwealth trade 
links. Keith Joseph pointed out the international ramifications of the Government’s imposition 
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of a tariff for this was ‘a departure from the Ottawa Agreement … although it is in connection 
with the textile industry which occupies a unique position in our international trade’.85 Julian 
Amery an ardent imperialist continued this theme stressing that the quota system had the 
advantage of discriminating in favour of the Commonwealth producers and considered that 
Crosland’s adjustments would ‘sacrifice the interests of Pakistan, India and Hong Kong to 
Japan, Korea and equally more or less underdeveloped countrie’.86 When questioned on the 
most appropriate balance of his package between the interests of developing and developed 
countries, Crosland stated confidently that it was a ‘solution which preserves a balance between 
these various factors’.87  
In Cabinet, Crosland had received broad support for the measures proposed although 
views on the level of aid to India were divided. The abandonment of quotas was accepted for, 
with falling consumption, quotas were bound to become less effective.88 Wilson stated later 
that these measures were necessitated and justified by the increasing threat from imports from 
aboard. ‘Overseas competition much of it manifestly unfair, had for many years inflicted the 
most serious damage on the morale of the cotton and associated industries, with all that meant 
for their confidence in the future’. 89 However, as Wilson noted and predicted, there was a great 
outcry from the exporting countries.90 A delegation from the United Nations Association led 
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by Humphrey Berkeley, confronted Crosland at the Board of Trade protesting against the tariff. 
‘We believe that this [tariff] is a contradiction of the principles underlying aid to developing 
countries, in so far as it will create an obstacle to the improvement of their export earnings’.91  
Crosland claimed that no precedent would be set and that other developed countries had 
resorted to such measures.92 
This protectionist measure was criticised in the press. The Guardian drew attention to 
this ‘unprecedented step which flies in the face of world-wide liberalisation policy’. 
Nevertheless, it approved of the package of measures for they illustrated Crosland’s ‘blueprint’ 
for the future of the textile industry. 93 
 
In effect, yesterday’s proposals are yet another lease of life to the cotton textile industry 
to give it what must be surely be a last chance to solve its problems. The industry has 
been given very largely what it asked for and it is now up to individual firms to invest 
in new machinery and pursue other rationalisation measures.94 
 
Crosland’s responsibilities as President covered not only the traditional industries such as 
textiles but also a growing sector of the service industry tourism. From supporting an ailing 
regional industry his attention was drawn to the development of one which was rapidly 
becoming a useful source of foreign earnings. Tourism within the United Kingdom was another 
of the ‘ragbag’ of responsibilities which were part of the Board of Trade responsibilities. Until 
the 1960s the body which had promoted the tourist industry was the British Travel Association, 
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a voluntary body to which the Government had provide a steadily increasing grant to enable it 
to continue its work. However, Crosland realised that with the increase in numbers coming to 
Britain and the possibilities for foreign currency earnings, there was need, in his opinion for a 
statutory basis to the organisation.  In a speech during the budget debate in March 1968 he 
illustrated the importance of tourism to Britain stating that over four million visitors had come 
to these shores and he had estimated that they had spent about £240 millions. By 1970 he 
projected the figure of over six million visitors and he stressed that ‘we must be able to provide 
adequate accommodation for them, as well as for our own holidaymakers’. 95  
In a statement to the Commons in November 1968 concerning the proposed legislation 
for the tourist industry, Crosland laid down the justification for a restructured tourist body. 
‘Tourism is making a steadily increasing contribution to our foreign currency earnings. I hope 
that these substantial proposals for reorganisation will increase that contribution still further’.96 
Crosland supported the establishment of a new body The British Tourist Board. This would 
have overall responsibility for the United Kingdom and two national boards for Wales and 
Scotland. The Board would be accountable to Crosland as President. This Board would 
concentrate on the two vital aspects: promotion to attract visitors and development of facilities. 
Crosland’s proposals did meet with a number of objections. Conservative MPs 
defended the traditional way whereby the tourist trade had relied on self-regulation. Some 
considered that the real problem inhibiting growth was the existence of Selective Employment 
Tax (SET). This was a measure introduced by Labour in 1966 and was designed to favour the 
expansion of manufacturing rather than service industries by taxing the number of employees 
in the tertiary sector. The intention was to drive employees to the manufacturing sector which 
was considered a high productivity sector and therefore could increase revenue from exports 
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far more than the service sector. Following the introduction of SET by Callaghan in 1966, the 
Conservatives led the opposition stating that it was unworkable and disproportionate.  
Keith Joseph made the comprehensive case against Crosland’s proposals defending at 
the same time the previous Government’s record in this area. Joseph urged the Labour 
government to withdraw the Selective Employment Tax and doubted that these organisational 
reforms were really necessary and, inevitably, more costly. He asserted that the opposition 
would need convincing that it was right ‘to substitute a statutory body and a new bureaucracy 
for the British Travel Association which has done such an excellent job’.97 Conservative MPs 
considered that the tourist boards that Crosland wished to create reflected neither economic nor 
geographic balance of the tourist industry and that public funds to the newly created statutory 
boards would be allocated on a discretionary basis.98 The contributions from many MPs 
reflected their own regional associations especially from the north of England which they felt 
would not receive adequate representation with the relegation of the original BTA.    
 Crosland did offer help to the tourist service sector in the form of grants through a Hotel 
Development Incentive Scheme. He elaborated on this scheme publicly in an apparent attempt 
to satisfy those who considered that he had neglected the service sector.  On a visit to York, he 
stated that government plans included assistance to hoteliers and a general scheme for the 
classification of hotels via a dossier or handbook of accommodation facilities.  ‘After all they 
[hotels] are the first essential for the development of tourism’.99 
  The representative of the British Resorts Association defended the BTA claiming that 
this body had proposed a classification of minimum standards over the preceding two years, 
but that time had not been granted for this exercise. The Consumer Council welcomed 
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Crosland’s plans for comprehensive registration and classification citing the regular practice 
of this abroad. However, the Council also claimed that the BTA already possessed the 
machinery for inspection.100 The fear of controls which, it was felt, would come in the wake of 
classification, was the concern of the management of the prestigious Imperial Hotel in 
Torquay.101 The Times travel correspondent considered that Crosland’s plans for a classified 
register would generate much controversy for ‘how is a Government body to compare the 
advantages of a large hotel in a seaside resort or city against a small boarding house or the mass 
of unregistered accommodation masquerading as private houses’.102  An editorial expanded 
upon the doubts raised by the Conservatives in the Commons. While recognising that Crosland 
was now following the example of other countries, it emphasised that the BTA had performed 
its functions ‘admirably’ and restructuring was not required. ‘Past experience of statutory 
bodies gives good reason to fear bureaucracy, unnecessary interference, incompetence and 
waste…Mr Crosland would do well to bear in mind the danger of provoking the hostility of the 
industry he wants to help’.103  
Crosland did receive support from Bill Rodgers his minister with special responsibility 
for tourism. He explained that specialists from outside the industry would man the boards. 
Furthermore, he stressed that the aim of these officials was to ‘modernise, revolutionise and 
regenerate’ Britain’s tourist industry.104  There was still much scepticism in the House of 
Commons that the replacement of the British Travel Association by the Tourist Board would 
address local needs especially in the north of England. They were not enthusiastic about the 
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hotel incentive scheme offered as compensation. Opposition came from both sides and some 
Conservatives MPs considered that restructuring was unimportant compared to the 
abandonment of SET. 
 Crosland had identified the tourist industry as one which could, if managed well, 
increase foreign earnings. He had proposed that government supervision would achieve this 
and that The Tourist Board would bring an element of planning to this sector one which, 
ironically, the Labour government had identified as of less importance than the manufacturing 
sector and therefore subject to SET. 
 
Europe and EFTA. 
Crosland’s relationship with EFTA, strained over his defence of the import surcharge while he 
was at the DEA, was tested again over his plans to expand Britain’s aluminium industry. 
Crosland saw a role for government intervention in his regional policy. This was part of a 
programme of economic planning a strategy favoured by the Labour Party. Crosland aimed to 
build aluminium smelters in areas which were in serious industrial decline as part of 
regeneration policy for these regions. Predictably, Norway and Sweden regarded this as a threat 
to their own well-established aluminium industry especially if the British government were to 
provide financial assistance to these areas which would be a violation of EFTA rules. 
Both countries accused the British Governments of favouring their domestic industry 
with subsidies a measure forbidden by EFTA’s rules. In fact, the Norwegians attacked British 
policies over several years which they felt had caused difficulties for other member countries. 
An officially approved editorial in a Norwegian newspaper stated that the understanding and 
patience of ‘Britain’s most loyal partner in Europe were about to be undermined’.105 A ten per 
                                                          
105 Times, 18 November 1968, p.23. 
156 
 
cent tariff on fish fillets imported from Norway was seen as a further breach of the spirit of the 
EFTA agreement. The aluminium issue was the latest ‘shock…which has been caused by our 
friends on the other side of the North Sea, be it an import surcharge, devaluation, or subsidised 
aluminium smelting’.106 
Crosland’s strategy for the aluminium industry was a combination of generous financial 
support from the government but support which was predicated upon the active cooperation by 
management and unions in the rationalisation of their industries.107An Industrial Expansion 
Act was designed to provide this support in areas designated as ‘development areas’. Norway 
questioned the legitimacy of this funding to the emerging aluminium industry which impaired 
the growth of their own industry. Norway had complained to the Council throughout protracted 
negotiations with Crosland over several months. The Council supported them. 
Commenting on a White Paper, Crosland robustly explained that the policy of the Board did 
not amount to government subsidy. The assistance to companies that were involved in smelter 
construction constituted loans granted under the terms of the Industrial Expansion Act. He 
further stressed that these contracts were framed so as to anticipate possible objections under 
GATT and EFTA rules and that imports from Canada would be more likely to suffer than 
Norway which would probably increase.108 GATT was the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade and was an organisation within the United Nations signed in 1948 with the aim of 
encouraging free trade between nations by reducing tariffs, subsidies, quotas and regulations 
that discriminate against imported products. 
In a final meeting in Vienna, he defended Britain’s devaluation in the strongest of terms 
stating that the measures had to be taken by the Government ‘as a consequence of the greatest 
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monetary crisis’ especially in view of the pound’s role as a reserve and trading currency.109 
The issue of the tariff of ten per cent on Norwegian frozen fish fillets was an area where 
Crosland was prepared to debate but unwilling to yield. However, he did achieve a compromise 
with the EFTA states over a joint communique concerning any constructive interim proposals 
put forward by the Common Market in relation to trade arrangements between the two 
organisations. 
The construction of aluminium smelters in the United Kingdom was vital to Crosland’s 
strategy for regional regeneration and Crosland was determined that this project would 
succeed.110 Three smelters would be built in the north-east of England (Blyth-Lynemouth), 
Scotland (Invergordon), and Wales (Holyhead). Crosland justified his policy in the Commons. 
‘A large part of the object of the entire regional policy is to attract industries and firms to the 
[development] areas’.111 Crosland predicted that by the 1970s over £30 million would be saved 
in aluminium imports.112 The only adverse comments concerned the delay in securing the 
necessary deals with the companies concerned. Crosland responded, ‘We are considering here 
the creation of an entirely new industry in Great Britain which involves the most intricate 
questions of regional policy, fuel policy and international policy’.113  
His tenacity in establishing these three sites was recognised by the areas Labour MPs. 
In anticipation of the smelter construction, Eddie Milne from Blyth stated that the decision 
would be ‘hailed with delight’ by all in Northumberland.114 He paid tribute to Crosland and his 
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team for all the hard work in bringing Alcan to the area and stated categorically that ‘this opens 
a new era in the industrial history of south-east Northumberland’.115 Other Conservatives 
expressed their concerns about the commercial viability of Crosland’s deal.  Nicholas Ridley 
asked if the construction of the smelters depended upon the investment grant of twenty 25 per 
cent. He questioned whether the deal was value for money for the British tax payer. ‘Does he 
not think that this a subsidy which ill befits the British people to have to pay?’. 116 Likewise, 
Sir Keith Joseph asked if, in view of the generous arrangements that the three companies had 
been granted with the suppliers of power, ‘other large continuous industrial users of energy 
could make similar arrangements with the electricity industry?’.117 The issue of the subsidised 
electricity involved in the package prompted some MPs to ask for an assurance from Crosland 
that there would be no need for tariff protection of home smelted aluminium against 
competitors when transitional support was withdrawn. Crosland stressed that the numerous 
benefits to the three regions would take precedent in the establishment of this industry. 
Crosland faced criticism from cabinet colleagues who were concerned that the extra 
funding that he sought to ground this strategy was against the spirit of the programme of 
government reductions in expenditure.  Crosland argued that a reduction of 5 per cent in the 
rate of investment grant in the development areas would be badly received and would cause 
acute difficulties for the aluminium smelters, particularly for Alcan.118 He pressed for 
transitional funding at a higher level as construction on succeeding stages of the Alcan smelter 
in Blyth continued even though he recognised that there would be a sharp reaction from our 
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partners in the European Free Trade Area; but that increased smelter capacity was vital.119 
There was limited support from his Cabinet colleagues for treating Alcan as a special case. 
Transitional relief extending as widely as Crosland had proposed for the development areas, 
would, it was felt, ‘whittle away’ the savings already made. Nevertheless, Crosland did manage 
to obtain a postponement to the date when the relief was terminated. Crosland persuasive 
arguments had won concessions for the aluminium industry in the north-east, a project which 
he had supported against the opposition of EFTA members. 
Throughout 1968 Crosland had targeted increased foreign earnings from enhanced 
exports. This was an area that he identified as crucial to the balance of payments issue. Greater 
opportunities for trading growth were offered following the devaluation of the pound in 
November 1967 and he was determined that the Board would lead the business community in 
capitalising on these. However, he saw the role of the BOT as supportive supplying the services 
to allow companies to compete successfully abroad. Limited funding was provided but 
government involvement stopped there. 
Crosland introduced a series of measures to assist companies with export development. 
He helped to establish a Permanent Committee on Invisible Earnings which were now 
recognised to constitute over thirty-three per cent of all exports and Crosland ensured that these 
figures were included in the monthly trade figures.120 In November 1968 he announced 
facilities to support companies in their efforts abroad.121 An overseas project group were set up 
to encourage companies with roughly the same size but not marketing competing products to 
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establish joint representative overseas. (This replaced a scheme whereby large companies 
supervised smaller ones.) Crosland secured greater funding for the export services it provided.  
 Crosland attempted to contribute to the free trade movement by involving Britain in 
bilateral trade deals with overseas trading bodies. Although his relations with EFTA were at 
times fraught, he engaged in the international attempt to liberalise trading arrangements. 
Crosland committed Britain to the tariff cut in international trade in the Kennedy Round 
Agreement. His commitment was dependent upon the agreement of the major trading groups 
of the world the USA, Japan, the EEC and EFTA. Even Keith Joseph had to admit Crosland’s 
participation looked to be a ‘constructive initiative in the face of the growing threat to world 
trade expansion’.122 He did question Crosland’s willingness to expose some industries to 
‘damaging’ competition during the accelerated reduction of tariffs.123 Crosland admitted that 
he was aware of the risk but warned of the greater risk of ‘a downward spiral due to an endless 
series of retaliatory measures’ which had been avoided since the war.124 
 
Evaluation 
As President of the Board of Trade Crosland was provided with the executive authority as 
departmental head to assist economic growth in key industrial sectors. At the DEA he had acted 
as deputy to Brown. At the BOT he was able to pursue his economic ideas for regional 
development ones which he continued to follow when appointed as Secretary of State at the 
Department of Local Government and Regional Development in 1969. He committed himself 
to regeneration projects in particular often underestimating the opposition of his cabinet 
colleagues while arguing for special financial support. He was also unwilling to acknowledge 
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and be bound by policy measures already drafted in the department. This was to become a 
feature of Crosland’s style as he embarked upon each new ministerial brief.  
  Crosland was faced with three pressing decisions when he assumed his responsibilities 
at the BOT. In each of these he took the initiative and proposed policies which did not receive 
automatic Cabinet approval. His attempt to convince Cabinet of the viability of the purchase 
of BAC 2-11 failed. This was the first occasion in which he had faced clear opposition from 
the Cabinet to a carefully argued case for the benefits which he believed would arise from his 
judgement as departmental head. (Crosland had received broad support within Cabinet and 
from Labour MPs when announcing educational reforms). He then found himself in the 
Commons having to defend a collective decision from which he had dissented. He still 
managed to present a rational, coherent and seemingly committed case for his colleagues’ 
decision even though many of the comments made by MPs who were critical of his statement 
and echoed those he had voiced in Cabinet the day before.125 Crosland clearly accepted the 
doctrine of collective Cabinet responsibility and, presumably, was unwilling to sacrifice, at this 
stage, a career in the ascendancy.126  Crosland’s failure to press for the BAC 2-11 was 
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condemned by leaders of the aircraft industry as a wasted opportunity to secure Britain’s future 
in the jet age. 
 Crosland’s decision to open the case for Stansted as the third London airport was 
resented by his civil servants; but on this occasion he did not meet resistance from the Cabinet. 
A senior civil servant in the BOT confided to Crosland’s wife that his decision to re-open the 
case was a brave and ultimately correct one in the eyes of his sceptical officials and that ‘we 
would have incurred immense expenses ten to fifteen years in advance of the need…If at the 
end of the day Stansted is concreted over, the case for doing so will have been intellectually 
examined, not just allowed to slide through’.127 His decision was proved correct for the Roskill 
Commission, appointed in 1968 to consider the citing of the third airport, considered four 
locations none of which were Stansted.  
Crosland’s reaction to the crisis over the prospective launching of the Cunard liner the 
QEII was uncharacteristically spontaneous and uncompromising. He misjudged the mood of 
Wilson and the Cabinet which appreciated the embarrassing position in which the Queen would 
be placed if a Labour government cancelled the launch. Crosland’s justification was that the 
government should not support companies in serious difficulties even ones as prestigious as 
Cunard. In fact, he had surrendered responsibility as a departmental head allowing a cabinet 
colleague to find a solution acceptable to all. 
Cunard eventually emerged from a difficult period having secured assistance from the 
Labour government. By April 1968, its resurgence as a company seemed assured in the wake 
of the sale of The Queen Elizabeth I for over £3 million. However, the Times shipping 
correspondent gave the credit for its improvement to the Chairman of Cunard and Crosland’s 
role questioned. In terms of the relationship between the two new heads of their respective 
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organisations, the newly installed Chairman seemed to have outmanoeuvred his opposite 
number at the Board. In the negotiations during the crisis in the third week of September’ Sir 
Basil Smallpiece, it was recorded, had employed ‘the old Cunard magic’ which involved ‘that 
of dipping Cunard’s hand into the public purse’.128 
 
For Sir Basil persuaded Crosland not only to increase the Government loan on the 
Queen Elizabeth II from £17,600,000 to £24m, he also persuaded him to secure it on 
the passenger fleet only, which was put into a separate subsidiary for the purpose.129 
 
Crosland’s policy towards mergers was ambivalent. While stressing their potential 
benefits he had to declare publicly that he would ensure that the government would ensure the 
viability of such takeovers to ease the fears of smaller companies. In regard to the textile 
industry of Lancashire he saw mergers as a way of restructuring and modernising a traditional 
manufacturing base as crucial to enabling the industry to face competition.  As President of the 
Board of Trade, Crosland had undertaken a major challenge in tackling the serious problems 
which faced the textile industry in the 1960s – a proliferation of small and medium sized firms, 
aging plant, numerous unions and, above all, fierce competition from developing countries. His 
appointment was initially met with much goodwill by employers and workers alike; but this 
was quickly dissipated when it was obvious that he was unwilling to make concessions without 
a thorough study of the status and shape of this industry so vital to the economy of Lancashire 
in particular. He resisted the temptation to advance aid without assurances from owners of a 
corresponding effort on their part to invest and modernise. A desire for restructuring and 
rationalisation underpinned his strategy. For this, he advocated that a tariff should be imposed 
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(although he was under some pressure in Cabinet and the Commons to consider other 
measures). This would provide the security that the industry demanded while it carried out 
these reforms. Crosland achieved acceptance of his strategy in dealing with the textile industry: 
urging them to take the necessary measures to make it more competitive while giving them the 
space and time in the form of a protective tariff to undertake significant changes. He hoped that 
a restructured industry could continue to grow.  
Crosland’s ambivalence extended to foreign competition for although he supported 
moves towards the global liberalisation of trade he was only too willing to entertain 
protectionist measures when appropriate. He saw the benefits of American inward investment 
but objected when such holdings threatened the integrity of the UK publishing industry. Again, 
a measure of protection in the form of a tariff was offered to the textile industry as a means of 
enabling the industry to survive against imports from the developing world especially the 
Commonwealth countries. A charge of inconsistency was levelled at Crosland in the press. 
Although his instinct was to favour unfettered trade he adopted a more realistic policy. 
 His attempt to encourage the development of a domestic aluminium industry as part of 
regional regeneration programme depended upon extra government funding which came to be 
regarded by Sweden and Norway as violating EFTA rules. Crosland’s reputation suffered 
further in Europe as the Times noted: 
 
The aluminium smelter issue and the Swedish claims of purchasing discrimination in 
EFTA are only two features of the government’s somewhat tainted image in EFTA 
dating back to the import surcharge, imposed suddenly and without full consultation 
with the EFTA partners.130  
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Crosland’s policies had further ramifications for the editorial warned that Britain’s 
prospects of joining the EEC would be much reduced for ‘historical precedents die hard in 
international trade’. 131 If Britain were seen as a ‘rule breaker’ in one organisation there would 
be ‘less full acceptance of into another community’. 132 The responsibility of the Board of Trade 
in the deteriorating relations with EFTA was highlighted. 133 The existence of a perceived ‘buy 
British’ policy running through purchasing by public bodies in Britain was strongly denied by 
Crosland and the Board; but the Times considered that this suspicion had undermined the 
credibility of Britain as a bona fide member of the trading group.134  His reputation within some 
EFTA states for placing national interests first had been reinforced. Some commentators 
considered that he had exacerbated Britain relations with the EEC impairing the future chances 
of a successful applications. Crosland was not a Europhile even admitting that he was agnostic 
on the issue of entry. 135 In line with many in the Labour Party Crosland regarded the issue of 
entry into the Common Market as less important than the struggle to defeat the Conservative 
government and divisions over this impaired the effectiveness of their opposition in Parliament. 
In Crosland’s opinion, membership of the Market was secondary to economic and social reform 
at home.  Roy Jenkins led the pro-Marketeers in the Labour Party and asked Crosland to support 
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entry when the conservatives pressed for UK entry in Parliament.136 Crosland was in favour of 
Britain’s membership but would not comply with Jenkins plea if this brought about party 
disunity and entailed voting with the Conservative Government. He abstained in the crucial 
vote in parliament in October 1971 leading to much criticism by Jenkins and Bill Rogers and 
those on the right of the party who were euro enthusiasts.  
A recurring feature of Crosland’s modus operandi when appointed to a new ministry 
was to inform himself of the necessary background to the problems which underpinned the 
relevant issues. A decision would only occur once this process had taken place. He frequently 
referred to his appalling blunder, over the Woolwich speech when he rushed into an 
announcement on polytechnics before a detailed personal examination of the case for them.137 
Instant decisions ran counter to his preference to engage in a lengthy intellectual and rational 
analysis of issues. His instinct proved correct over the citing of Stansted but not when reacting 
to the QEII crisis where he failed to appreciate the delicate nature of the national context. 
 Crosland had come to realise that the Board could be used to take advantage of the new 
economic climate following devaluation (a measure he had always pressed) and he had made 
a major contribution to enabling the Board to exploit the opportunities for export growth. 
However, his approach was frequently inconsistent. At times he favoured allowing the market 
to prevail and thereby allowing Cunard to fail. On other occasions, he would entertain 
government intervention by the use of a tariff to protect an ailing industry such as the 
manufacturing of cotton textiles. He had to accept political reality and make concessions or 
even abandon his proposals when faced by the lack of Cabinet support.
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Chapter Four: The Department of Local Government and Regional Planning (1969-1970) and 
the Department of the Environment (1974-1976) 
 
He knows absolutely nothing about local government and has no interest in the job…He is a 
macro-economist, interested in the budget, a natural Chancellor, in fact, a disappointed 
Chancellor.1 
Harold always makes things sound better than they turn out to be. I’ve not become cynical – 
just world weary. I couldn’t bring myself to ask him about the status of the job.2 
We have to come to terms with the harsh reality of the situation which we inherited.  The 
party’s over.3 
If I stayed in this bloody job for another two years, I could actually advance something. Not 
solve it. You can’t solve anything. But start things moving in the right direction.4 
 
 
By the late 1960s Crosland’s career had reached a point where he was concerned that 
advancement to the higher offices of state seemed to be receding. He had failed to achieve the 
Chancellorship in 1967 and Crossman reflected on the nature of his manner which possibly 
impeded his progress. Even in 1970 Crossman believed that he had become disenchanted and 
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was ‘a man with no future outside politics who makes himself awkward in politics’.5 Crosland 
was appointed to head an amalgamated ministry the Department of Local Government and 
Regional Planning. Crosland was confronted with the task of running two departments housing 
and transport but still administered as separate entities. The Economist realised the enormity of 
the challenge commenting that Crosland had acquired ‘the task of creating a more compact 
empire out of his tangled inheritance’.6 Crosland held responsibility for environment twice as 
Secretary of State (1969-70, 1974-76) and once as shadow minister 1970-74.7 Crosland was 
therefore minister of environment for seven years an exceptionally long time for one politician 
to hold the same portfolio. 
 Environmental concerns were becoming a significant issue in British politics. Many 
pressure groups were pressing for government intervention to protect the environment by 
reducing pollution and also ensure an improving quality of life for those in urban areas. 
Housing and transport were now recognised as major factors impacting on the environment 
and therefore a single department was required to co-ordinate their administration. Crosland, 
unenthusiastic at first, attempted to utilise the opportunity of the Department of Local 
Government and Regional Government to further his ideas on housing and transport 
development. As Secretary of State at the Department of the Environment he found that any 
policies he had for housing and transport were severely restricted owing to recurrent economic 
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crises. He had to persuade local authorities that they had to curb their spending plans warning 
them in 1975 that ‘the party’s over’.8 
 
 Appointment as Secretary of State 
Crosland’s third Cabinet post arose from Harold Wilson’s decision to amalgamate several 
ministries into larger departments in 1969. In another round of government reform, Wilson 
believed that certain areas of government, (for example local government and regional 
development) could be administered more effectively.9 Changes to the machinery of 
government were seen by Wilson as reforms which would enable the more efficient delivery 
of planned economic growth, the aim of the DEA.  Both he and Edward Heath believed that 
structural redesign in central government would solve deep–seated economic and policy 
problems especially if they represented the fashionable philosophy that ‘bigger was better’.10 
Central to Labour’s policy agenda was the drive for planned economic growth in the period 
1964-70. The first round of administrative innovation, between 1964 and 1965, saw the 
establishment of the DEA, the Ministry of Overseas Development, the Ministry of Technology 
and the post of Secretary of Wales. Later, in 1968 and 1969, larger amalgamated departments 
were announced – the Department of Health and Social Security, the Department of 
Employment and Productivity and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Crosland was 
appointed Secretary of State for Local Government and Regional Planning in October 1969. 
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Crosland was informed of the prospective appointment by Wilson in September 1969 
and headed a department representing the merger of several ministries. He explained to 
Crosland that the DEA was to be wound-up and the Board of Trade was to be reduced in 
importance. Wilson gave a lengthy explanation of the decision to ‘bring the DEA experiment 
to an end’ after five years in his memoir in 1971 citing the unfavourable economic context of 
a balance of payments deficit and hostile speculative activity. One of its perceived successes, 
regional planning, was now transferred to Crosland’s new department. 11 
The new department (which did not receive a name at this point) would combine 
responsibility for housing, transport, local government and regional planning. Crosland was 
asked specifically to concentrate upon the pressing issues of local government reform and 
pollution. Wilson stated that he considered Crosland to be an appropriate choice for tackling 
environmental questions. ‘He had identified himself in numerous speeches and writings with 
environmental questions and the quality of life and he was widely regarded as the right 
choice’.12 Crosland’s ideas on the environment were expressed in numerous articles after his 
appointment in 1969 and formed the contents of the chapter on the environment in the volume 
Socialism Now published in 1974. Apart from his comments to his wife, Crosland made few if 
any public statements on the subject before 1969.  
Another motive for Wilson’s decision could have been a decision to punish Crosland 
for participation in the ‘July crisis’ and consequent possible conspiracy against the Prime 
Minister by presenting Crosland with an impossible task as Secretary of State.13 A panic on the 
foreign exchanges in July 1966 led to a split in the Cabinet on the best measures to deal with 
this crisis. Castle, Jenkins, Benn, Brown, and Crossman joined Crosland in calling for 
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devaluation. They were opposed by Wilson, Callaghan and the rest of the Cabinet. Wilson 
became increasing suspicious that a ‘conspiracy’ was hatched to remove him while he was in 
Moscow and that Crosland was heavily involved. Jeffreys states that there was no evidence for 
Crosland’s participation in such a movement; but Wilson’s suspicions remained.14 However, 
the economist and academic William Plowden suggested that it was a sound appointment 
merging responsibilities for regional planning, local government, and transport. This 
acknowledged the relationship between land and motorway construction vital to regional 
economic growth.15  
Crosland’s reaction to this move was stoical admitting to his wife that he was sceptical 
about the status of the new department.16 Even though Crosland did not see this move as a step 
up in Cabinet ranking, Richard Crossman considered that it was. ‘Crosland is promoted to the 
gigantic job of running Housing and Transport with Tony Greenwood under him’.17 
Nevertheless, Crossman acknowledged that Crosland’s real ambition was the Treasury. Before 
the press learnt of Crosland’s new Cabinet post, there was much speculation that he was to be 
demoted. His omission from the initial list in the reshuffle prompted the Observer columnist to 
speculate on Crosland’s future citing a persistent rumour in Whitehall that he might be 
‘dropped’ from the Cabinet.18 As Benn perceived, he had been given the job of Secretary of 
                                                          
14 Jeffreys, Crosland, pp. 115-6 
15 See William Plowden, ‘Riding Two Horses: The Crosland Ministry’, New Society, 1 January 1970. William 
Plowden was attached to the Board of Trade in the 1960s and published the Motor Car and Politics in 1971. 
16 Crosland, Crosland, p. 206. 
17 Crossman, Diaries, Vol 3, 5 October 1969, p.666. 
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State for England, coordinating transport and housing and that he was ‘very sick about it 
because he doesn’t think there is anything in the job’.19  
 
Local Government Reform and Regional Development. 
Crosland was given the responsibility for preparing legislation to implement the report of the 
Royal Commission on reform of local government which had been established in 1966 and was 
chaired by Lord Redcliffe-Maud. Harold Wilson accepted the recommendations in principle 
and committed the Labour Government to the legislation introduced ‘as early as possible, 
probably in the 1970-71 session after a general election’.20 Redcliffe-Maud proposed the 
amalgamation of town and country districts under all-purpose unitary authorities with the 
establishment of metropolitan authorities for the large conurbations.21 Wilson termed their 
proposals ‘the first thorough analysis of local government - unchanged in its main structure 
since the Acts of 1888 and 1894’.22 The report stressed that town and country were 
interdependent and therefore the separate administration of urban areas and their rural 
hinterlands was no longer required or feasible. 
The report also suggested the establishment of eight provincial councils which would 
draw up strategic development plans and these would take over the existing Regional Economic 
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Planning Councils (REPC). The Government’s consideration of this feature was to present 
problems for Crosland in his relationship with the existing bodies both at regional level and 
local for these organisations were concerned about the security of their existing programmes 
for development and investment.23  
 Crosland summarised the various options which the Government could take. He 
suggested that there were four effective alternatives: to adopt Maud ‘undeviatingly’; to 
abandon Maud altogether and go for what he termed the ‘Senior’ national two-tier system (see 
below); create more unitary areas by dividing up some of the proposed Maud areas; and 
creating more metropolitan areas by amalgamating some of Maud’s unitary areas.24  
Crosland acknowledged that any radical reform would be ‘bitterly resisted’; but that an 
easy solution would be to follow Maud undiluted for this would automatically have the 
authority of the Royal Commission behind it. Crosland’s preferred choice was the alternative 
he called ‘Senior’. Derek Senior was a member of the Commission who dissented entirely from 
the proposals and put forward his own Memorandum of Dissent. He advocated a two-tier 
system with 35 city-regions along with 148 districts which would be grouped into five 
provinces.   
 
This has great attractions for me [Crosland] and for some of my colleagues. It would 
give upper tier authorities of a much better size for planning, transportation, and (often) 
education; while the lower tiers would have a genuine local function to fulfil.25  
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Crosland published the white paper on the reform of local government in February 
1970. In the House of Commons, he stated that the Government accepted that wherever 
possible all local government would be in the hands of a single authority and that the unitary 
authorities would cover both urban and rural areas and of the size recommended by the 
Commission.26  
Crosland made two revisions to the recommendations of the Commission. Education would 
now be the responsibility of the top-tier rather than the second-tier authorities.27 Secondly, two 
more metropolitan areas should be added to the three suggested by Maud – West Yorkshire 
and South Hampshire. Conservative reaction to the White Paper was relatively limited. There 
was more concern over the issue of the imminence of the Crowther Report on constitutional 
reform in the United Kingdom. This report would focus on the issue of devolution measures 
for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland with the rise of nationalist parties in these areas. 
 Peter Walker, who became Secretary of State for Environment in 1970, considered that 
Crosland should delay progress on local government reform for it was more advisable to have 
‘Crowther before Maud rather than Maud before Crowther’.28  Another MP voiced the concerns 
of those who represented rural constituencies citing the threat to such areas if a unitary authority 
was imposed for ‘local government must remain local and not become remote … [for this 
would be] an abuse of principle’.29 Crosland firmly rejected these points stressing that the 
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Crowther Commission had been set up to consider ‘functions which might be transferred, not 
from local government to provincial, but from central government to provincial’.30 Crosland’s 
stated priority was local government reform. 
Labour MPs were more critical of the details of the proposals in the Crosland’s White 
Paper although these focused more upon the possible impact upon vested party interests rather 
than the broader constitutional issues. Fred Blackburn, while accepting the necessity for 
reform, observed that ‘it would appear that the Government has fallen into the same mistake 
that the Redcliffe-Maud Report has in thinking that mere size is the criterion of efficiency’.31 
Arthur Blenkinsop pressed for the creation of Tyneside as a metropolitan area for here there 
was ‘complete isolation of urban from rural communities’.32 These two MPs repeated these 
concerns in a Labour Party meeting a week later.33 There was broad support for Crosland’s 
White Paper and a recognition that reform of local government was long overdue.  
However, on examination of Crosland’s proposals, there was concern that these could 
damage the Labour Party in a number of ways. Accepting that there were no votes in these 
proposals, there was a fear that the increase burden which the larger unitary authorities entailed 
might deter ordinary members of the working classes from standing for office. ‘Something 
ought to be done to protect the working-class councillor who found it difficult to keep his job 
when it was necessary to have so much time off’.34 This raised the issue of salaries for those 
elected to local government an issue that many felt had not been addressed. Fears were also 
raised concerning the need for boundary changes if the Maud proposals became law. Such 
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changes might have ‘adverse’ results for the Labour Party for ‘Politically the new system would 
not help to spur on the activities of the Party machine’.35 Crosland, while assuring the attenders 
that full consultation with constituencies had been conducted, insisted that ‘on balance’ he 
considered that the constituency parties in the country to be ‘more in favour of the proposals 
than the Parliamentary Party’.36 He also defended his decisions by reminding the meeting that 
‘his freedom of action was to a certain extent limited by the recommendations of the report and 
the timetable already imposed’.37 
  Crosland faced less criticism in Cabinet than at PLP meetings and his suggestions 
were accepted. The only major area of dispute centred on the number of metropolitan areas to 
be included in the white paper. Here, Cabinet accepted the recommendation of Crosland’s 
ministerial committee that West Yorkshire and South Hampshire should be added; but firmly 
rejected the addition of Central Lancashire ‘for this would represent a derogation from the 
unitary principle favoured by the Royal Commission in the direction of two-tier local 
government’.38 Cabinet also accepted Crosland’s advice that there should be ‘positive line’ 
taken on the possibility of salaries for councillors although he did recognise ‘the need for 
substantial improvements in allowances to encourage individuals from different social 
backgrounds to take part in local government’.39 
Crosland appeared to have no strong feelings concerning reform in this area in contrast 
to those he held on transport and housing reform ones which were to draw more criticism when 
he resumed his brief at the DOE in 1974. (See below) Although he did favour the dissenting 
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view of Derek Senior who favoured retaining a two-tier system, Crosland never pressed this in 
Cabinet and managed to achieve the general acceptance of the conclusions of the ministerial 
committee which he chaired. Wilson’s preference for Maud assisted the passage of the draft 
White Paper in Cabinet as well. Crosland’s left many issues open in the White Paper – the 
impact of Crowther and local government finance - for fear of opposition when legislation was 
drafted.  
Crosland latter commented that this was his main achievement at the Department of 
Local Government and Regional Planning especially as he felt that he had improved the style 
of the White Paper.40 This was his first white paper as minister. Richard Crossman 
complimented Crosland on the skill he had shown preparing and presenting the White Paper 
and his management of the committee.41 Ironically, Crossman also noted that prospects for 
legislation were limited in view of an impending election and that enthusiasm for reform had 
waned for ‘in either in 1971 or 1972, we shan’t be in power’.42  
When the Labour government was elected in 1964, one of its first tasks was to set up a 
new regional planning machinery. This was originally under the supervision of the Department 
of Economic Affairs. It was also necessary to secure acceptance of the importance of the 
regional and economic dimensions in planning both at national and local level. Within months, 
eight Regional Economic Planning Councils (REPC) and their parallel Regional Planning 
Boards had been established. These bodies were given the tasks of advising the Government 
on the implications of national economic policies for the regions and on the ways in which the 
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resources of each region could be fully realised.43 Each Council was instructed to assess the 
needs of their respective region and by the end of 1968 studies had been published for the eight. 
The next task for the REPCs was to design regional strategies to provide a framework for 
investment considerations and for the major planning work and executive decisions of local 
authorities.44  
 Within this structure for economic planning, the DEA had also identified areas which 
required special assistance owing to industrial decline and all the associated problems which 
this had brought in its wake. These areas were designated as Special Development Areas 
(SDAs) and contrasted with ‘Congested’ areas where development was rapid. In between were 
‘Intermediate’ zones. It would now be one of Crosland’s tasks to consider when SDA status 
was to be conferred on an area and, conversely, when progress was sufficient for an SDA to be 
‘delisted’. Assistance was graded accordingly to the three types of area. 
Much of his nine months as Secretary of State was spent encouraging the REPCs to 
promote developments in their regions while attempting to placate these various bodies in the 
wake of the government’s support for the Redcliffe-Maud conclusions.  Although Crosland 
accepted some specific recommendations of a study group that delivered in April 1970, he 
questioned the underlying rationale. Crosland considered that the report reflected a strategy 
still based on the problems and solution suited to the issues of the 1950s and 1960s rather than 
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those of the 1970s.45 Further, it drew a simplistic interpretation of a North-South split while 
underestimating the impact of new technologies and overestimating the benefits of new town 
development especially to the north. Crosland finally criticised the report as adopting ‘a 
backward-looking instead of a forward –looking view’.46 He agreed that the priority over the 
following years was to reduce further regional disparities in unemployment; but thinking had 
clearly moved on and the officials had not, in his view, revised their policy imperatives.  
 
It is misleading in 1970 to present regional policy in the context of a narrow contrast 
between development areas and congested areas in parts of the South and the 
Midlands…there has been a growing realisation that regional needs are much more 
complex and varied than the ‘black and white’ of the development areas and the more 
prosperous South East. 47 
 
In fact, he observed that the document ‘largely ignores the development of a policy for the 
intermediate areas’.48 Crosland focused on another theme which he also felt had likewise 
escaped from their attention – the rate of technological change. ‘One of the new problems for 
the Seventies is likely to be the rapidity of further technological change which reduces the 
scope of labour-intensive manufacturing industry. It is bound to have important implications 
for job creation associated with the flow of firms to areas of high unemployment’.49   
                                                          
45 Anthony Crosland, ‘Study Group Report on Regional Planning Policy’, 6 April 1970, TNA, FK 1/1. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
180 
 
Crosland had trenchant views on demographic changes and movements within the 
United Kingdom and their impact on strategic planning policy. Crosland was sceptical of the 
simplistic solutions offered by his officials to the unemployment problems of the north 
especially those based on the building of new towns and the encouragement of internal 
migration. He doubted whether the creation of more new towns in the less prosperous regions 
would attract population from the South for ‘it is difficult to see how the less-prosperous 
regions could benefit by this population movement when their inhabitants need new jobs and 
new houses themselves’.50 He warned that the Labour Party should not acquire the label of a 
party that was prepared to acquiesce in the dismantling of established communities. Whatever 
the potential benefits of such migration, he considered it an unrealistic policy ‘for the Seventies 
and perhaps the Eighties’.51 His final comment stressed again that regional policy was pivotal 
to planning for the future but that a holistic approach must ‘bring together economic, industrial, 
environmental and social policies’.52 
 
We are trying to demonstrate that we are not prepared to force people from North to 
South by lack of employment, but do we now wish to lead people in the South to think 
that the Labour Party are in favour of pushing people from the South to the North? 53  
  
Crosland did recognise that the report was correct in acknowledging the close link 
between economic, physical and social elements when planning for the regions and that the 
new ministry of which he was head would enable a comprehensive strategy to be executed. He 
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also supported the official report in its promotion of a more effective link between the REPCs 
and local planning councils. However, he had to convince both the REPCs and the local 
planning authorities that their authority was not threatened by the new Ministry of Local 
Government and Regional Planning and that the overarching supervision it provided was to 
their benefit. In a meeting called to allay these fears, Crosland assured the Chairman of the 
eight regions that his responsibility for regional policy as a whole together with transport and 
housing would ‘make for more efficient co-ordination’.54 He also stressed that in line with 
Wilson’s statements in Cabinet, a new emphasis on environmental factors was vital even 
though the term ‘economic’ was to remain in the title. The chairmen were obviously 
unconvinced. They had worked with the DEA and the Board of Trade before when information 
had flowed freely. They feared for their independence in the formulation of industrial policy 
especially as the Redcliffe-Maud proposals for local government reform called for a new tier 
of councils for eight new provinces in the UK. The Chairmen expressed concern that another 
layer of bureaucracy would inhibit their authority. Ignoring speculation on the future 
relationship with the new provincial councils, Crosland exhorted them to focus on their main 
role.  
 
In the post-Maud and post-Crowther period however, the central task for the Councils 
would seem to be to concentrate on regional strategies, to survey the extent to which 
there was a strategy and, in cases where this had not yet been developed, to assess 
whether there was the machinery required for this work. The ultimate aim would be to 
build up a comprehensive picture for the whole country.55 
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With the publication of the White Paper on the reorganisation of local government, the REPCs 
were given a new phase of developing firmer regional plans linked with specific physical 
planning.  
 
To this end the government intends to make arrangements to develop the cooperation 
between the Councils and standing conference, or other groupings of local authorities 
for planning purposes, in order to ensure both that their aims and policies are 
increasingly harmonised and that their methods of planning at regional level are more 
securely based.56 
 
Even before the White Paper, Crosland had embarked on regional visits to encourage 
local standing conferences to cooperate with the REPCs; but the publication of Crosland’s 
Paper, made his task more urgent. These two bodies were to exchange information and to work 
out joint machinery for reaching agreement on a strategy which would provide the essential 
framework for government and industry investment decisions and the regional setting for local 
authority development plans. Crosland laid out the focus of the Government’s planning 
objective for the regions in the press in April 1970. It was to ‘even out the disparities in 
employment, real income, and opportunities between the more prosperous and the less 
prosperous regions. There has been real progress though not complete success in achieving this 
aim’.57 
Crosland explained the weakness of the existing planning machinery. In his opinion 
there had been a separation between economic planning which had come under the DEA, and 
physical land use planning which was under the auspices of the Ministry of Housing and Local 
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Government – ‘one department trying to attract industry to a certain region and another 
department taking decisions about new towns and overspill schemes’. 58 He confidently 
announced that the creation of the Department of Local Government and Regional Planning 
had brought to an end the ‘unreal distinction’ between economic and physical planning and 
that now they had been amalgamated in a single central group.59 This would eliminate 
unnecessary duplication between the studies and plans for the regional councils and the 
standing conference of local authorities. The task for Crosland was to convince the two bodies 
to work in collaboration to reach an agreed framework within which to set the local authority 
plans.60 Much of his nine months as Secretary of State was engaged in convincing these local 
planning authorities of the necessity of working with the REPCs to construct a framework for 
producing a coordinated regional plan. He was to meet with mixed success. 
 Both in the North and Midlands he was to meet predictable resistance from bodies who 
were suspicious of the perceived threat to their local development programmes. In November 
1969, Crosland embarked on visits to the north-east where there was increasing criticism of 
government policy. This region presented Crosland with generic problems of unemployment, 
pollution and the absence of specific investment which many felt was tailored to their needs. 
Crosland’s policy for these regions proved unpopular for he was not prepared to invest in the 
creation of jobs in traditional industries or to extend SDA status indiscriminately but rather to 
encourage the evolution of a diverse economy drawing upon technological innovation. In 
speech at Redcar in November 1969 he laid his programme for the future of the north-east. 
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Jobs are of course crucial to development areas. But the number of jobs created for the 
immediate future cannot be the only yardstick by which to measure the success of 
development area policies. The quality, variety and durability of employment are 
equally important. The fact is that many of the problems of the development areas stem 
from their narrow industrial base. It is essential that this base should be broadened. – 
that they should share in the modern, capital intensive science-based industries as well 
as in the more-labour-intensive industries.61 
 
Bill Rodgers, who had worked under Crosland at the DEA and was MP for Stockton-
on-Tees, had warned Crosland of the hostility to government policy for Teesside. In particular, 
the decision to locate the headquarters of the General Steels Division of the British Steel 
Corporation in Scotland and not Teesside. He warned Crosland that ‘There is a considerable 
history of Teesside losing (or apparently losing) white collar employment to Scotland’.62 The 
area still lacked a university. Also, Crosland would have to answer the claim that the 
government’s investment grants did not generate enough jobs. Rodgers advised Crosland that 
he would have to stress in answer to this the potential for further employment that would be 
generated through an emphasis on capital intensive industry. Rodgers recommended a 
‘confident’ speech which placed some responsibility on local people for ensuring that they 
made the most of ‘present advantages and trends’.63  
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Crosland’s speech in Redcar to the Chamber of Commerce was a robust defence of the 
government’s strategy for development areas. The rapid creation of jobs was considered by the 
majority in the Chamber of Commerce to be an essential feature of any regional policy. He 
made an uncompromising reply to the accusation that the government policy was ‘too broad 
brush’ and that by providing across the board assistance to industry, needless expense had been 
incurred.64 Crosland was not prepared to compromise on this approach and he asserted that the 
priority was to improve the total industrial structure of the development areas. Crosland was 
not prepared to compromise on DOE policy for our assistance would cover the whole spectrum 
and not be related solely to numbers of jobs created even though the regional employment 
premium over £100 million was still awarded to the area for continuing labour-intensive 
investment. In the event, the speech from the President, A. G. Simon, of the Chamber of 
Commerce was more supportive of the long term benefits of the grant investment programme 
for capital-intensive industry than the local MP. However, he did express disappointment that 
the Headquarters of the General Products Division of BSC were to be taken to Scotland. The 
President considered that ‘.Teesside can advance an almost indisputable claim to be considered 
in this connection’..65 
Crosland concluded with praise for their efforts to improve their local environment 
especially in regard to the ICI works in Billingham. In a rather ironic way of complimenting 
the campaign to ‘Clean up Teesside’, he finished by stating  
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Even when it is cleaned up, Teesside will perhaps not vie with Monte Carlo as a holiday 
resort. But that is not the point or the purpose. What you are striving to do is create the 
kind of environment in which people who earn their money on Teesside can also 
enjoy.66 
 
 Crosland’s efforts to convince the audience that the Government had their best interests 
at heart met with a mixed response according to the Teesside Evening Gazette.67 The report of 
the speech concentrated upon the delay of the improvement to the A19, the main road artery 
linking the industrial areas of Teesside and Wearside. Local feeling was reflected in the ‘bursts 
of laughter’ which greeted Crosland who rejected criticism of the Government on this matter.68  
Although there was grudging acceptance of the DOE efforts to balance investment to both 
capital and labour intensive industries, the paper quoted the President’s statement that the 
region would have to rely as always on their own efforts whatever the regional structure and 
that Teesside’s ‘amalgamation’ in the proposed reform of local government could not work.  
Crosland had attempted to promote his strategy for regional regeneration through the 
development of capital intensive investment which would be of benefit in the long term. On 
Teesside this received only limited support. The main concern here was for the creation of 
employment during the transition to a new economic base which would be on a longer time 
scale. On Tyneside, which Crosland visited after Teesside, there was greater support for the 
potentialities offered by the creation of a metropolitan borough in the Redcliffe-Maud report 
endorsed by Crosland’s White Paper. In contrast to Teesside, there was frustration that 
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Tyneside would not be allowed to integrate local authorities in advance of national 
reorganisation. The Evening Chronicle in an article titled ‘We cannot wait that long’, had hoped 
that Crosland, now installed as Secretary of State with a remit for regional development, would 
permit advanced local development plans for Tyneside.69 The Evening Chronicle had expected 
more from Crosland than the two previous incumbents of this post Richard Crossman and 
Anthony Greenwood. Crosland had failed to give a ‘priority’ to Tyneside.70 This decision had 
effectively shed responsibility on to the next Government. Crosland’s inaction was considered 
‘intolerable’.71 The Tyneside paper placed Crosland’s decision in national context. 
 
Vast sums of money are being spent annually by every local authority on developments 
that may or may not make sense when at last Greater Tyneside and the other local large 
authorities come into being.72 
 
Sunderland had long called for SDA status to combat the continuing decline in 
traditional industries and the consequent rising unemployment. Crosland was not convinced 
that to confer this was justified and resisted all attempts to persuade him. The issue was 
complicated by the involvement of another department that of technology and this resulted in 
a conflict of interest that Crosland resolved by direct appeal to Wilson. A campaign by the 
                                                          
69 Evening Chronicle, 24 November 1969.  
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. Crosland was approached by the Tyneside developer and local politician T. Dan Smith, Chairman of the 
Northern Economic Planning Council as well chairman of the Peterlee Development Corporation where Smith 
had plans for a Science Centre as a hub for regional regeneration. There was no record of a planned meeting but  
T Dan Smith’s strategy for the region would have accorded with that of Crosland. 
188 
 
Northern Group of MPs in the early months of 1970 presented the grievances of Sunderland in 
a meeting with Crosland and Tony Benn, who was the Minister of Technology. Suggested 
action included a deceleration of pit closures, expansion of the regional housing programme to 
boost the construction industry, a review of the ten per cent increase in the price of steel and 
further dispersal of government offices to the north.73 Both Sunderland MPs, Gordon Baggier 
and Fred Willey ‘drew attention to the anomaly of Sunderland’s proximity to SDAs and urged 
that similar status be accorded to Sunderland’.74  
 Local press reaction was inevitably supportive of the efforts of the Sunderland MPs and 
in particular praised Wedgwood Benn for his determination to press their case for SDA status 
with the Prime minister. Although both Benn and Crosland were reported to have promised to 
take the matter to Wilson, the Sunderland Echo gave The Minister of Technology the credit for 
this initiative. 
 
Sunderland has asked for – and been refused – Special Development Status so often 
that it comes as a shock (albeit a pleasant one) to learn that the Minister of Technology 
has agreed to put the proposal to the Prime Minister…He is to be congratulated as 
recognising the strength of Sunderland’s case. 75 
 
In fact, Benn took the lead in assisting the campaign and Crosland’s role was relegated in 
further coverage of the meeting. The new ministries of Benn and Crosland overlapped in certain 
areas. The Ministry of Technology absorbed some of the responsibilities of the Board of Trade 
and Crossman had warned Crosland that this would cause problems for his department. Benn 
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now oversaw aspects of regional planning which would hinder housing plans and industrial 
development.76  
There is no record of this issue reaching Cabinet level or of Wilson agreeing to a 
consultation with the fifteen northern MPs. The only response was a letter apparently from the 
Prime Minister’s private office which said that he recognised that the pace of improvement was 
not quicker but that ‘.no useful purpose [of a meeting] would be served at that time.77  
 Crosland’s reluctance to advocate the case for the promotion of Sunderland to SDA 
status in as robust a manner as Benn may be explained in a document sent to Wilson.   
This document was marked ‘Confidential’ and entitled ‘Special Development Areas’.78 
Although undated, it refers to the issue of the possible expansion of the scheme and 
Sunderland’s inclusion. Crosland reported to Wilson the results of a review by his officials into 
the impact of SDAs since their establishment in 1967. The report recorded success in these 
areas although some may have attracted industry but not necessarily from congested areas. On 
the advice of his officials, Crosland urged that Sunderland should not be added to the list for, 
with an unemployment rate of 6.2 per cent (8.8 per cent male), it did not meet the original 
criteria for SDAs of eight per cent. In fact, the officials recognised that anomalies had emerged 
in that Scotland was disadvantaged by this system as work remained in the South; and it was 
difficult to justify ‘the continued exclusion from SDA status of areas with moderate 
                                                          
76 Crossman, Diaries, Vol Three, 9 October 1969, pp. 670-1. 
77 Ibid, ‘MPs take Troubles to the Summit’. Another local paper reported that Wilson, while refusing to meet the 
group, had, nevertheless, urged his ministers to ‘get cracking on the problems of the North’. ‘North MPs press for 
aid’, The Journal, 26 February 1970.  
78 ‘Prime Minister/Special Development Areas’, undated, TNA, FK 1/20. 
190 
 
unemployment when certain areas with low levels of unemployment were still included’.79 
Crosland’s advice to Wilson was unequivocal. 
 
There were no overriding cases for adding further areas. While the case for delisting 
was strong in a number of cases, it was undesirable to make changes at this stage…it 
would increase the pressures from the excluded areas if change were made now and the 
number of those dissatisfied would increase in total.80 
 
While Benn had decided to champion Sunderland’s case for inclusion in the list of 
SDAs, Crosland appears to have lobbied quietly against the delegation from Wearside. 
Crosland’s decision was heavily influenced by the review conducted by his departmental 
officials and his advice to Wilson was uncompromising in regard to the expansion of the SDA 
programme. When a similar group of MPs from the North East met with ministers in April 
1970 to protest against the closure of the Palmers-Hebburn ship repair yard, Crosland’s 
department was not represented although the Ministry of Technology was.81 Crosland’s 
confidential document may have influenced Wilson’s decision. 
 While the potential benefits of local government reform were welcomed on Tyneside, 
the reaction to the Redcliffe-Maud report and Crosland’s White Paper were greeted with 
suspicion by local authorities in the West Midlands. There was much trepidation on the part of 
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the Standing Conference of Local Planning Authorities which represented Birmingham City 
Council and surrounding County Councils. These authorities feared that their voice would be 
lost amid the expanding authority of the West Midlands Regional Economic Planning Council. 
The Birmingham Post suspected that Crosland was preparing to use the REPC for the West 
Midlands to usurp the power of its ‘rival’ the West Midlands Planning Authorities Conference 
which represented local authorities.82 The Birmingham Post warned of the possible tactics to 
be used by Crosland in a proposed meeting of the two bodies planned for March 1970. 
 
Although the meeting is primarily intended to bring these two bodies closer together, it 
is also seen as part of the Government’s plan for reorganisation of local government… 
[However] The Government’s White Paper has not accepted the Provincial Councils 
[of the Maud report] … suggesting that the regional overlords should be the eight 
Economic Planning councils set up by George Brown in 1965.83 
 
The paper stressed that these existing Regional Economic Councils were not comprised of 
members democratically elected unlike the Provincial Councils proposed by the Maud report. 
These members would be appointed by the Government Minister and would be obliged to sign 
the Official Secrets’ Act. Also, the meetings were not open to the public.84 
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 Both bodies had embarked on studies of the region and the best development strategy 
for the future. Co-operation between the two was crucial. This was Crosland’s objective but 
one which involved a difficult diplomatic approach. ‘Danger: to be avoided at all costs: that 
these studies should turn out [to be] mutually inconsistent. E.G. Conference Study sent to 
Government without effective consultation [with] REPC’.85 Crosland’s opinion was 
unequivocal however. The West Midlands was of crucial importance to the economy of the 
UK and, therefore, there was a need for a firm strategy which only the REPC could provide. 
Long term delay as the two planning authorities consulted was unacceptable and could result 
in the unfortunate situation with the government acting as arbiter.86 
Crosland’s task would be to engage on a diplomatic mission to encourage the leaders 
of the Standing Conference and the West Midlands REPC to subscribe to this ‘joint venture’. 
Working within the advice given by his officials, Crosland focused his attention on two key 
figures on these bodies: Alderman Griffin on the Standing Conference and Michael Higgs who 
was the Chairman of the Standing Conference but was also a member of the West Midlands 
REPC. Crosland asked his advisers the best way of ‘squaring’ him (Griffin) so that his support 
would be assured before letters inviting the two bodies to a meeting.87 Crosland was warned 
that Griffin was a ‘shrewd politician and a successful operator in his field’, but probably open 
to an approach from the Secretary of State even though Birmingham City Council feared for 
the relegation of the role played by the Standing Conference to the REPC.88 Crosland used the 
potential siting of the new National Exhibition Centre in the City of Birmingham as an 
inducement for Griffin’s co-operation in persuading the Standing Conference to comply with 
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the strategy of the REPC although Crosland was advised by officials that he ‘.should be careful 
to avoid giving him [Griffin] the impression that the Government had already decided to 
support Birmingham’..89 
In a letter to Higgs, Crosland emphasised that his main priority was to achieve a rapid 
‘co-ordinated and comprehensive’ strategy between the two bodies and that of Coventry for 
the future prosperity of a region of major importance to the country.90 This strategy was to also 
to include environmental aspects. ‘Needless to say, the framework must not only provide a 
basis for physical and social planning but must effectively meet the needs of industry and 
commerce on which we are dependent for the maintenance of standard of living, employment 
and resources’.91  
Throughout the letter, the underlying message was the imperative nature of conforming 
to the thrust of the plans of the West Midlands REPC as the senior economic body. Any delay, 
Crosland stressed, ‘would have serious consequences, not the least being the continuance of 
piecemeal decisions not adequately related to each other and possibly inconsistent with good 
general planning criteria’. 92 Although Higgs maintained that all future recommendation by the 
REPC would be ‘not binding’ on the Standing Conference, Crosland claimed success.93 
Crosland, in a press statement following the meeting, considered that the objective of his 
department had been achieved. Future regional studies in Britain were to be conducted jointly 
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by each region’s economic planning council and the relevant local planning authorities’ 
conference. This was the first of such agreements and Crosland hoped would act as a model 
for the rest of the regions for the agreement would minimise the danger of the two bodies 
arriving at contradictory conclusions.94. 
Higgs had prevented Crosland from achieving his immediate objective of a rational 
economic plan for the region and one which would not be compromised by local interests. 
Clearly, Crosland faced a reluctance on the part of local authorities within the orbit of the 
REPCs to comply with his overarching rationale for regional development. His tactics to gain 
the support of local interests by personal contact and correspondence had met with limited 
success and illustrated the obstacles to planning on a national scale. Birmingham and 
authorities in the North-East may had decided that a possible incoming Conservative 
administration would be more sympathetic to local agendas than a regime of national planning 
imposed from new regional ‘overlords’ as envisaged by Crosland’s White Paper. 
 
Pollution and the Environment. 
When Crosland was appointed as Secretary of State for the Department of Local Government 
and Regional Planning, Harold Wilson had given him a brief to take on responsibility for 
problems arising from environmental pollution an issue that was gaining greater traction with 
the public. The issue of environmentalism was not identified as a specific problem in the 
Election Manifestos of the Labour Party in the 1960s or the party conferences. Only in 1970 
was the Labour Party Conference to pass a motion citing ‘with alarm the increasing pollution 
of land, sea and air’ and calling upon all sections of the party to demand the necessary 
controls.95 
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The main issue dominating the debate between the environmental lobby and governments in 
the 1970s was the possible adverse impact of continuous economic growth on the environment. 
Crosland, appointed as minister responsible for tackling pollution of the environment, was 
faced by this dilemma for he saw economic growth as essential to rising living standards and 
as the fundamental element for addressing the balance of payments issue. 
Wilson offered Crosland’s department a permanent unit composed mainly of scientists 
to assist him in co-ordinating inter-departmental work and to monitor any signs of new dangers 
to the environment.96 Wilson also announced that there would be a standing Royal Commission 
on Environmental Pollution to advise on matters both national and international concerning the 
pollution of the environment; on the adequacy of research in this field; and the future 
possibilities of danger to the environment.97 Equipped with these tools, Crosland was to submit 
a White Paper on this latter in the year.  
That Crosland was to undertake responsibility for the environment and its protection 
was seen by many as ambiguous. Susan Crosland defended this perceived ambiguity in her 
biography. Conservationists were to applaud his decision over Stansted and eventually 
rejection of the site for Maplin airport. Nevertheless, environmentalists were to oppose him 
vigorously on other issues. One Labour MP, Bruce Douglas-Mann, remarked on his 
unpopularity with this environmental group. ‘The fact is that the man I want to see lead the 
Labour Party is more hated by environmentalists than any man I know’.98  Ironically, this 
‘hated’ man was a passionate supporter of most conservation and environmental causes. 
‘Greedy men,’ he [Crosland] wrote, ‘abetted by a complacent government, are prowling over 
                                                          
96 Wilson, Record, 1971, pp. 732-733.  
97 Harold Wilson, HC Debates, 11 December 1969, Volume 793, Columns 638-45. 
98 Quoted in Crosland, Crosland, p. 254. 
196 
 
Britain and devastating it’.99 He recognised that that commitment to the ‘environment’ was not 
without its contradictions. The desire to preserve rural beauty spots, for instance, conflicted 
with the need to acquire land for over-spill housing. 100 
Although Crosland loved ‘uncongested countryside’ he opposed the environmentalists 
over their hostility to economic growth and their apparent indifference to the needs of the 
working classes.101 Crosland argued that much of the contemporary environmental problems 
arose from Britain’s industrial legacy-slum housing, polluted rivers and factory smoke. Only 
economic growth would provide the wealth to rectify these problems. His perception of 
conservationists was that they were middle-class activists who wanted to preserve the 
countryside for themselves.  His conclusion was that a compromise was imperative between 
‘despoiling the land and keeping it the preserve of the fortunate few’.102  He stressed that the 
economic growth should have equal priority with environmental considerations. ‘We can’t 
ignore the need for economic growth while there is so much poverty. Any amenity enthusiast 
who totally neglects economic considerations is not only wrong-headed but immoral’.103 He 
also warned of an over-enthusiastic campaigning for an unpolluted environment citing the 
possible impact on his own constituents. ‘We have in the middle of Grimsby a fish finger 
factory which is smelly and noisy. But my council is not unnaturally nervous of turning the 
screws too tight for fear the firm will go to Hull or Aberdeen’.104 Crosland admitted that the 
environment was now a major political issue and that he was appointed to the tackle the 
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problems raised. He also stressed that it was only the Labour party which could be relied upon 
to put ‘social control over free enterprise, which is ready to impose unpopular burdens on 
industrialists and which does not regard cuts in public expenditure as the overriding priority’.105  
Crosland’s response to his new brief from Wilson was to commit the government to a 
raft of measures to improve the environment.106 Crosland’s strategy to tackle river pollution 
included a national survey to discover the scale of the problem an attempt to persuade river 
authorities to co-ordinate their efforts and acceptance of scientific advice on the right methods. 
In May, reacting to pressure from professional and rural authorities he announced that a circular 
of 1968 would be withdrawn thereby allowing an immediate increase in spending on small 
sewage schemes amounting to £12 million. More money would be diverted to eliminate derelict 
land. Legislation was prepared to make pesticide control mandatory. Crosland stated that the 
battle for clean air had largely been won for ‘there hasn’t been a bad fog in London for seven 
years’- although he appeared to claim this as a victory for the Labour administration.107  
All this was enshrined in a White Paper introduced into the Commons in May. The 
Paper entitled ‘ the Protection of the Environment’ gave details  on the government strategy to 
combat pollution via tighter legislation covering vehicle exhausts, the emission on industrial 
pollutants and permitted noise levels from vehicles and aircraft.108 Crosland’s claims that the 
government was ‘intensifying efforts all along the front of environmental pollution’ would 
appear substantive.109 Aircraft noise was to be halved as new standards would be imposed on 
subsonic jets via the establishment of an Advisory Noise Council. Finally, there was an 
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international commitment by the government to protect the global environment by ratifying an 
agreement to award compensation for damage by oil pollution at sea. 
Inevitably, the Rural Districts Councils Association gave their approval to Crosland’s 
decision, although the additional sum of £6million was considered insufficient for the whole 
country.110 The President of the Association of River Authorities also welcomed Crosland’s 
statement concerning withdrawal of the circular allowing for wider use of funds for sewage 
control; but he was still sceptical of the Labour Government’s commitment to the detoxification 
of river water which had been under greater threat from urban development since the war and 
a threat which had outstripped ‘the development of sewage disposal plant needed to match 
it’.111 A seemingly sceptical President, Lord Nugent, stressed that ‘it would be a test of the 
Government’s practical contribution to European Conservation Year’ to see how far a real 
programme of rapid improvement in the quality of water in rivers was announced and 
funded.112 (Nugent added that a European Conservation ‘Decade’ was required if the problem 
was to be tackled successfully.)  
Wilson had confidently stated in December 1969 that the White Paper later in the year 
would illustrate ‘how much has so far been achieved under existing arrangements which our 
new proposals will greatly reinforce’.113 Wilson also announced the establishment of a Royal 
Commission on Environmental Protection to begin work in 1970. The Conservative David 
Lane had predictably warned that Crosland should be aware that ‘what the public want is not 
advice, consultation, or co-ordination, but action’.114 Crosland’s measures, in the limited time 
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given to him, certainly relied on referral to consultative bodies often newly established; but 
additional money was made available for river improvement and the reduction of derelict land. 
Similarly, the Government made a firm commitment to international movement to tackle 
continental pollution.  
Crosland’s commitment to the task of protecting the environment was genuine; but the 
measures announced appeared to be strongly motivated by professional pressure and public 
concern especially in rural areas and 1970 was European Conservation Year. Crosland 
reminded the Commons that ‘the United Kingdom was already recognised as one of the leading 
nations of the world in the development of pollution control’ and that it would participate fully 
in promoting associated activities throughout the year.115  
What Crosland did contribute to the debate on the environment and the resolution to conserve 
it, was what he regarded as a sense of reality. Environmental protection would come at a price. 
Launching the European Conservation Year, Crosland pressed this point home. ‘We must 
accept higher prices if we compel manufacturers to design quieter engines or install expensive 
plant for the control of smoke or effluent’.116 He also criticised those who were oblivious to 
this reality stating that public attitudes would have to be discriminating. ‘Some of the current 
protests have a note of negative hysteria about them as though the whole picture was doom-
laden and all change for the worst. But we cannot stop the world and get off’.117 Crosland and 
the Duke of Edinburgh formed an unlikely combination to launch the European Conservation 
Year. The Duke prophesied a bleak future if evidence was ignored; but Crosland tempered this 
with a prediction that the public would have to pay more to combat pollution.118 
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The Times was obviously impressed by Crosland’s efforts on environmental protection 
in the brief time given to him as government minister. Commenting on the rising levels of 
pollution, the article stated: ‘For six months of the year one knight in shining armour Anthony 
Crosland, strove manfully with improved if still rusty weapons, in making sallies from a 
beleaguered castle quaintly styled the office of the Secretary of State for Local Government 
and Regional Planning, but also fighting a defensive battle against ministerial colleagues who 
had not yet been converted to the faith’.119 
 
Shadow Minister for the Environment. 1970-1974 
In June, the Labour Party returned to opposition having lost the general election. The 
Conservatives under Heath gaining an overall majority of thirty seats. Crosland had 
campaigned on a theme of responsible government, economic recovery and social reform.120 
With four days to go trade figures began to show a deficit after nine months of surplus and 
Heath’s accusations that the economic recovery was unfounded impacted upon public opinion.  
 In spite of defeat Crosland determined to persevere with his political career retaining 
the brief for Local Government and Regional Planning throughout the period of opposition 
between 1970 and 1974.121 The department was now entitled ‘Environment’ by the 
Conservative government and it contained three ministries: Housing and Local government, 
Transport and Public Buildings and Works. Peter Walker was appointed head of the department 
in November 1970. Heath looked to new managerial techniques in government stressing the 
need for rationality and efficiency in policies. The White Paper in which the DOE was 
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announced contained repeated references to concepts such as strategy, objectives, policy 
planning, output budgeting and central capability.122  
This period is significant in the ministerial career of Crosland for two reasons. Firstly 
he was able to enhance his reputation as an effective shadow minister and for commitment to 
the issues which were covered by this enlarged ministry especially opposition to the 
Conservative Housing Finance Bill in 1972 and the siting of a possible airport for London at 
Maplin.  Secondly, he was able to develop his political strategy and philosophy in relation to 
two policies which came to dominate his tenure as Secretary of State of the Environment when 
the Labour Party resumed office in 1974 – housing and transport.  
 In the first months of 1972, Crosland assumed responsibility for opposing the 
Conservative’s Housing Finance Bill. This was designed to divert monies from subsidies to 
council house tenants to fund the building of new homes or the improvement of old ones. The 
Labour Party intended to portray the Government as reactionary and divisive even though 
Heath and Peter Walker regarded it as a major piece of progressive social reform.123 During 
one of the longest committee stages in post-war politics, Crosland led the opposition in all-
night sessions. His efforts impressed many in the Labour Party who came to admire his 
passionate devotion to a cause for which he felt strongly. The Guardian agreed stating that he 
had ‘enhanced his standing in the party by showing more talent for … hard political slog than 
some had given him credit for’.124  
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Crosland attacked the bill as an assault on working class families under pressure from 
exorbitantly high rents and a means test. This would result, he warned the Commons, in these 
families applying for ‘charity’.125 Crosland’s analysis of the bill exposed the unintended 
consequences for poorer council house tenants compared to the objectives which underpinned 
the legislation. Having pointed out that in his opinion the bill was the first time in British social 
history means testing would be conducted on such a scale, it would be a denial of the principle 
that ‘the relief of poverty and the maintenance of incomes is a national responsibility’.126 
Crosland’s leadership and incisive attack upon the Bill led to some concrete results. Two 
Conservative ministers were moved by Heath to other areas having struggled to combat 
Crosland’s tactics in Committee.127 Crosland claimed that the opposition had forced crucial 
concessions and that rent rises were not likely to be as punitive as would have been the case.  
 Crosland’s parliamentary campaign against the Bill was a significant episode in his 
political career. Some saw him as indecisive and that he was talented but unlikely to live up to 
his potential.128 Crossman stated that in the late 1960s Crosland seemed to have become 
disenchanted and was ‘a man with no future outside politics who makes himself awkward in 
politics’. 129 Now he had proved his ability to work in a team of MPs of varying background 
and even won the admiration of the vocal left-winger Dennis Skinner an achievement in the 
Labour party of the 1970s where the left wing was increasingly vocal and critical of the 
government. Skinner, Labour MP for Bolsover in Derbyshire, was a committed socialist and 
joined Crosland’s team on the Standing Committee. Although of vastly different backgrounds, 
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he came to admire Crosland who came from ‘the greener side of the hill’.130Skinner, suspicious 
of members of the Shadow Cabinet, cited Crosland as ‘a frontbencher whose intellect I 
respected’.131  
This campaign also focused Crosland’s attention on the perennial question of housing 
– or rather adequate housing at a reasonable rent and in greater numbers for those 
underprivileged working-class families whose interests he represented in Grimsby. Crosland’s 
frequent references to his constituency’s interests presented difficulties for one who was 
perceived as a theoretician. During 1972 and 1973 he outlined the basis for a Labour 
programme in office. He pledged to repeal policies that he said were causing inflationary rent 
increases. Efforts would be made to boost the low number of council house completions by the 
Tories and to prevent the land speculator from making ‘outrageous fortunes at the expense of 
the buyer’.132 
The question of a second London airport arose again in 1972 when Edward Heath, 
pressed for its siting at Maplin, a remote location at Foulness in Essex. Maplin and the Channel 
Tunnel were two major development projects to which Heath personally attached great 
importance identifying them as far sighted investments in national infrastructure. Crosland’s 
determined resistance helped to obstruct the second reading of the Maplin Bill in February 
1973. When Heath fell so did Maplin which was seen by the Labour government in 1974 as 
one of Heath’s, ‘follies’ and scrapped. 133  
Crosland had termed it ‘Heathograd’ for the complex was to incorporate a town as well. 
According to his wife, Crosland thought that there were much more ‘higher priorities that 
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should not be sacrificed to this lavish scheme’. 134 In Parliament, Crosland robustly attacked 
the choice of Foulness as ‘totally wrong’ citing the damage to the environment and the probable 
escalating cost involved.135 He further prophesied that by the time it was built, it would not be 
required. In an article in the Guardian he described Maplin as ‘the wrong airport in the wrong 
place at the wrong time’. 136 Crosland stressed that because vertical take-off planes were 
nearing production, a third London airport would be unnecessary and that provincial airports 
should be established assisting regional growth outside the South East. He further warned that 
this ‘enormous white elephant of Maplin …illustrates beyond any doubt that no additional 
airport capacity in the South East is needed before 1985’. 137 This line of criticism was in denial 
of Crosland’s previous comments as President at the BOT concerning the growing numbers of 
tourists visiting the UK and the need for extra carrier capacity. Crosland placed far too much 
faith in the potential for vertical take-off planes for which he had limited knowledge and there 
was no reliable evidence for the significance of 1985 as a crucial date in airport development. 
Crosland’s main objective was to expose Heath’s favoured project to ridicule. 
Crosland’s determined resistance to the project from the opposition benches throughout 
the year, helped to seriously impede the progress of the Bill. The Second Reading was 
postponed from January to February and the Bill only just managed to pass a third Reading in 
June. Combined with pressure for public expenditure cuts, Rippon, the Secretary of State for 
the Environment, made a partial concession and postponed the planned opening of Maplin by 
two years from 1980 to1982. 
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The period of opposition provided Crosland with an opportunity to prepare his next 
work on the development of socialism, Socialism Now, which was published shortly after 
Labour’s return to power in March 1974. This was mainly a compilation of articles or speeches 
that had appeared in journals and newspapers over a period of years since 1970. The focus was 
on the areas of policy that had been of most concern to Crosland as a politician in and out of 
government: education, the environment and housing.  Dick Leonard, who was his PPS and 
edited the volume, stressed that Crosland was able to bring the benefit of ministerial experience 
to his conclusions. In terms of Crosland’s career, this work was written in very different 
circumstances.  When Crosland published The Future of Socialism in 1956, he had no official 
position within the Labour Party and possessed only five years’ experience as a backbencher. 
His expertise was as an academic economist. As author of The Conservative Enemy (1962) as 
well, he was now regarded as the leading revisionist writer on socialism. From 1964 onwards, 
departmental issues were to dominate his attention especially as he became a full-time member 
of the cabinet from 1965. Socialism Now, therefore, focused upon areas over which he held 
ministerial responsibility. In Leonard’s opinion, Crosland the theoretician was able to combine 
creative innovation with administrative experience.138  
Crosland was able to develop his ideas on the environment and its protection following 
his attendance at the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in the summer of 
1972. He reiterated his belief that economic growth did not entail ecological disaster. 
Challenging the idea that zero growth was imperative to environmental protection, he wrote 
that ‘contrary to what the doomwatch school assert, we are not in an either-or situation where 
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we have to choose between the two. Growth does not inevitably mean a worse environment 
more often a better one’.139  
Central to his observations on housing, was an admission that a balance had to be struck 
between the needs of the tenant and the motivation of the private landlord for ‘No post-war 
government has produced a policy which combines a reasonable protection for the tenant with 
a commercial profit for the landlord so the sector has been the scene of continuous tension and 
dispute’.140 Admitting further that he was no friend of the commercial owner, he then attacked 
the rationale which he believed was the basis of the Conservative attitude to public housing 
and established the principle which he asserted must be followed by a Labour Government.  
 
A labour housing policy should be imbued with a philosophy of free choice. It must 
wholly reject the Tory philosophy…that some people should be council tenants and 
others owner-occupiers, that council houses are only for certain categories of person 
and not for others.141  
 
For Crosland, housing was at the core of his socialist objectives. Homelessness, overcrowding 
and slums were a feature of poverty and squalor and the elimination of these should be Labour’s 
priority. He was opposed to the Conservative belief in a market solution to the housing 
problem. ‘Some part of the housing stock must be leased or owned at less than the economic 
cost; and the government must bear a final responsibility for the overall housing situation’.142 
He did not rule out what he termed ‘municipalisation’ which would entail a large scale transfer 
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of the ownership of private property to local authorities and the acquisition of development 
land.143 He also advocated the ‘rehabilitation’ of old stock rather than it destruction. 
Communities needed to maintain their integrity for ‘there had been too much of the bulldozer’ 
in housing regeneration schemes. 144 Crosland attempt to reconcile a fair rent for tenants with 
a reasonable return for the landlord was ambitious but realistic if the rented market was not to 
contract. Another distinctive feature of Crosland’s approach to housing reform was the 
reluctance to create new housing estates although this may represent a ‘romantic’ view of 
working-class communities not supported by those who inhabited them. 
 Crosland presented the essence of this programme at the Labour Party Conference in 
October 1973 its third and last in opposition. Citing housing as ‘one of the bitterest sources in 
this country of misery, of family tension, and certainly inequality’, he advocated three measures 
that involved public ownership: land ‘which would do more for greater equality, more for 
redistribution of wealth and power, than any other single act of nationalisation I know’, private 
rented property and the construction industry which could fall under local authority building 
departments.145 He concluded his speech that these measures would solve the housing problem 
and thus Labour would have taken ‘a giant step on the road to a more socialist society’.146 
Crosland the revisionist was now advocating an element of nationalisation having relegated 
this in The Future of Socialism.  
His speech was well received by the evidence of the applause especially for the 
measures announced from the Shadow Environment Secretary. The speeches that followed 
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supported Crosland’s programme; but many called for further measures such as public 
ownership of building societies. This would provide the money ‘to allow the full nationalisation 
of the building industry and a planned socialist building and housing programme’.147 
Crosland’s performance in opposition had impressed many in the Labour Party but this 
was not reflected in his attempt to secure a place on the National Executive Committee. He 
failed narrowly in 1970 and in 1971 and, following the resignation of Roy Jenkins from the 
Shadow Cabinet in April 1972, Crosland was passed over for the position of Shadow 
Chancellorship.  Instead Denis Healey was appointed.148 When Crosland stood for the vacant 
position of Deputy Leader with Jenkins’ departure, he came third to Foot and Short although 
he did manage to capture a creditable sixty-one votes. The only indicator of progress in the 
party ranking came in the Shadow Cabinet elections in autumn 1973 which saw Crosland 
achieve fourth place one ahead of Jenkins. 
 
Secretary of State for Environment: Housing and Transport. 
Heath, facing a second miners’s strike in two years and a deteriorating economic situation, 
called a general election for February 1974 challenging the electorate on the question of ‘Who 
Governs?’. Heath asked the question: should the nation be led by its elected representatives or 
‘held to ransom’ by the miners? 149 Wilson campaigned on the Conservative government’s poor 
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record on unemployment and inflation and Callaghan made the case that only Labour could 
ensure industrial peace. Labour emerged as the largest party but with only four more seats than 
the Conservatives and no overall majority. Wilson became Prime Minister for a third time and 
Crosland returned to the Cabinet as the Secretary of State for Environment.  Crosland lacked 
the ‘exhilaration’ he felt in 1964 for, as well as industrial unrest, there was soaring inflation a 
product of the Arab- Israeli war.150 Crosland nevertheless felt that there were always ‘things 
we can do’, although he admitted that radical change would have to wait until another election 
delivered a workable majority.151 
 Housing was to be one of the issues that Crosland was to concentrate upon when he 
returned to the renamed Department of Environment in October 1974. This was an area that he 
was determined to tackle as opposed to the issues which he had inherited - local government 
reorganisation and pollution. These had dominated his time as Secretary of State in Local 
Government and Regional Planning but the Conservative had delivered the terms of the 
Redcliffe-Maud report although with significant adjustments. Before launching a housing 
review, he had to resolve the matter of the disqualification and fining of councillors who had 
defied the law enshrined in the Finance Act 1972. This had obliged local authorities to increase 
rents in line with those in the private sector. Crosland found himself with the unenviable 
responsibility of upholding the law as Secretary of State against councillors who had refused 
to impose the rent increases on their tenants especially as he had led the campaign against this 
Act in parliament. His task was made more difficult by the mood of the Party conference and 
the attitude of his permanent secretary.     
 Crosland found himself with a difficult situation made worse by a resolution in the 
Party Conference of 1973 which had pledged support for councillors who defied the law. In 
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particular, the representatives elected in Clay Cross Derbyshire had made a well-publicised 
stand against imposing a higher rent. Crosland was faced with three issues: recovery of rent 
lost by all recalcitrant authorities; lifting the disqualification from public office imposed on 
councillors who refused to comply; and, whether to uphold the fine imposed on Clay Cross 
councillors who were liable for fees following the appointment of Housing Commissioners in 
Clay Cross (In Wales, two authorities, Bedwas and Machen were also chargeable for this.)  
On the question of the surcharge, Sir Idwal Pugh his Permanent Secretary informed his 
Secretary of State that ‘you should know that as required by law’ the Clay Cross councillors 
were liable for ‘remuneration’ of expenses and that this would have to be done by the end of 
the month when the debt passed to the ‘unfortunate’ new authority North East Derbyshire 
District Council.152 In a memo to his PPS, Crosland commented on this uncompromising advice 
that it was ‘rather twisting the knife’. 153 However, Crosland ‘reluctantly’ agreed that action 
had to be taken ‘although with a minimum degree of publicity’. 154  Crosland regarded Pugh as 
a ‘blunt’ Welshman. Pugh admired Crosland’s leadership and believed that his impact on the 
department would be lasting.155 Pugh considered that although he was courteous with him, 
Crosland required little more than factual information to support his policy objectives which 
Crosland had already formulated. 
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I felt he didn’t look on civil servants as his real advisers on fundamentals…He looked 
upon civil servants as people who are natural conservative. He presented a closed shop. 
‘This is what I want to do. Tell me how to do it’. We always talked about business on 
the basis of an agenda. It was always very proper.156 
 
 Some of his civil servants agreed with Pugh. ‘Some felt that he [Crosland] used them as books’ 
to be consulted but nothing more.157 He did not have the informal relationship with any of his 
advisers that Pugh desired, one where you ‘meet late in the evening over a glass of whisky or 
a cup of tea and talk about this and that’; but Crosland liked Pugh’s ‘straight blunt manner’.158  
Crosland decided that a balance had to be struck between reinstatement of those 
councillors disqualified and respect for the law. The tone of Pugh’s memo would appear to 
regard compliance with the law as his priority. Crosland had to find a suitable resolution which 
also recognised the feeling of the party as expressed in the Conference while avoiding a 
damaging accusation of ignoring the Government’s legal obligations as imposed by the 
Housing Finance Act. He prefaced his paper to the Cabinet accordingly. 
 
The Prime Minister also said that the law of the land must be obeyed. We are committed 
to removing the sanction of disqualification. But, in other respects, we should seek a 
solution which upholds the rule of law. 159 
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Wilson’s injunction that the law must be obeyed (albeit one made by the previous 
Conservative Administration) was non-negotiable in the opinion of the Prime Minister; but the 
reaction within the party would be overwhelming if some leniency was not extended to the 
recalcitrant officials. Crosland stressed in Cabinet the arguments against recovery of rent on 
such a scale. This would inevitably end in bankruptcies and much hostility from councillors; 
‘The processes are bound to drag on for a long time with continued publicity and controversy; 
and that it is necessary to avoid further bitterness’.160 An ad hoc solution was acceptable in 
view of the ‘complexity’ of the situation that would result from the reorganisation of local 
government. Councils could be empowered to make up losses from future rents or rates. The 
surcharge on the Clay Cross councillors would remain although all other charges would be 
waived. The Cabinet agreed with this compromise. Crosland duly proposed a general amnesty 
for hundreds of councillors who had been late in implementing the Act. He lifted the 
disqualification from the Clay Cross councillors who continued to defy the Act; but he did not 
lift the surcharge of £6000. In November he introduced a bill to replace the Housing Finance 
of 1972.  
In the Commons, Crosland followed the rationale adopted in Cabinet claiming to 
support the law but stressing the iniquity of the legislation passed in 1972. ‘As democratic 
socialist I am profoundly committed to the rule of law but could not condone let alone 
encourage defiance of the law’.161 He based his decisions on the demands of natural justice for 
the Conservatives had broken the ‘two-way bargain between government and governed’ which 
grew from ‘a tacit agreement as to what was permissible and what was not’.162 Opposition MPs 
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were not convinced. One Conservative deplored Crosland’s actions in lifting disqualification 
stating that ‘this was a sorry day for the constitution of this country, for the rule of law and, 
indeed for the Labour Party’.163 David Steel for the Liberals attacked the claim that the defiant 
councillors were to be admired for their stand. In fact, they were merely ‘cardboard martyrs’ 
who had looked to their ‘friends in high places’ to legalise what they had done.164  
Crosland recognised the possible consequences of his attitude to the Clay Cross 
problem for he was ‘treading a fine line between observing the law and respecting party 
feeling’.165 In his private notes, he recognised that Clay Cross had been a ‘wretched bore; but 
someone had to do it – only option was to resign’.166 Tony Benn also noted Crosland’s anxiety. 
‘Tony said he found it distasteful but he hoped to present it to the House in such a way that 
Dennis Skinner did not walk out’.167 His decisions in regard to Clay Cross were heavily 
criticised in sections of the press. The Sunday Times leader called his decision to reprieve the 
Clay Cross councillors an ‘evil mistake’ for it illustrated how far he was prepared to go ‘to 
accommodate the Left which neither understands nor believes in the rule of law’.168  It accused 
Crosland of ‘weasel’ words when it came to defending the law.169 The left wing of the labour 
were increasingly critical of the party hierarchy and its perceived reluctance to support the 
working classes against the repressive legislation of the Conservative government. The Finance 
Bill was seen as a test of the Labour Government’s socialist credentials.  
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Crosland had returned to Government in 1974 to face a major challenge: how far to follow the 
party line as urged in conference, one that supported defiance of the law; and whether a Cabinet 
minister should implement legislation, (although unpopular even within Conservative ranks) 
as passed by Parliament. Crosland was convinced that he had found a balance between the 
conflicting aims of ‘tempering justice with mercy’ and the other of observance of the law.170   
Crosland’s strategy found support in Cabinet and some in the party, but he faced criticism by 
Opposition and press alike. He rejected the accusation that his solution to the Clay Cross would 
encourage the growth of lawlessness in society as claimed by Steel. Skinner accused Crosland 
of deserting the councillors in Clay Cross. The surcharge was to remain and this caused 
considerable distress to the officials concerned. Skinner’s comments in the Commons revealed 
his disillusionment with Crosland’s compromise. ‘Is it not sad that within the Labour 
establishment we now say that those who fight valiantly and give in will be excused; but that 
to some degree those who fight valiantly to the bitter end will be ostracised’.171 Furthermore,  
Skinner stated in his autobiography that the disqualification continued for the eleven 
councillors because they were unable to pay the surcharge and therefore were unable to stand 
for public office. Although the Finance Act was repealed, the question of retrospective 
legislation ‘was scuppered by some traitors on the Labour benches’.172  
 
  Much of the focus of Crosland’s work at the DOE was on tackling the issues of housing 
provision in Britain. Crosland stated that he wanted to make councils understand the 
importance of diversity in peoples’ lives. He believed that society was damaged in all kinds of 
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ways by herding people into estates built to standardized specifications, often appallingly 
managed by a remote and insensitive bureaucracy. Old properties, he asserted, should be 
redeveloped, not bulldozed, wherever feasible, allowing the tenants more choice. He hoped to 
encourage Councils to buy from private developers creating ‘mixed’ estates in which those 
renting were not branded as socially apart from home owners. Finally, he aimed to enable 
tenants to form co-operatives to decide much of their built environment.173 
Crosland outlined the means by which he would increase the supply of housing. 
Councils would be urged to renovate existing housing stock rather than embark on demolition 
for such destruction ‘accelerated astonishingly beyond the rate of public construction’.174 There 
would be special schemes to help the first-time buyers. He intended to press ahead with plans 
for the selective nationalisation of development land and immediate efforts would go into 
providing security of tenure for tenants in furnished accommodation. Crosland was considered 
by some in his department as particularly equipped to tackle the many issues surrounding the 
provision of housing. The section on housing in the Labour Party Manifesto were, in the 
opinion of Humphrey Cole the Chief Economic Adviser at the DOE, a reflection of ‘the 
thinking of his [Crosland] own’ and a result of ‘his genuine expertise in this area’. 175 
Crosland decided to establish two reviews on housing. One would consider the methods 
of raising revenue to fund housing development. A committee was established in the summer 
of 1974 to review the whole system of local government finance under Sir Frank Layfield. This 
would examine the rating system and the alternative instrument of a local tax however 
administered. A second review would eventually provide a comprehensive study of all aspects 
of the housing industry. Crosland took a personal interest in participating in these sessions and 
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devoted much time to attending their meetings Crosland also returned to the question of 
nationalization of development land in an attempt to prevent escalating land values which 
increased the cost of housing. Labour governments had attempted to achieve suitable 
legislation to this effect twice before in 1947 and 1967. Crosland was determined to rectify 
this.176  The Labour Government made no specific commitment to nationalisation of 
development land in the manifesto of February 1974. Two previous attempts had limited 
success and the Conservative government had repealed the 1967 Act. Crosland’s attempt was 
presented to Cabinet in September 1974 and formed the basis to a commitment to ‘public 
ownership of land’ in the manifesto of October 1974 for it would ‘get rid of the major 
inflationary element of the cost of housing’.177 Crosland’s paper stated categorically that 
‘public ownership of development land puts control of our scarcest resource in the hands of the 
community and enables it thereby to take an overall perspectiv’.178 Crosland introduced the 
term ‘positive planning’ which would enable facilities to be built where the community 
required them and at a ‘fair’ price rather than the inflated value desired by private speculation. 
These proposals met with very little enthusiasm even in the sympathetic press. The 
Observer considered Crosland’s bill ‘completely unworkable’ for his proposals would burden 
local authorities with responsibilities for purchase, conveyancing, management and other 
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services.179 Positive planning was considered no more than a ‘rhetorical device’ likely to bring 
the planning system to the point of complete collapse and that this latest attempt by Crosland 
to nationalise development land would perpetrate a ‘bureaucratic fiasco’ worse than the failed 
solutions of 1947 and 1967.180 By contrast, the Times’ leader recognised the attractions of 
Crosland’s plan for the proposals were simple and would command wide assent; to take from 
private individuals into the community purse the wealth realised from values created by the 
community.181 However, the leader doubted whether the local authorities could cope with the 
volume of work. It urged Crosland to broker an agreement with opposition parties so that any 
legislation passed would not inevitably face repeal following a change of government. The 
Times also raised the possibility that existing development might ‘actually be impeded rather 
than assisted’ by these proposals, a criticism voice by opposition MPs in the Commons in the 
January 1975.182 
The Layfield Committee on local government finance reported in March 1976. 
Humphrey Cole considered the setting up of this committee a possible political move on the 
part of Crosland in response to the shadow spokeswoman on the Environment Margaret 
Thatcher who demanded the abolition of local rates in the Commons in June 1974.183 He 
believed that Crosland had conceded to this review ‘.since there was no real alternative to the 
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rates and [he] expected Layfield to say so’.. 184 Cole speculated that the recommendation of the 
Layfield report for a greater proportion of rates to be raised locally would not have pleased him 
and consequently, the conclusions of the report were ignored by Crosland. Thatcher favoured 
the introduction of a poll tax to replace the rating system and, eventually as Prime Minister, 
would attempt to raise this tax in Scotland in 1989. 
Contemporary opinion was divided over the solutions proposed to the many problems 
facing housing in the 1970s: the increase in owner occupation which was extending down the 
social ladder; the decline of the private rented sector; falling average household size with their 
special needs and the need for the rehabilitation of older stock.185 In the opinion of Humphrey 
Cole, who attended many of the committee meetings, the policy proposals were numerous but 
not radical. He doubted whether Crosland would have approved although ‘he would have been 
proud of the thoroughness and quality of the analysis’.186 Cole considered that the opinion of 
one contemporary authority on housing issues was far ‘too savage’.  ‘Instead of attempting to 
develop policy changes appropriate to the current and developing situations, appeasement of 
the largest number of relevant interests became the overriding consideration’.187  
 Some of those who worked with Crosland, believed that the review served to shelve 
highly sensitive issues such as the effect on the housing market of mortgage interest tax 
relief.188 Bernard Donoughue, senior policy adviser to Harold Wilson and James Callaghan 
between 1974 and 1979, admired Crosland’s intellectual input to the Cabinet and especially his 
‘ability to place discussion of policy issues within the philosophical structure of a democratic 
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socialist movement’.189 Nevertheless, Donoughue was disappointed with the resulting review 
stating in 1987 that there had been accusations that the Secretary of State had failed to give a 
‘strong enough lead’.190 The review had been promised in 1975 but was only complete in the 
following year and that it ‘had run into the sand and ended as a feeble package’.191 Donoughue 
also criticised the DOE and Crosland for their failure to support the sale of council houses a 
project which Donoughue states was fully endorsed by Wilson. He quotes Wilson as 
commenting to him that Crosland and his officials ‘had made up their minds on council housing 
in 1965 and their minds have been closed ever since’. 192 Donoughue concluded that Crosland 
‘seemed not really to enjoy getting involved at the pit-face of politics or government and was 
a slow and reluctant decision maker’.193 In respect of council house sales and the possible 
electoral benefits, Donoughue accused Crosland and many in the Labour party of failing to 
understand the ‘changing spirit and priorities of our own natural supporters’.194 Crosland’s 
retort was that it would alienate many of their traditional supporters.195 (Ironically, Margaret 
Thatcher had responded in a similar manner when presented with a proposal for council house 
sales from her advisers in 1987) However, Crosland’s refusal to entertain the idea of council 
house sales was an inconsistent position to be adopted by the leading labour revisionist. This 
measure was designed to appeal to those who aspired to house ownership the very section of 
the electorate that Crosland’s revised socialism was designed to attract.  
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Crosland’s relations with the local authorities were tested immediately when he 
returned to the DOE. An order prepared by the Conservative administration concerning the rate 
support grant (RSG) was waiting for submission to parliament. Inflation, rating revaluation and 
local government reorganisation had combined to make this subject ‘a political minefield’ in 
the opinion of Humphrey Cole.196 The Conservative proposal favoured mainly the rural areas. 
Crosland rejected this and argued that the burden on hard-pressed metropolitan areas should be 
lightened in spite of the fact that his own constituency of Grimsby would suffer.197 Crosland 
invoked the Labour Manifesto upon which the February election was fought to endorse his 
decision. 
 
This is not an easy decision, but I concluded that on balance – and it was only on balance 
– it would be right to make the change, because it helps the hard-pressed inner cities 
where so many of our social problems come together, and it has long been Labour 
policy – and a policy to which I personally have been deeply committed –to give these 
inner-city areas more assistance.198 
  
Crosland admitted that this was ‘rough justice’ but that ‘no one should doubt that the results 
overall are socially equitable and just’.199 Many in his own party were critical of his judgement 
and Michael Foot is recorded as acknowledging that Crosland endured a difficult time when 
revealing his plans for the new basis to the rate support grant to the PLP. Foot told Susan 
Crosland that, in this tense meeting, Crosland made a determined ‘socialist defence of the rates 
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decision…It was made in exactly five sentences. Socialist and succinct’.200  Dennis Skinner 
also supported him in the PLP meeting even though the non-metropolitan areas that would 
suffer included his own Derbyshire constituency. He told Crosland’s wife that he and other 
left-wingers admired his long-term judgement and that Crosland was the only one that this 
group could imagine as leader after Wilson201  Some Labour MPs gave him valuable support 
even when their constituencies would be disadvantaged. One northern Labour MP stated that, 
although his constituents were ‘seething’, nevertheless he felt that ‘by far the greater 
responsibility for the massive increase in rates rests with the right hon. Lady’s [Margaret 
Thatcher] administration, not with my right hon. Friend [Crosland]’.202  
The Times criticised the Conservative government for a ‘general tendency to take away 
from householders in inner city areas the benefits which other adjustments in the formulae were 
designed to bring’.203. Crosland, by contrast, had ‘wisely decided not to make any far reaching 
changes in the distribution formulae or in the amount of Exchequer grant’ and it broadly 
supported the ‘egalitarian purposes’ that would be the objectives of the DOE under his 
leadership.204 Even Crosland reminded the Commons that the Economist had written that his 
system was ‘probably fairer than the Tories’ proposal’. 205 Crosland acknowledged the dilemma 
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facing him: ‘Now clear: redistribution of the RSG morally and socially absolutely right, but 
politically definitely wrong. Good and socialist policies not electorally popular’.206  
In an effort to improve relations between the DOE and the local authorities, Crosland 
created the Consultative Council on Local Government Finance in 1974. This became a 
meeting place between Ministers of the domestic spending departments (Environment, 
Education, Home Affairs and Health) and the leaders of local authorities. Humphrey Cole 
observed that ‘he thus helped greatly to improve relations and understanding between central 
and local government when they might have got worse’.207 David McDonald, a senior official 
in the DOE, was impressed with the rapport that he established with the members of this 
Council. ‘The local authority representatives knew he knew his subject inside out. They 
respected him. He acquired respect from them. He made the process of consultation work’.208  
The understanding that was forged on this consultative body helped Crosland to 
persuade the local authorities to curb their spending plans which had increased following the 
reorganisation of local government under Edward Heath. The surge of local government 
spending under the Conservative administration had continued through the first year of 
Labour’s return to office.  The rapid increase in inflation in the first few months of 1975 had 
led to the announcement of a significant package of cuts by the Treasury. A deepening world 
recession resulted in a slump in British exports, a sharp fall in economic growth, and rise in 
unemployment. With inflation running at over twenty per cent, Healy announce a package of 
cuts to public spending amounting to one billion pounds and a raise in income tax.209 Crosland 
had responded by framing a letter to Wilson and his colleagues stressing that Labour’s 
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objectives should be maintained; but accepting that selective cuts were necessary although a 
more rational approach should be adopted whereby certain priority areas would be protected.210 
However, his DOE officials were concerned that, as Secretary of State, he seemed more 
interested in policy-making than on concentrating all his attention on his department.  
Crosland’s forays into general policy dialogue and the promotion of his socialist principles 
illustrate the factors which impacted upon his work as an effective minister. Speaking to a 
gathering of local authority associations in Manchester in May 1975 he announced that urgent 
action was required and that they would have to curtail their spending plans. ‘We have to come 
to terms with the harsh reality of the situation which we inherited. The party’s over’.211  
Crosland’s second major review while Secretary of State at the Department of the 
Environment concerned transport. Although he had confessed to his wife that he considered 
the subject was a ‘great bore’, after immersing himself in the papers given to him by his 
officials, he then admitted that he, ‘had forgotten Transport is so interesting’.212  She further 
elaborated upon his main objectives in order to ‘produce a practical, socialist transport policy’. 
His priority was to focus less on building more motorways which he considered were mostly 
used by better-off business travellers. Railway passengers should have to pay more and he 
wanted to move away from the regressive policy of subsidising the better-off who could afford 
to live in country comfort and commute to London. More money was to be allocated to coach 
and to local bus service. Road tax would be abolished and replaced by higher petrol tax, on the 
principle that working people only use their cars largely at weekend, family visits should not 
have to pay the same tax as those who use the roads daily.213 
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His officials were impressed with his diligence in studying the material relating to the 
review. His Second Permanent Secretary Sir Idwal Pugh commented that ‘We’ve never had a 
Minister who took a subject apart like this, rethought it and re-presented it in this way’.214  
Humphrey Cole remarked that the latter stages of the review would have benefited from his 
greater ‘personal guidance’ at that stage; but that he was reluctant to contribute until he was 
able to devote himself to the task completely. Cole also noted that Crosland continually stressed 
that the content must reflect a clearly socialist policy although he was against an ‘integrated 
transport policy’.  
 
Indeed, he told us not to use that term, for he felt the phrase enshrined too well what he 
disliked about much instinctive Labour thinking on transport – the command approach 
that had little time for user choice and often pushed sectional interests in the name of 
planning.215 
 
Much of the review focused upon the issues of fares and subsidies. Crosland favoured 
a flexible practical approach combining the features of concessions, subsidies and variable 
pricing regimes appropriate to urban or rural environments. He was more dogmatic when the 
issue of the growth of car usage was examined for his solutions to the resultant environmental 
problems were simplistic if not uncompromising.  Crosland accepted that fares had been held 
down for political and inflation reasons.216 However, to the question ‘Why subsidy’, he 
suggestion a solution. ‘Why not let every mode cover its own resource costs? Especially 
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because subsidies produce undesirable side effects which [were] bad for efficiency’.217  In 
regional terms, he stated emphatically that there was no case for general indiscriminate 
subsidies, although he conceded that temporary ones were acceptable when innovative policies 
were introduced innovation.  
 Crosland justified his opposition to the increasing growth of the usage of the car by 
emphasising the problems this development created for the environment. He urged that 
subsidies should be directed to public use of transport. ‘Anti- congestion, environment, energy 
saving require modal switch from cars to public transport…subsidies to fares much less 
effective than physical or fiscal or financial direct restraint on cars’.218 The increased ownership 
of cars had resulted in the centralisation of shops, schools and other amenities which 
disadvantaged those especially among the working class who did not own one.219 A dual 
pricing system was proposed for urban areas; but if that failed then ‘must make a political 
choice between subsidies and reduction of services’.220  
The issue of subsidies represented the reality of the plea to local authorities to curtail 
their spending plans in 1975. Crosland agreed that ‘general subsidies’ were needed to maintain 
services for people without cars although limited subsidies could be used only when 
appropriate. He recognised the complex nature of cutting subsidies. London represented the 
‘fastest-growing’ subsidy; and yet ‘80% goes to above-average incomes’; but a resultant 
increase in fares would be a ‘harsh burden’ on poorer commuters.221  In terms of environmental 
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protection, Crosland supported the rather blunt tool of traffic restraint to combat congestion 
and stated categorically that ‘.still more cars would impede public transport, [also] restraint 
will produce local environmental advantages (noise, fumes, possibilities of 
pedestrianisation)’..222 
The issue of existing departmental policies which he considered, favoured the car owner 
divided Crosland from his officials in the DOE for ‘ [they] go strongly counter to our Manifesto 
commitments and to my beliefs’.223 In particular, he insisted that a transfer of funding of £100 
million be made from roads to subsidies for bus and commuter services and rail investment 
‘avoiding some (but not all) rail closures’.224 He accused his officials of persevering with a 
road programme when the public transport system required proportionally more funding. His 
abhorrence of the ‘savage things we are doing to public transport’ led to the rejection of the 
Departmental line. 
 
Given that we have a very decent road system already (and in many parts of the country 
a lavish one) and that much of what we are proposing for public transport will be 
extremely painful for many of our citizens, I am not willing to accept it. For I believe 
(if I may become a Benthamite for a moment) that we are more likely to achieve the 
greatest happiness of the greatest number by cutting £100m off roads than off public 
transport.225 
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 He outlined two priorities. The first was to concentrate all efforts and financial supports 
on providing public transport ‘for the diminishing but substantial number of people’ who could 
not afford a car.226 For this purpose spending should be directed towards the ‘less well-off’ 
rather than the ‘better-off’. Secondly, protection of the environment should also receive a ‘high 
priority’. He drew a sharp distinction between a Labour policy and that of the Conservative 
approach and at the same time emphasised that civil servants should take their lead from the 
government and not vice versa. 
 
We reject the Tory philosophy of a free-for-all in transport, which would inevitably 
lead to the worst off losing out. At the same time, we reject the approach of those who 
would manage transport so that traffic was allocated between modes by administrative 
fiat. The job of Government is to set a framework for pricing, investment, taxes and 
subsidy, and regulation which reflects the full range of environmental and social factors 
involved.227 
 
Determined to retain in government hands the planning and regulation of transport policy, he 
rejected the TUC’s suggestion of a National Transport Planning Authority and urged instead 
the establishment of a National Transport Council which would retain ‘democratic’ control of 
transport. This covering note then accompanied the consultative document which was given to 
the Cabinet.228 In an undated document in the Crosland Papers numbering seven pages, 
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Crosland wrote extensive notes on every clause of the Consultative Document given to him by 
his officials. His concluding comment was ‘whole thing too pro-road and anti-rail’.229  
When the ‘Consultative Document was introduced in the Commons by the new 
Secretary of State for the Environment, Peter Shore, opinions varied on the features of the 
recommendations There was general agreement that Crosland was to be praised for 
encouraging a national debate on the aims of a national transport policy. The Financial Times’ 
leader recognised that the document raised more questions than answers, but nevertheless ‘he 
has at least tried to make sure that the debate gets off on the right lines by re-stating the 
objectives of as national transport policy’.230 The leader in the New Statesman, in what it termed 
his ‘last will and testament as Environment Secretary’, complimented Crosland. ‘It is probably 
the most complete review of transport ever done in this country by a government in power’.231 
The Sunday Telegraph praised Crosland for ‘having brought the problems of transport into the 
centre of the political stage … [and] This document has settled the lines of what will be an 
important debate’.232 
The lack of any detail concerning proposals was highlighted by several papers. 
Although the Guardian praised Crosland’s realism for identifying the transport problems faced 
by society especially the growth in car ownership and freight, ‘It is notably light on global 
solutions – it recommendations tend to be piecemeal and hesitant’.233 The Times leader echoed 
similar criticism of other broadsheets. Commenting on Crosland’s efforts, it stated that ‘After 
all the labour and the high expectations, the Government’s transport review is noticeably short 
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of policy proposals’.234 The Daily Telegraph also found that the consultative paper ‘failed to 
provide a searching and rigorous examination of the economics of transport in Britain’ and was 
‘not a document of any great weight, for all that it says some very sensible things’. 235 There 
was little support from the socialist press. The Morning Star, supporting the trade union call 
for an integrated transport policy, criticised Crosland for advocating a ‘plan which is little short 
of a programme for integrated collapse’. 236 It condemned Crosland’s proposal for a national 
transport council rather than the planning authority representing the trade unions. It concluded 
that ‘labour must reinforce its demands for an integrated transport system and stressed that 
‘public ownership is the key, public control the method and public service the aim’.237 Alan 
Watkins in the Observer noted ambiguity in Crosland’s perspective on the modes of transport. 
Once, Watkins observed, the ‘party line’ had been that ‘railways were virtuous, roads viscous; 
trains good, cars and lorries (especially lorries) bad’.238 Now Watkins detected that the line, 
according to Crosland, was that trains were ‘bad’ all the time because they were ‘used 
predominantly by the middle classes’.239 Cars were still wicked; but ‘buses are virtuous because 
they are used by the working classes’.240 
Crosland completed his work on the transport review on 15 March 1976 expecting to 
manage the passage of a Transport Bill through the Commons.  Within a month following 
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Wilson’s resignation as Prime Minister, Crosland was appointed to a new Cabinet role as 
Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary under Jim Callaghan as Premier. 
 
 
Evaluation 
It was unusual for ministers to retain their ministerial brief for the seven years and Crosland’s 
continued responsibility for the environment is unique in this period. He was able to lay down 
the basis for developing housing and transport policy during opposition. These he had 
elaborated upon in Socialism Now. On returning to government, Crosland adopted an 
uncompromising position on certain issues which caused some tension with his officials. Their 
prepared position on Maplin and the transport review both of which were complete or nearing 
completion, were challenged by their Secretary of State. They were forced to comply. It would 
seem that Crosland was not a minister to be led by his civil servants.  
His attempts to convince elected regional bodies of the benefits of the Government’s 
policies met with less success. Local interests would seem to be too entrenched. Predictably, 
local authorities were unwilling to co-operate with the regional planning authorities established 
by the Labour government in the first Labour administration. In fact, suspicion was the key 
element in the relationship between the DOE and local authorities and Crosland’s personal 
diplomacy failed especially in Birmingham a crucial economic area.  
It was claimed that Crosland hoped to achieve ‘practical and socialist’ policies although 
these may have been irreconcilable. Both the housing review and that for transport were heavily 
weighted towards social justice for working class members of society and a determination to 
advance their interests. Officials were convinced that his determination to favour public 
transport rather than roads distorted the review’s recommendations. Crosland perceived 
transport in simplistic terms stereotyping usage according to class. His perception was that the 
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working class restricted the use of their car until the weekend and motorways were the preserve 
of business men. Consequently, he suggested punitive measures against car owners whom he 
regarded as mainly responsible for environmental problems in the cities. There was even a 
degree of inconsistency in his reasoning advocating subsidies for public transport such as rail 
and yet perceiving those who used rail as able to afford to live in rural comfort and yet commute 
to work. In his opinion it was not the duty of a Labour government to provide financial 
assistance. 
Crosland’s views on housing, were in some ways, prescient. He rejected the wholesale 
destruction of inner-city residential areas for new development and pressed for renovation and 
the establishment of diversity in housing with socially mixed estates. In spite of political 
pressure, he opposed the sale of council houses. However, his socialist perspective on the 
expansion of housing provision may have been unrealistic for membership of the owner-
occupier class was the aspiration of an increasing section of traditional Labour supporters. 
Bernard Donoghue and Harold Wilson considered his opposition to the sale of council housing 
as an opportunity that would be lost in the struggle for a changing electorate. For a theoretician 
who based his revisionist works on the changing needs of the working class since the war, he 
seemed unwilling to acknowledge that home ownership was now their prime objective. 
There was a disconnect between the radical programme on housing that Crosland 
advocated at the 1973 conference and the nature of the White Paper when it finally appeared. 
Crosland ideas were diluted and, in particular, tax relief on mortgage payment were left 
untouched. The resultant Green Paper which was published in 1977 under Crosland’s successor 
Peter Shore has been described as a ‘very conservative’ document.241 The political reality of 
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retaining the support of  the burgeoning class of new home owners had led to the emasculating 
of Crosland’s objectives.242 
Crosland persevered with policies that advanced his socialist objectives often against 
resistance on pragmatic grounds. He ignored the findings of the Layfield Committee when it 
supported the increase of the rating contribution locally. Again, he recognised the possible 
damaging electoral consequences of switching rate support grants from urban to non-
metropolitan  areas as ‘politically wrong’ although ‘morally right’, but nevertheless continued 
to press for them. As minister, he seemed willing to be bound by inquiry results when they 
failed to uphold his theoretical position on social justice.  
 In regard to his regional policy there exists a contradiction. His approach encouraged 
the modernisation of the economic traditions of northern areas by diversifying through science-
based capital-intensive industries. However, he objected to the destruction of local 
communities by housing development and supported a regional strategy which would assist 
wealth redistribution.  Susan Crosland cited her husband’s frustration with the process of 
Departmental progress. In a reference to his ambition for his future at the DOE, he stated to her 
in 1975 the following. 
 
If I stayed in this bloody job for another two years, I could actually advance something. 
Not solve it. You can’t solve anything. But start things moving in the right direction.243
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Chapter Five: The Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 1976 (April) -1977 (February) 
 
‘When I pop off,’ Tony said to the Prime Minister, ‘and they cut open my heart, on it 
will be engraved ‘Fish’ and ‘Rhodesia’’.1 
 
The British press have been unanimous in the criticism of Callaghan for putting 
Crosland into the job instead of Roy [Jenkins]. I have been impressed by Crosland’s 
capacity for rudeness coupled with his complicated character, his unpredictability and 
his manifest charm’.2 
 
The Foreign Office has every essential for a good foreign policy except muscle.3 
 
Crosland’s last ministerial position was Secretary of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office, a Cabinet post which he was to hold for only ten months before his death in February 
1977. This chapter will examine firstly the circumstances surrounding his appointment 
following the announcement of Wilson’s resignation as leader and Callaghan’s election. 
Secondly, Crosland’s thoughts on the role of Britain in the post-war world will be explored. 
Two issues dominated his time as Foreign Secretary: the ‘Cod War’ with Iceland and the 
attempt to find a political settlement to the future of Southern Rhodesia and much of this 
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chapter will concentrate on these areas and his success in finding diplomatic solutions to these 
problems. 
 
Appointment as Secretary of State  
Wilson announced on the 15 March 1976 that he would resign as leader. This led to a leadership 
election in which Crosland was persuaded to stand. Roy Hattersley, a close friend and colleague 
warned that a humiliating result could severely damage his career aspirations. Crosland 
considered that he could appeal to the common ground that united left and right and that he 
should show ambition as one of the senior cabinet members. However, he had never held one 
of the three major offices of state and was pitted against two other centre right candidates for 
votes. His campaign was further limited by his overall reluctance to cultivate support in the 
party.4 Out of six candidates in the first round he came last with only seventeen votes out of a 
possible three hundred and fourteen and therefore was eliminated. Callaghan eventually 
triumphed after two more rounds of voting defeating Michael Foot and thus becoming Prime 
Minister.5 Nevertheless, Crosland was offered the position of Foreign Secretary by Callaghan 
within days. Callaghan’s decision was a combination of regard for Crosland’s assistance and 
friendship over the years and the need to place centre-right politicians in the three key positions 
in his Cabinet.6 Crosland had supported Callaghan in his first leadership campaign in 1963 and 
had arranged for Callaghan to meet distinguished economists when he was appointed Shadow 
                                                          
4 For details of the election see Jeffreys, Crosland, pp.188-96 and Giles Radice, Friends and Rivals (London, 
Abacus, 2003) pp. 234-9. 
5 Callaghan won by 176 votes to 137. 
6 See James Callaghan, Time and Chance (Glasgow, Collins/Fontana1988) pp.399-400. 
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Chancellor in 1963. Callaghan also felt that Jenkins’ appointment as Foreign Secretary would 
be unacceptable to several anti-Marketeers in the new cabinet.7 
The Observer agreed with Crosland’s appointment even though Roy Jenkins appeared 
to be the obvious choice. ‘Because of Mr. Jenkins’s unique reputation in Europe, however, the 
Foreign Office would, for him, have provided a worthwhile task. For Mr. Crosland, it will be 
a waiting room for the Treasury’.8 The appointment did not meet the approval of some. 
Nicholas Henderson, British Ambassador at the UN was critical of Callaghan’s decision 
commenting on Crosland’s inappropriate conduct in the first month as Foreign Secretary.9 
Nevertheless, Crosland had now achieved one of the three key posts in government. His 
political future seemed more promising. There was even a possibility that Healey at the 
Treasury and Crosland at the Foreign Office might exchange roles allowing Crosland to 
become Chancellor. A challenge for the leadership in a few years was now no longer 
improbable.10 
His new position presented a unique challenge compared to the other cabinet posts 
which he had held. Apart from an interest in matters connected with international socialism, 
Crosland’s previous ministerial work had focused upon domestic issues. By contrast, Jim 
Callaghan had developed a sound understanding of international relations in opposition and for 
the last two years of government.11 While at the DOE, Crosland was able to pursue policy 
objectives and achieve a tangible improvement in peoples’ lives. ‘At the DOE, Tony could 
                                                          
7 Ibid. 
8 Observer, 11 April 1976, p.14. 
9 See quote above. 
10 See Jeffreys Crosland, p. 198. 
11 Callaghan’s expertise in this area was to become a significant factor in Crosland’s handling of the Rhodesian 
question. (See below) 
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pose questions with some control over the answers, get his raw material, focus on it, come up 
with logical coherent conclusions’.12 The Foreign Office offered a stark contrast.  
 
The whole thought process at the Foreign Office is very different from the domestic 
department, in some ways much easier. Instead of persuading and directing, most of the 
time one is reacting to the moods of people from highly varied cultures.13 
 
John Weston who was a senior Civil Servant at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and 
worked with Crosland, made a similar early judgement. In respect of Crosland’s introduction 
to the department, he commented that: 
 
Initially rather uncertain about the Foreign office, feeling that he had left a job where 
he could design a transport policy for the entire United Kingdom … and he would just 
put out his policy and the minions would make it happen, and he could get on with 
designing another wonderful policy. But he didn’t actually have to rub shoulders with 
a lot of people he didn’t know.14 
 
Crosland showed an impatience with the formalities of the Foreign Office especially 
the established protocols. He felt that much time was wasted with functions with foreign 
ambassadors and this even extended to the required dress code for specific occasions.15 This 
irreverent approach was a cause of irritation to his civil servants. Sir Michael Palliser, who was 
                                                          
12 Crosland, Crosland, p. 338. 
13 Ibid, p. 339. 
14 John Weston interviewed by Liz Cox, 2001, British Diplomatic Oral History Project. 
15 See Jeffreys, Crosland, 1999, p. 201. 
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Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office between 1975 and 1982, cites a greater 
problem initially. As with previous Cabinet appointments, Crosland was determined to master 
the background to the pressing issues of the department and this would take time. However, as 
Palliser noted, often time was not available. 
 
In Foreign Affairs, however important the issues, the devil is in the detail; and Tony 
Crosland was ever reluctant to reach a decision until he had mastered the detail; this 
often meant for him several hours – sometimes days – of careful reading … This meant, 
inevitably, that to some of his officials he seemed overly cautious and a shade 
dilettante.16 
 
Crosland and the Role of Britain in the 1970s 
Crosland set out his priorities in regard to the conduct of British foreign policy in briefing 
notes: national security, the reduction in tension in international relations between east and 
west in Europe; lessening the risk of war in the world; furthering human rights; and protection 
of British citizens abroad.17 These would form the context for his management of British 
foreign affairs. His officials did not always agree and there were clashes in areas where civil 
servants had strong views, notably on free trade and on the EEC.18 Crosland’s perspective also 
differed from that of his officials in another significant way. The Foreign Office considered 
that foreign policy transcended party politics and officials had traditionally responded to those 
                                                          
16 Michael Palliser, ‘Crosland and New Labour’, ed. Dick Leonard (London, Macmillan, 1999), ‘Chapter 9: 
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17 ‘Objects. F.P’.(Foreign Policy), ACP 5/13 
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ministers who advocated respect for British interests especially Ernest Bevin and George 
Brown.  
 
Both shared a quality that endeared them to officials: both saw their job in terms solely 
of advancing British interests abroad. Tony did not. This was maddening for officials – 
constantly having to take account things they thought irrelevant.19 
 
In fact, in his briefing notes, there is no mention of British interests. He emphasised a role for 
Britain that was supportive of the international community and its pursuit of peace through 
international bodies and the balance of power. Recognising the reality of Britain’s position in 
the world he accepted that Britain’s independent action was limited and therefore Britain 
should join and strengthen international bodies such as the EEC, NATO and the UN.20 Mixing 
realism with a measure of optimism and recognising the continuing Russian threat in central 
Africa, he asserted that the West should attempt to maintain a military balance.21 The nuclear 
superiority of the West over the communist world was no longer sustainable and, therefore, he 
considered that a nuclear first strike was ‘most improbable’ and a regional balance was 
crucial.22 His final comment on the global geo-political position was the essence of realpolitik. 
‘Détente essential to satisfy West public opinion and prevent CND etc: Governments must be 
seen to be ‘trying’ for peace: strong but conciliatory’. 23 
                                                          
19 Susan Crosland, Crosland, 1982, p. 382. 
20 ‘Objects of FP’, ACP 5/13. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
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He was also aware that in respect of the protection of the rights of British citizens, there 
was ‘a strict limit to what can and should be done’.24 His notes further reflect the notion that 
foreign policy conducted by a Labour Government should have an ethical basis. He posed the 
question ‘How far should foreign policy, especially under Labour, be based on morality?’.25 
His response, reviewing conduct in the nineteenth century, was to examine the arguments for 
and against such a policy and the case for having no foreign policy. He noted that traditional 
foreign policy of the Foreign Office ‘shifted from morality mid-19th Century to cynicism post 
1914’.26 He contrasted this evolution with the ‘mixed’ traditional of the Labour Party, a 
combination of pacifism, anti-imperialism and support for socialist internationalism although 
leaders could never ignore public opinion.  
Crosland accepted that responding to party and public opinion was a vital element of 
his new role. David Lipsey, who was special adviser to Crosland at the DOE and subsequently 
the Foreign Office, offered him some initial advice in April 1976 following his appointment 
advice that Lipsey considered might well assist his future political ambition. He stated that 
dealing with the press would be much easier at the Foreign Office where coverage would be 
on the front page as long as he pursued ‘an active policy and a Socialist philosophy’.27 In a 
document which provided a subtext for Crosland’s next career move, he advised him to support 
socialist groups in Europe which would be popular with the party and in this context he stressed 
that contact with the trade unions was vital and that he should involve those responsible for 
                                                          
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 David Lipsey, ‘Secretary of State: Chat with Dick Leonard/Dereck Gladwin – Conclusions’, 22 April 1976, 
ACP, 5/12. 
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international relations in the unions.28 In terms of departmental organisation, he advised 
Crosland to give every minister ‘.a bit of each but do Africa yourself’., Africa and the United 
Nations being identified as ‘glamorous jobs’.29 His final comment on the Foreign Office was a 
realistic assessment of its influence in contemporary international relations: ‘The Foreign 
Office has every essential for a good foreign policy except muscle’.30 In December 1976, as 
Crosland was about to assume the Presidency of the European Council of Ministers in January 
1977, Lipsey concluded: 
 
I should avoid getting over-involved in your work as President of the Council; I 
[Lipsey] could make little useful contribution. I [Crosland] should instead use my time 
to concentrate even more on those non-Community issues from which your attention 
will inevitably be deflected, and on the domestic political situation (particularly with 
the possibility that you might become Chancellor in mind.) 31 
 
The Third Cod War. 1975-1976. 
Crosland’s apparent reluctance to prioritise the protection of British interests in his foreign 
policy was tested when faced with the continuing fishing dispute between British fishing 
trawlers and the Icelandic coastal authorities. The attempt by British trawlers to fish close to 
Icelandic shores had been resisted, often by force, throughout the late nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. One Scandinavian historian draws a distinction between fish-surplus states in the 
north of the North Atlantic and fish-deficient in the south. The latter, including Britain and 
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31 David Lipsey, ‘Secretary of State. Personal and Confidential’, 22 December 1976, ACP 5/13. 
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Germany, could not meet the increasing demand for fish and therefore had to encroach on 
fishing grounds to the north especially Iceland a pattern followed through to the post-war 
period and still continuing.32 Icelandic historians consider that there were ten ‘Cod Wars’ 
dating back to the 15th Century when English fisherman first visited Icelandic waters. 
  On the 18 November 1973, an agreement had been signed ending the ‘Second Cod 
War’. This limited British fishing activities to certain areas inside a fifty-mile limit. This 
agreement would expire in November 1975, but the Icelandic government announced its 
intention to extend its fishing limits to two hundred miles in July of that year. The British 
government did not recognise this extension to the exclusion zone and a ‘Third Cod War’ 
followed lasting over a year (July 1975-June 1976). This conflict, which was the most hard 
fought of the cod wars, saw British fishing trawlers have their nets cut by the Icelandic Coast 
Guard and the attempted ramming of Royal Navy escort frigates. 
 For Crosland and other members of NATO this dispute was perceived as a threat to the 
Western Alliance. The Icelandic Government threatened to close the NATO base at Keflavik 
which would have severely impaired the ability of the alliance to defend the Atlantic Ocean 
from the Soviet Union.33 The dispute was intensified in February 1976 when the Icelandic 
government severed diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom. Jim Callaghan as Foreign 
Secretary until his victory in the leadership election in April 1976, had handled the increasing 
tension between the two countries. It was left to Crosland to attempt an interim agreement with 
the Icelandic minister of Foreign Affairs Einar Augustsson in Oslo during May. The basic terms 
of the agreement were settled on the 6 June. The agreement was to last for a period of six 
                                                          
32 See Jon Th. Thor (2000), ‘The quest for cod: Some causes of fishing conflicts in the North Atlantic’, Acta 
Borealia, Vol. 17, No.1, pp. 41-50. 
33 For the implications of the Cod Wars for NATO and the Western Alliance see GuDmundur J. Gudmundsson, 
‘The Cod War and the Cold War’, Scandinavian Journal of History, Vol. 31, Issue 2, 2006, pp. 97-118. 
242 
 
months. The British were allowed twenty-three or twenty-four trawlers at any one time, the 
inshore fishing limit in certain areas would now be twenty and thirty miles instead of twelve  
and twenty as in the 1973 agreement and the EEC would be invited to assume responsibility 
for longer term arrangements.34 
Crosland acknowledged that concessions would have to be made.  These concessions 
included acceptance of Icelandic conservation areas ‘without exception’ a considerably 
reduced fishing effort and concessions as regards ‘distances from the coast’. 35 Crosland stated 
to Augustsson that ‘the terms of the likely agreement were already being represented as a sell-
out in the British press and it was clear that we could not go much further’.36 Both ministers 
were aware that the matter would finally fall to the EEC to produce a workable relationship 
and Crosland stressed that nothing contained in their bilateral agreement should ‘prejudice’ 
these future negotiations.   
 Reaction to the terms was broadly hostile perceiving the agreement as harmful to British 
interests; but there was also a recognition of the reality of the situation which limited Crosland’s 
negotiation strategy and that he had handled a delicate issue with equanimity to both sides.  The 
Guardian leader reflected this: ‘Iceland has won outright and no harm comes of acknowledging 
this. But Mr.Crosland was right to accept the peace terms on offer; the alternative was a further 
long period of costly and ineffective naval protection’.37 It concluded by stating that the 
settlement was less than ‘catastrophic’ and that Crosland was right to accept it ‘in spite of its 
                                                          
34 The normal number of vessels was a total of one hundred and five – thus only forty-six or forty-eight could 
carry on a day-to-day basis. 
35 ‘Icelandic Fisheries Talks Oslo 31 May 1976. First Plenary Meeting’, 31 May 1976, TNA, FCO 73/207. 
36 Ibid. 
37 ‘Cold coley and colder comfort’, Guardian 3 June 1976, p.12. Coley was a substitute for cod but was not as 
popular because it was not pure white. Nevertheless, the Guardian recommended it to its readers.  
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baleful effect on some of his constituents’.38 A latter comment in the same paper pointed to the 
difficult nature of Crosland’s task. ‘Britain has admitted defeat in the cod war with Iceland and 
accepted surrender terms which ought to make the government blush. In the final negotiations, 
Mr Crosland made the best he could of an impossible situation’.39 There was support for the 
notion that Crosland’s task was made worse by the last Secretary of State:  
 
Had his predecessor as Foreign Secretary, Mr. Callaghan, showed as much good sense 
and courage at the beginning of the dispute as Mr Crosland showed at the end, much 
better terms could have been obtained.40 
 
The leader then urged Crosland to concentrate on reforming the EEC’s Common Fisheries 
Policy and move as fast as ‘decently possible’ towards a two hundred mile limit to protect our 
stocks of fish.41  
The reaction of trawler men was predictably less nuanced on hearing of the prospective 
terms before they were confirmed in public. When the representative of the British Trawlers 
Federation heard the terms Crosland proposed, he stated that his only reaction could be ‘Oh 
God! At the very most, it would be possible to operate in all only twice the daily average of 
trawlers permitted’.42 Crosland had prefaced his announcement of the prospective terms by 
stating that the negotiating team were on ‘a hiding to nothing’ and that he had come to the 
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conclusion that there ‘really was no other option’.43 The representative of the Transport and 
General Workers Union accepted Crosland’s line on this for he considered that even though it 
was a bad deal, nevertheless it would not possible to get a better agreement than Crosland had 
secured.44 Although he advocated adequate compensation for losses sustained by the 
fisherman, he further urged all other representatives to support Crosland and that they should 
be ‘progressive and look forward’ to negotiations with the EEC.45  
Crosland was aware that a crucial test for his diplomacy would be the reaction in 
Grimsby, his constituency, and on Humberside two areas where the fishing industry was a key 
component of the local economy. He received full support from Labour Party officials in 
Grimsby in spite of warnings that his 5,000-plus majority could be under threat at the next 
general election. Matt Quinn, secretary of the Grimsby Labour Party, justified Crosland’s 
agreement by stating that ‘this was not a local issue [for] Mr. Crosland had to take NATO into 
consideration’.46 On Humberside, Crosland described the pessimistic predictions for the 
industry as ‘ridiculous’ and reiterated that there was no alternative for any continuation of the 
Cod War would have to be met ‘with increasing cost to our defence budget’.47  
His announcement of the terms in the Commons drew strong criticism from the Labour 
member for Hull East James Johnson who said that there would be ‘dismay and disgust’ felt 
by the people of Humberside. The City Council and fishing families in particular felt that they 
had been let down.48 Crosland had stressed again that the Law of the Sea Conference was about 
                                                          
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid, Mr.Cairns, Representative of the Transport and General Workers Union. 
45 Ibid. 
46 ‘Trawler owners seek State aid’, 3 June 1976, Guardian, p. 22. 
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to meet and he pointed out that the ‘the trend towards a 200 mile limits was now clearly 
irreversible’. 49 There was little to be gained from ignoring the reality of the need for a 
compromise with the Icelandic government. 
 
Recriminations about the past will do no good to anyone. They will not save a single 
job on Humberside or in Fleetwood. This agreement has been as passionately 
denounced in Reykjavik as it has been on Humberside. I regard it as a concession to 
common sense.50 
 
Crosland’s strategy, set within the implications for the Atlantic Alliance, seemed to have gained 
significant traction in the Commons. Francis Pym for the Conservatives accepted that the two-
hundred mile limit was inevitable as Crosland said but that the government should present a 
strategy to ensure that alternative employment was eventually provided.51 Similarly, in 
Scotland, the SNP member accepted the reality of the situation. George Thompson urged the 
Government to take as tough a line over the Common Fisheries Policy as they had with Iceland. 
 Crosland also received considerable support from John Prescott MP for Hull East who 
believed that Crosland had ‘got the best possible deal out of the mess he inherited’.52 Replying 
to the comments made by his Labour colleague for Hull West, Prescott rejected the ‘hysterical’ 
claims that 9000 men would be made unemployed as a consequence of the agreement. In fact, 
Prescott had embarked on an unofficial information gathering exercise to Iceland in the spring 
of 1976, before Crosland was appointed as Foreign Secretary. Prescott had worked as a seaman 
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in the merchant navy and had represented the seamen’s union. He was sympathetic to the 
Icelandic position in regard to exclusive fishing rights off the continental shelf.53  Prescott had 
formed the impression that Icelandic public opinion was unaware of the potential hardship that 
the UK fishing industry would suffer if fishing rights were drastically reduced. He believed 
that the Icelandic Government had done nothing to educate their population about this. 
Consequently, Prescott advised the following to Crosland.  
 
The Icelanders were TV addicts and if an explanation of the UK case could be put 
across on Icelandic TV… it would be very helpful. When the Icelanders saw the 
magnitude of the UK problem they would be more sympathetic to the negotiation of a 
transitional agreement.54 
 
Prescott laid claim for the ‘deal’ that was eventually struck having discussed at length the issue 
with the Icelandic home minister and had come to some resolution before April. He says that 
he went to see Crosland after his appointment and told him of this ‘deal’. 
 
He [Crosland] didn’t seem to know much about it [the deal]. I said it must be lying in 
some drawer in the Foreign Office, covered with dust … He asked if I considered the 
Icelanders would still agree to my deal. I said I thought they would, so he decided to 
start new negotiations. In the end a deal was done, based on a limited number of fishing 
trips, which was the principle I had been working on.55 
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247 
 
There seems little in the archives to support this interpretation (apart from the reference above) 
and neither of the biographies mention the part played by Prescott.  
 Any evaluation of the effectiveness of Crosland’s management of the crisis of the Cod 
War must be assessed against the criteria that he had stated in his briefing notes. Although 
Crosland recognised that his deal was being portrayed as a ‘sell-out’ in the press, he seems to 
have satisfied two of his cardinal principles of foreign policy namely the lessening of 
international tension by the preservation of peace between Iceland and the United Kingdom 
and the strengthening of security in the North Atlantic. Both Crosland and Prescott were 
convinced that the continuation of the standoff between the Icelandic coastguard and the Royal 
Navy would lead to a dangerous escalation and a costly one at that. The security of the North 
Atlantic Alliance was a significant factor. Crosland’s willingness to find an agreement with 
Agustsson, even though concessions had to be made, was a price worth paying and one 
applauded by NATO. Sir John Killick, Britain’s permanent representative at NATO wrote to 
Crosland citing the Icelanders’ high regard for his responsible attitude to the negotiations and 
the ‘high standing with your NATO colleagues’.56 Crosland’s deal had restored diplomatic 
relations between Iceland and the UK - severed while Callaghan was Foreign Secretary - and 
ensured that Icelandic naval facilities were available for NATO use.  
 Crosland’s intervention and diplomacy could be interpreted as serving British interests 
as well. He stated several times that there were no alternatives to the compromise solution he 
constructed with Agustsson. British interests were not served by a prolonged armed conflict 
which would eventually endanger lives and lose support in NATO and the EEC ‘and our 
bargaining position within the Community over the common fisheries would be seriously 
complicated’.57 One recent study supports the view that Crosland had no option but to enter 
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into a conciliatory agreement.58 Even the critics of Crosland’s diplomatic conduct accepted  
that the imposition of a two hundred mile limit was inevitable throughout the  Economic  
Community. The accusation that his negotiations with the Icelandic authorities represented a 
‘sell-out’ are not born out by a study of the minutes of the meetings with Agustsson who was 
equally pressured by public opinion in Iceland which regarded the agreement as unacceptable 
and generous to the British.59 On the implications for the domestic industry Crosland had 
stressed that the British fishing industry would now enter a long period of ‘adaption’ which 
other fishing industries would have to face and that the government would help in this 
restructuring necessary. His claim that few if any jobs would be lost was probably optimistic 
and rejected by the trawler representatives he met and by opinion in the coastal towns. The 
trawler union did recognise that there was a perceived benefit in that a reformed common 
Agricultural Policy would strengthen the move towards the ‘decasualisation’ of labour 
prevalent in the fishing industry.60 
 
Rhodesia 1976-1977 
On the 11th November 1965 The Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia Ian Smith issued a 
unilateral declaration of independence for this self-governing British dependency ruled by a 
white minority. This was against the wishes of the British government which had insisted on 
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the widening of the franchise to include the black population. This decision by the Rhodesian 
Front led by Smith was seen as completely unacceptable to the Commonwealth as well. Harold 
Wilson had refused to grant independence unless Smith promised to allow unimpeded progress 
to majority rule and the ending of racial discrimination. Wilson’s response was to impose 
sanctions on imports from Rhodesia and an embargo on oil exports to Rhodesia hoping to force 
Smith to back down. Wilson engaged in further talks with Smith in 1966 and 1968; but the 
Rhodesian leader refused to co-operate and accept the formula of ‘NIMBAR’.61 In the 1970s 
the black opposition war against the Rhodesian Front intensified especially as the new Marxist 
government in Mozambique now offered a base for cross border African guerrilla activity. At 
this point, Henry Kissinger, American Secretary of State, announced that he would intervene 
and attempt to find a solution to the problem and would visit frontline presidents. Kissinger 
embarked on a mission to visit African states with the intention of resisting increased Soviet 
influence.  His biographer states that Kissinger was determined to transform American policy 
which would be based now on emphatic opposition to white minority regimes and on financial 
support for the emerging black nations.62   
Jim Callaghan as Foreign Secretary handled relations with Rhodesia until his election 
as Party leader and Prime Minister in April 1976. He had made little headway but laid a marker 
for any negotiations with Smith in the Commons on 22 March 1976. He stated that if Britain 
were to play a constructive part in the discussions, the Rhodesian Government would have to 
accept the following: majority rule; elections in 2 years; and an interim government with black 
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Prime Minister. Callaghan appointed Crosland as the new Foreign Secretary but was to retain 
a close interest in matters.  
In October 1976, the Guardian leader produced a most derogatory critique of 
Crosland’s diplomatic management of the attempt to find a solution of the Rhodesia question 
since his appointment the previous April. With reference to his working relationship with 
Henry Kissinger the American Secretary of State who had devoted himself to the rapid 
resolution of this issue and under a title of ‘Mr Crosland’s diffident diplomacy’, it stated the 
following: 
 
If Dr Kissinger had done a more thorough job, and if the British Foreign Secretary had 
contributed more to the proceedings than an appearance of supercilious distaste, the 
present disorderly approach to the Rhodesian settlement might have been avoided 
…[Crosland] had made little attempt to influence events [and] there is no hint of any 
plan or coherent strategy.63 
 
Crosland’s handling of the Rhodesian issue during his thirteen months at the Foreign Office 
has been overshadowed by the collapse of the Geneva Conference in December 1976, the 
degree of progress made by David Owen who succeeded as Foreign Secretary following 
Crosland’s death and the assertion that Crosland allowed himself to be dictated to by Henry 
Kissinger.64 Furthermore, Callaghan’s official biographer stated that the real axis was between 
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Callaghan and Kissinger because Callaghan believed that ‘Tony Crosland, in Rhodesian affairs, 
was felt to be rather more frail’.65 In this section which reviews Crosland diplomatic efforts for 
a solution to the Rhodesian issue, I shall examine the relations between Crosland and Kissinger 
and in particular the contribution that he made to the diplomacy which they both conducted 
and how effectively he maintained the integrity of the British policy against the determination 
of the American Secretary of State to pursue his own initiative and thus achieve a rapid 
resolution of this issue.  
 Although the American Secretary of State was surprised and annoyed to be invited to 
their first meeting at RAF Waddington near Grimsby rather than Heathrow, they developed a 
working relationship which on one level was sustained even after Kissinger left office in 
January 1977; but, on another level, it became strained over the pace demanded by the 
American state department. Crosland welcomed Kissinger’s support for majority rule but he 
was less enthusiastic about Kissinger’s determination to pressurise Ian Smith into making an 
early deal. Crosland was convinced that the British had a better grasp on the dynamics of geo-
politics in Southern Africa and that any lasting settlement could only work if the ‘front line 
states’ were brought on board first.66 Kissinger’s priority was to stem the growth of 
communism in Southern Africa in particular for as his biographer states Kissinger saw most 
national liberation movements as acting on behalf of the Soviet state.67  Kissinger immediately 
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attempted to hasten progress by utilising a discussion paper produced by the Foreign Office 
officials as a basis for a meeting with Smith.68  
 Crosland asserted himself over three issues that became areas of dispute with the 
American Secretary of State: relations with the black front-line leaders; compensation to white 
farmers; and, above all, the strategy of the Kissinger plan for resolution of the future of 
Rhodesia. At a formal meeting between Crosland and Kissinger and their respective teams 
before Kissinger departed for Africa, the question of the diplomatic approach to Kaunda of 
Zambia, Nyerere of Tanzania and Machel of Mozambique was discussed. Differences arose 
over the involvement of Machel. Kissinger obviously distrusted him and feared that he would 
extend the influence of his Marxist movement into a Rhodesia ruled be a black majority. 
However, Crosland and his officials had become convinced that Machel was amenable to a 
diplomatic approach and that he was ‘anxious to avoid an internationalisation of the war’. 69  
 The issue of financial compensation to the white farmers who had decided to emigrate 
was contentious. Kissinger supported the international fund unreservedly; but Crosland and his 
advisers considered that time was required for expert study of the practical and financial 
implications.70 Two days later, Crosland was more emphatic that Kissinger should 
acknowledge the British position on the terms of the settlement which was for the British non-
negotiable. 
 
                                                          
68 See Jeffreys, Crosland, 1999, p.202. See below for this discussion paper termed ‘Annex C’ by the FCO. 
69 Meeting of Crosland and Kissinger in London, 4 September 1976. TNA, FCO/ 73/209. 
70 Crosland to Kissinger, ‘Rhodesia Joint Planning’, 14 September, 1976. ACP, 5/14. 
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If you do let me reassure you that we remain most anxious not to cramp your style or 
restrict your room for manoeuvre, except on the major points of concern to us – no 
departure from the principles laid down by Jim Callaghan on 22 March [1976]71 
 
Crosland again stressed that when financial arrangements were included ‘we must get this part 
of the plan strongly refined before any package as a whole is launched’.72  
In spite of Crosland’s concerns, Kissinger indicated that after his meeting with Smith 
in Salisbury he expected an announcement within five days from the Rhodesian leader. 
Crosland’s reply illustrates the divergence between the two diplomats on policy and his 
determination to impress on Kissinger the obstacles that the British Government faced in 
supporting the Kissinger plan. Having complimented the American Secretary of State on his 
‘courageous and audacious initiative’, Crosland reminded Kissinger that he, Crosland, did not 
have the same authority for unilateral decisions as Kissinger possessed. 
 
For better or worse we have Cabinet Government and Cabinet has not endorsed any 
detailed proposals. The Prime Minister said in his talk with you on 6 September that 
consideration was still being given to certain joint proposals. That remains his position 
… We support them strongly but have no powers to enforce them on either side, only 
to endorse them as constructive proposals.73  
 
                                                          
71 Crosland to Kissinger, ‘Rhodesia Joint Planning’, 16 September 1976. ACP, 5/14. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Crosland to Kissinger, 21 September 1976, ACP, 5/14. 
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It was at this point that Crosland had to remind Kissinger that the ‘plan’ which he was using as 
a basis for negotiation with Smith and the frontline Presidents was ‘always put forward as a 
discussion paper [annex C]…[which] we have felt necessary from time to time to modify’.74 
  Crosland’s authority was severely limited by several factors: having to respond to 
events 5000 miles away without Kissinger’s ‘on the spot feel’; obligations to the Cabinet; and 
the triangulation of Crosland-Kissinger-Callaghan. Kissinger ignored all of these constraints 
and the response that followed Crosland’s communication of 21 September, revealed his wider 
agenda. In referring to Crosland’s caution, Kissinger laid bare what was at stake to American 
involvement: 
 
Your attitude could encourage the radical Africans to put forward more and more 
demands, and the Russians to meddle. Instead of stability, we invite chaos at the critical 
moment. And this whole enterprise after all only makes sense as a firebreak to African 
radicalism and Soviet intervention.75  
 
Kissinger stated that Crosland’s approach ‘to negotiate an interim government of indeterminate 
design would have failed at the outset’ and that if Crosland could not give support ‘then frankly 
it would be best to say nothing publicly’.76 
By September 1976, Kissinger’s initiative was disintegrating. As Smith prevaricated 
upon the potential deal, the African leaders in the frontline states and the Rhodesian 
oppositional party the Patriotic Front publicly dissociated themselves from it and demanded a 
                                                          
74 Ibid. 
75 Henry [Kissinger] to Tony [Crosland], undated but presumably sent between 21 and 23 September 1976, ACP, 
5/14.  
76 Ibid. 
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conference.77  They were unwilling to submit to an interim government for two years and 
demanded majority rule immediately. Crosland was left with no other option but to call a 
Conference on the Rhodesian issue. Crosland was torn between the pressure for Britain to 
assume some moral responsibility for political future of Rhodesia and the feeling in the Cabinet 
that they were exhausted with the ‘.Rhodesian Morass’..78 The Labour Party Conference in 
1976 also called for a Constitutional Conference stressing that ‘the people of Zimbabwe had 
on all occasions rejected any attempts by outside powers to determine their future’ and regarded 
all Smith’s proposals as seriously flawed and therefore unacceptable.79 Crosland felt justified 
in preparing for such a conference and returning to Callaghan’s original principles. He 
concluded a memorandum to Cabinet:  
 
In addition, we must not allow ourselves to be caught in any lengthy negotiation. For 
this reason among others, while we must not be wholly negative, we should be cautious 
of calling a constitutional conference. Above all we must refuse to accept any direct 
involvement, whether administrative or militarily, in the government of Rhodesia 
during the run up to independence. 80 
 
It was now Crosland’s task to formulate the details of this meeting especially its 
composition and venue. Crosland resisted the attempts of Smith to dictate to the Secretary of 
                                                          
77 Crosland, Crosland, p. 369. ‘While Ian smith haggled over the ‘package deal’, the front-line Presidents publicly 
dissociated themselves from it … they wanted a conference’. 
78 Crosland, Crosland, p.365. 
79 Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ‘Rhodesia’, 21 September 1976, CAB/129/192/5. 
80 FWS Craig(ed.), Conservative and Labour Party Conference Decisions (Surrey, Unwin Bros., 1982), 1976, p. 
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State on various issues. Smith objected a European venue for the Smith considered it illogical 
for Rhodesians to have to go to Geneva to discuss their own future. He further expected the 
British government to bear the full costs of transport and accommodation of the delegation of 
thirty six. Crosland refused to increase the amount already considered appropriate. By these 
tactics, Smith hoped to gain leverage over the conference by engineering a Salisbury location. 
If that failed, then he would try to ensure that the Rhodesian delegation outnumbered the other 
African groups the composition of which he would attempt to determine. Smith rejected the 
idea that the Rhodesian Government’s delegation was to be treated on the same basis as any 
one of the three African Nationalist Delegations.81 In order to neutralise the Patriotic Front 
delegations of Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe, he suggested that Crosland should invite a 
delegation from the ‘Council of Chiefs’ whom Smith claimed represented the views of and had 
considerable responsibility for ‘millions of Africans of moderate views’.82 Smith warned 
Crosland that if this request as rejected it would prove that the British Government was not 
prepared ‘to consider the views of any Africans other than the Nationalists politicians and the 
terrorists … [and] I am confident that a delegation of Chiefs would exert a moderating 
influence’.83  
 Crosland’s response was unequivocal. He rejected the suggestion that the Rhodesian 
delegation should be treated in the same way as the total African representation and he also 
dismissed the notion that the tribal Chiefs should be invited:   
 
                                                          
81 Smith to Crosland, 16 October 1976, TNA, FCO 73/226. 
82 Smith to Crosland, 18 October 1976, TNA, FCO 73/226. 
83 Ibid. 
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Since the Chiefs are appointed by your Government and are not elected representatives, 
I do not believe they merit a separate invitation. If we invited them, we would have to 
invite representatives of the European Community other than the Rhodesian Front.84 
 
Callaghan had already warned Crosland in Cabinet that Kissinger should not be impressed by 
Smith’s appointment of African Chiefs to ministerial office for they were ‘merely paid 
officials’.85  His only concession to Smith was to increase the number of seats at the conference 
by two and two more in the conference room, more than any of the African delegations.86 
 The Conference in Geneva opened on 28 October but was finally adjourned by Crosland 
on14 December having achieved nothing substantial. Crosland was criticised by the Guardian 
for offering little towards the settlement ‘beyond offering to chair the opening conference’ and 
for lacking a ‘coherent policy’ throughout.87 Crosland refused to accept the chair appointed for 
he felt that he would be a more valuable influence at a latter, decisive stage if he had not 
personally committed himself to an operation he thought would be a ‘fair shambles’.88 Instead, 
he appointed Ivor Richard Britain’s UN ambassador and former Labour minister. Richard faced 
great difficulties in conducting a successful dialogue between the various delegates. Smith’s 
party wanted to use the Kissinger plan as a basis for a settlement; the black nationalists wanted 
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to move to majority rule immediately and they utilised any tactic to obstruct discussions 
initiated by the Rhodesian Front.  
 Crosland’s attempt to find a successful resolution to this problem was also dependent 
on the potential involvement of the Prime Minister and former Foreign Secretary Jim 
Callaghan.   Callaghan continued to communicate with Kissinger during the year and seems to 
have overseen the direction of policy in August and September. Callaghan’s biographer 
Kenneth Morgan comments on the working relationship between Callaghan and Kissinger 
especially in regard to Rhodesia. Callaghan had his own background of expertise going back 
twenty years and his own personal perspectives and that the Kissinger phase of the manoeuvres 
in Rhodesia reflected the close personal ties of Callaghan and the American Secretary of 
State.89  
Two meetings were arranged with Kissinger while the American Secretary of State was 
in London. Callaghan laid down ‘operational requirements’ for Kissinger’s mission although 
he did insert a proviso ‘subject to Mr. Crosland’s views’ for the Foreign Secretary was on 
holiday.90 Callaghan continued to play a significant role in the weeks leading up and during the 
conference.  Julius Nyerere, President of Tanzania, commented: ‘How much I appreciate the 
speed which you and Mr Crosland have responded to my various messages on Rhodesia…glad 
it was possible for the Foreign Secretary to leave an opening for additional members 
[Sithole]’.91 Callaghan seems to have initiated this development for he sent a note to Nyerere 
                                                          
89 Morgan, Callaghan, 1997, p.595. 
90 Meeting between Callaghan and Kissinger, 4/5 August 1976, JCP, Box 148. 
91 Nyerere to Callaghan, 14 October 1976. JCP Box 197. Ndabaningi Sithole was the founder of the militant 
organisation the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZAPU) Robert Mugabe was his deputy. In 1964 Sithole was 
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saying ‘I have spoken to Tony Crosland to see what can be done [for Sithole] and he is 
considering the matter’.92 However, when Nyerere showed a preference for Crosland as 
Chairman in place of Richard, Callaghan replied that ‘we think his appearance would confirm 
the entirely unwarranted criticism of Mr. Richard’s appointment’.93 When Nyerere pressed for 
immediate majority rule citing Britain’s ‘colonial responsibility, it was Callaghan who stressed 
that he favoured ‘early’ majority rule as a vital part of his formula as laid before the 
Commons.94 
Crosland had achieved a solution to the Cod War although one that was not generally 
popular. He met with no such success in dealing with the intractable problem of Rhodesia. He 
was accused by the Guardian of lacking a ‘coherent’ policy and of ‘diffidence’ in application 
to the required diplomacy. He certainly allowed Kissinger to dictate the pace of negotiations 
with the instrument of a Foreign Office discussion paper as a basis for a settlement. Crosland 
seems to have deferred to Callaghan for policy details. There were major differences between 
British and American perspectives on Rhodesia – the British saw no role for Smith and wanted 
him out. Kissinger saw him as integral to the diplomatic dialogue and settlement and Crosland 
had accepted this position in the initial stages of his ‘shuttle’ diplomacy.  Both Kissinger and 
Callaghan, who had already formed a close association while Jim Callaghan was Foreign 
Secretary, figured prominently in the attempt to find a workable settlement.95 Crosland’s role 
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appeared to be largely supportive. His decision to appoint Ivor Richard to chair the Geneva 
Conference and not even attend the sessions may have resulted in a lost opportunity to control 
events. 
 Crosland as in so many departments demanded time to master the necessary 
background; unfortunately, this time was denied to him at the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office. He had built up rapport with some of the front-line Presidents for Nyerere did address 
his concerns to Crosland as well as Callaghan. The Geneva Conference has come to be 
compared unfavourably with that of Lancaster House in 1979; but the intransigence of both the 
Rhodesian Front delegates and those of the Patriotic Front severely impaired any progress in 
1976.96 Crosland was faced by a cabinet which was increasing unwilling to involve itself in the 
Rhodesian issue; but he did receive support from the Labour Party Conference at Blackpool in 
1976 when he announced that the Government were determined to ‘.play our part in bringing 
to Zimbabwe a peace which is firmly rooted at long last in black majority rule and so in justice 
and equality’.. 97 Palliser stressed that Crosland was given very limited time to solve the 
Rhodesia problem and, even though little headway was made, he had nevertheless devoted 
great effort and attention.98 Palliser was also convinced that Crosland would have welcomed 
the Lancaster House Agreement, which was certainly in tune with his own approach.99 
 Crosland’s comments to Jim Callaghan concerning the intractability of the Cod War 
and Rhodesia and their possible fatal impact on his health proved prophetic.100 He was working 
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on his Rhodesian papers minutes before a serious stroke that killed him. His wife stated that he 
was determined to achieve a solution ‘before I go to the Treasury’. and that a new initiative for 
Rhodesia was in preparation this time without the intervention of Kissinger or perhaps 
Callaghan.101 
 
Evaluation 
Sir Michael Butler, a senior Foreign Office official, commented that had Crosland lived ‘.he 
would have been one of Britain’s great foreign secretaries’..102 John Weston commented that 
initially Crosland considered that the intellectual ‘grist’ of the Foreign Office would be less 
demanding than that it had been at environment but that he began to see the complexities of 
the subjects. In fact, Weston considered Crosland a very good minister who red papers given 
to him and provided clear indications of the policy decisions which he required.103 However 
Sir Ewan Fergusson, who was Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary (1975-78), considered 
that he had limited objectives in term of Britain’s contribution to international relations. 
  
[Crosland was] a very good chairman but he was not at his most active and energetic 
and that his instinctive reaction was not to change things around, not to seek to change 
things too much and so his method as chairman was essentially to see how to get 
through the meeting effectively not to create a new world.104 
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To a certain extent Marcia Falkender recognised that Crosland was not comfortable in the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office and unable to ‘show his true worth’ for 
 
The Foreign Office is a considerable strain with its enormous workload, the wide 
spectrum of issues involved, the number of people to be seen, visits to be made, the 
continuous moving around and the cruel demands it makes on personal lives 105 
 
Falkender considered that Crosland was ‘emotionally and temperamentally’ more suited to the 
Treasury and that his failure to achieve promotion to this office hampered his potential 
candidature as a future leader of the Labour Party.106  
In terms of conducting a foreign policy on ethical grounds, there were elements in the 
two major issues Crosland managed. In his attempt to resolve the crisis over the Cod War, 
Crosland accepted the basis to the claim of the Icelandic government even though this would 
restrict the activities of British trawlers and drew criticism from the press. However, this policy 
was a pragmatic solution as well for Britain was no longer in a position both financially and 
militarily to enforce her traditional rights and interests. Crosland took the broader view that the 
security of the area was a factor which should take precedent and that the interests of the wider 
community were also at stake.  
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 Crosland’s approach to Rhodesia reflected more a concern that Britain should avoid 
expensive involvement than a passionate commitment to the achievement of ‘justice and 
equality’ for the black population. Callaghan had laid down the details of a settlement and 
Crosland’s policy was to ensure that any attempt by Kissinger to come to an agreement with 
Smith was still grounded on these. In this he had prevailed. The failure of the Geneva 
Conference was more a product of the intransigence of both sides rather than his management. 
Crosland was to take responsibility for this although he was preparing to reopen the conference 
in 1977. Owen’s attempt met with success for he benefited from Smith’s deteriorating position. 
Just as Crosland’s revisionism reflected the changes in society and the necessary 
response by the Labour Party to these, so he seems to have accepted that Britain’s role in 
international relations could no longer be based on a unilateral approach to further her interests. 
He promoted a more collaborative approach to problems confronted by the international 
community and this may have become his signature policy if he had lived to continue his work 
at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
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Chapter Six – Conclusion 
 
At the 1997 Crosland memorial meeting in London several of his erstwhile colleagues gave an 
assessment of his record as a minister. It was the first significant appraisal of his performance 
in office. The discussion of his contribution to the evolution of socialist thought had become 
the main focus of studies on Crosland. This thesis has attempted to rebalance this consideration 
of his ministerial career in the light of substantial archival material and recent research. The 
criteria for assessment provided by Marsh, Richards and Smith offers an appropriate model for 
considering the ministerial record of Crosland.1  
As with most newly appointed ministers, much of on-going policy presented to a new 
minister by officials is accepted and sustained and momentum maintained. Crosland was no 
exception in this regard; but he did attempt policy initiation and when he became convinced of 
a change of direction for the department’s agenda following his own study of issues and his 
passionate commitment to an objective, he would not be open to persuasion and would confront 
perceived hostility from his civil servants. Very rarely could he be described as a ‘mandarin 
minister’- his premature announcement of a programme of polytechnics in April 1965 under 
pressure from his senior civil servant was an example of a minister led by departmental dictat; 
but he ensured that this would never happen again. When he was presented with the plan for 
the expansion of Stansted, he resolutely rejected this to the consternation of his civil servants. 
He provided executive leadership for the departments to which he was appointed but this 
leadership was less energetic and forceful towards the end of his career and his management 
of the Rhodesian crisis was less decisive than required. Failing health may have been a factor 
here.  
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In terms of policy setting and initiation, a distinction can be drawn between his first two 
appointments 1964-1967 and those which followed. Both at the DEA and the DES Crosland 
had both the technical expertise and moral and philosophical commitment and this was 
reflected in his record. His appointment to the departments that followed was accompanied by 
an initial lack enthusiasm and admission of a lack of confidence in his knowledge. Ministers 
rarely have the luxury of selecting the departments they relish and to which they feel 
committed. Crosland often expressed his unsuitability for appointments after 1967; but 
managed to impress especially at the Board of Trade and the Department of the Environment.   
At the DEA although he was not the Cabinet lead, his economic knowledge enabled 
him to suggest a variety of economic tools and instruments to improve productivity and 
enhance exports. However, he failed to convince his department on the issue of a ‘freeze’ on 
earnings and wages and the cabinet hierarchy consistently rejected his advocacy of 
‘devaluation’. This, for Crosland, was the solution to the poor performance of the national 
economy.  
In terms of policy setting at the Department of Education and Science, Crosland found 
that the agenda had been laid by the previous ministerial incumbent and his function was to 
maintain the impetus already established. The drive to the comprehensive model was a cause 
close to his heart. Crosland believed that selection in education whether in the state or private 
sectors was a major factor in the denial of equality of opportunity in society in general. 
Appointment to the department of education in 1965 gave him the power to advance the cause 
of equality a fundamental principle in his philosophy of socialism. The abolition of selection 
at eleven and the promotion of comprehensive education in place of grammar schools had 
begun under the previous minister Michael Stewart and a formula providing LEAs with 
instructions for reorganization.  Crosland accelerated this process and dealt vigorously with 
any authorities, Labour as well as Conservative that attempted to dilute the process with 
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reorganization plans that did not accord with the aims of the department’s objectives. Crosland 
had hoped to ‘destroy every fucking grammar school’ under the jurisdiction of the DES. This 
was not achieved during his tenure of office (and many authorities have continued to retain 
grammar schools) but he had provided the ‘impetus’ to reform that he considered a feasible 
target for any minister of state. Crosland had provided the essential leadership in this process. 
However, he was served by very experienced and committed departmental civil servants who 
ensured the successful progress of reorganization between 1965 and 1967.  
Crosland’s determination to confront elitism in the education system which he argued 
prevented the establishment of a society based on the principle of equality, led him to reform 
the delivery of higher education. He was not originally an advocate of a dual system of higher 
education and allowed senior civil servants to steer him in a direction for which he was not 
adequately prepared. This was a rare occasion when he had failed to undertake a thorough 
scrutiny of the factual background to such a reform. Crosland became convinced of the 
necessity of such institutions which provided a broader, innovative and vocational education 
and one which was removed from the essentially elitist academic world of the universities.  
Crosland was charged by contemporaries of inconsistency in the creation of segregation in the 
sector of higher education while destroying it in secondary education.  
This charge also extended to his failure to deal with the existence of private education. 
This would prove to be a more difficult area to reform. There was a reluctance in Cabinet to 
tackle this institution even though some in the Labour party saw this sector as representing the 
essence of privilege and elitism. Crosland was aware of the financial implications of thorough 
reform and his only action was to meet the basic obligation of the manifesto of 1964 and 
establish a commission to examine these schools and the various options for their reform. 
Crosland had in the opinion of some of the left of the party avoided tackling this issue for 
practical reasons  
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At the Board of Trade Crosland was able to have some impact on the economic 
development of key areas of the economy by policy selection - namely a restructured textile 
industry in the North West - and an innovative policy of establishing an aluminium industry in 
areas of industrial decline. The ethos was one of a business-driven agenda. And this was 
recognised by the business community. He may have won over the industrialists but his 
relationship with his European counterparts was not harmonious. British interests appeared to 
be prioritised over those of Norway. A protectionist tone was identified in British policy. 
Crosland favoured free trade in international commerce but as President of the Board of Trade 
he resorted to a more pragmatic approach affording a measure of protection to the British textile 
industry even though this involved an increased tariff on goods from the Commonwealth 
countries. Again, he was determined to provide preferential financial treatment to the 
embryonic aluminum industry a project he had personally encouraged and thereby facing 
criticism from Norway an EFTA member and a major aluminum producer. At the DEA he had 
announced to the European Council of EFTA a surcharge on imported goods, a measure 
considered essential if Britain’s deficit was to be addressed but predictably unpopular with 
Britain’s trading partners. 
The Department of the Environment provided Crosland with opportunities for 
implementing policies based upon a socialist agenda. This department was an amalgam of two 
key areas - housing and transport political issues upon which Crosland had written 
passionately. Crosland displayed considerable leadership in his involvement in the committees 
that were concerned with the housing review. Socialist measures were at the heart of the 
programme of reforms which he favoured: bringing development land under council control; 
instituting a scheme of fair rents and preventing the destruction of traditional communities. 
These would ensure improved living standards for the working classes in particular. Attempts 
at the nationalization of development land have been revisited by several Labour governments; 
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but the obstacles have proved to be formidable and Crosland’s plans were as unrealistic as all 
previous schemes. 
A weakness of Crosland was his simplistic interpretation of issues such as transport and 
often his judgement was impaired by his insistence that socialist principles should dictate the 
basis of any findings. Crosland was determined to place the interests of working people as the 
foundation to the DOE’s Transport Review. He argued for subsidies to be directed towards 
public transport at the expense of the car owner and considered that motorway construction 
would benefit predominately car users and that such funding should be channelled to transport 
for the working-classes. He considered that rail usage enabled the affluent commuter to live 
outside metropolitan areas and therefore should be denied extra assistance in the form of a 
government subsidy. 
 
A criticism of Crosland was that he was unable to carry through decisions and failed to 
complete measures which he had initiated. Barbara Castle, not an admirer, was particular 
critical of his performance as a Minister and his inability to bring matters to a conclusion often 
citing his ‘procrastination’ in Cabinet. 2 Denis Healey, a friend since Oxford days, stated that 
Crosland had a habit of ‘evading responsibility’ when confronted in Cabinet.3 If some of his 
Cabinet colleagues considered that he displayed a failure to hold his position on issues under 
discussion, such fragility was not evident in departmental terms. Although he would only 
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commit to a decision after intense examination of the necessary background to an issue, his 
civil servants acknowledged and came to admire the intellectual depth which underpinned his 
chosen course of action. He could not be accused of manipulation by his departmental officials 
although his premature speech at Woolwich was an error which he rarely committed again. His 
decision to reopen the Stansted case illustrated his determination to act independently even 
when confronted with a united front from his civil servants in the Board of Trade.  
In terms of international polices he appears to have placed British interests subordinate 
to those of the cause of international peace when required. He brought the escalating dispute 
with Iceland over cod fishing to an equitable conclusion although this was not in the interests 
of the British fishing industry. He was unable to bring the same decisiveness to the more 
intractable matter of Rhodesia a successful solution to which had evaded most of those detailed 
to take responsibility since the 1960s. Crosland was restricted in his actions by the intervention 
of Callaghan and Kissinger although he did show a lack of firmness when confronting African 
political tactics in the discussions in Geneva.  
 Marsh, Richards and Smith have commented that since the 1960s ministers have 
acquired another role – overseeing the department’s relations with interests groups, the public 
and the media. This was not as significant during Crosland’s career as for subsequent  
governments; but it was an additional feature of a cabinet minister responsibilities. It has been 
noted that Crosland was not at his best when dealing with professional bodies. Although 
teachers unions were in favour of the abolition of selection at eleven years, he displayed an 
antagonism to those who supported the grammar schools. Educationalists considered that he 
should have been more proscriptive and uncompromising when issuing circular 10/65. He 
rarely came into contact with LEAs during the process of the submission of plans for 
comprehensive reorganization for this was left to his department officials; but he was willing 
to confront those who appeared recalcitrant to the departments aims. He was viewed by 
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committed environmentalists as unsympathetic to their cause. Crosland was not a high profile 
politician in the public’s mind as were some of his colleagues and he was often portrayed in 
graphic representation in the press as a marginal figure alongside other cabinet ministers. Tony 
Benn was far more adapt at capturing the support of the public – Crosland was a more abrasive 
character in public and this did not endear him to various interest groups. However, he was 
prepared to provide lengthy interviews with the press and both broadsheet and tabloid 
recognized the intellectual strengthen of his arguments and the underling rationality behind his 
decisions. 
In terms of his ministerial legacy, above all, he is still perceived amongst the popular 
press as the destroyer of the grammar school and educational selection although, as discussed 
earlier, the advocates of comprehensives both in the 1970s and more recently, regard his 
contribution as of less significance than ministers and educationalists before him. His dual 
system of higher education was overturned in the 1990s with the expansion of universities; but 
his espousal of broader based and vocational courses has become integral to education in all 
higher institutions. Crosland considered the issue of the status of the independent sector in 
education as ‘insoluble’ and attempts at major reform have never progressed beyond the report 
of his royal commission established in 1966. His attempt to penalise car owners and support 
public transport has gained some traction in London. Stansted remains in a supporting role to 
Heathrow and Gatwick as Crosland envisaged. The textile industry did not recover in 
Lancashire to the extent that it had existed before the war in spite of his measures; but Britain 
did acquire a growing aluminum industry much to his credit. Crosland was prescient in his 
opposition to the sale of council houses although he was not able to prevent the rapid erosion 
of the stock of public property but successive governments.  
Crosland had limited time to establish his own signature in the conduct of foreign policy 
and his reputation in attempting to resolve the crisis in Rhodesia has suffered compared to the 
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success enjoyed by those who followed him in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. To 
some extent the reverse was true in the rapid resolution of the dispute with Iceland although 
subsequent generations of fishermen would have a different view and the demise of this 
industry would be a factor in the vote in June 2016 supporting Britain’s exit from the European 
Community. The desire to regain control over fishing grounds surrendered in 1976 by Crosland 
and the Labour government was undoubtedly a powerful motive for many in the Referendum. 
‘.All political lives, unless they are cut off in midstream at a happy juncture, end in 
failure because that is the nature of politics and human affairs’.. Enoch Powel’s summative 
statement on political careers offers a useful means of viewing the course and achievements of 
Crosland’s ministerial career. Crosland committed himself to the efficient discharge of all of 
the roles assigned to him and his contribution to departmental work often went beyond 
providing ‘impetus’ to the reforms or departmental business he inherited. There seems to be 
general agreement amongst his civil servants that he ‘added value’ to the business of the 
departments to which he was appointed. Crosland considered that his time at the DOE did not 
allow him the opportunity of fulfilling the tasks which this expanded department required. 
In terms of his ambition for cabinet advancement he had hoped to become chancellor – 
but this role was denied him on several occasions and was a constant disappointment especially 
as his colleagues and contemporaries - Callaghan, Jenkins and Healey - were promoted above 
him. Crosland was the foremost economist of his generation as recognized by his 
contemporaries and yet he was unable to steer the nation’s economy on the lines which he 
considered necessary. His potential for even greater advancement to the leadership of the party 
was limited by a failure to engage and lobby supporters and an inability to transmit his desire 
for this goal. He may have been another ‘lost leader’ of the Labour movement as seen by some; 
but that opportunity, if it existed at all, had probably passed by the time he became Foreign 
Secretary. Jim Callaghan considered it a possibility even in 1976 for strong leadership of the 
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centre right of the party was needed. Crosland’s sudden death has led to speculation of future 
achievements; but, at the age of fifty-eight, this could not be regarded as ‘midstream’. He had 
begun to enjoy the new challenges he faced at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office although 
Crosland himself admitted that he was weary of office. Crosland had contemplated a career 
outside politics and was uniquely equipped to continue a writer or university academic. His 
contribution to the debate on the direction of the Labour party was relevant and his ideas have 
influenced much of the thinking behind New Labour and the development of the party today. 
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